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Abstract
Many individuals of African descent who migrated to Nova Scotia during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries never received fee simple interest to their allotted
lands. For over 200 years since, their descendants, African Nova Scotians, have been fighting to
clarify and confirm legal title to the land on which their ancestors were settled. Most recently, a
government program called the Land Titles Initiative was developed to help residents acquire
perfected title to their land through the Land Titles Clarification Act (“LTCA”). The LTCA is
remedial legislation that was adopted in 1964 to create a simplified procedure for ascertaining
legal title to land in designated communities within Nova Scotia, predominately African Nova
Scotian communities. Despite the adoption of the LTCA, the land titles issue persists in African
Nova Scotian communities.
Over the last 10 years there has been heightened awareness about real property issues
in African Nova Scotian communities, with particular emphasis on the land titles issue. In 2020,
the Nova Scotia Supreme Court remarked “the lack of clear title and the segregated nature of
their land triggered a cycle of poverty for black families that persisted for generations.”1 Shortly
after, the same court commented, “African Nova Scotians have been subjected to racism for
hundreds of years in this province. It is embedded within the systems that govern how our society
operates.”2
Nova Scotia, particularly rural Nova Scotia, has a long history of obscure land titles and
boundary disputes, and a general reluctance (or inability) by the government to effectively
resolve the problem. However, the ensuing cycle of poverty appears to have disproportionately
impacted African Nova Scotians more so than White Nova Scotians. This thesis aims to reframe
the African Nova Scotian land titles discourse into a broader understanding about the existence
of systemic anti-Black racism and White supremacist ideology embedded within the origins of
property law in this province, revealing the land titles issue as merely the tip of the iceberg.
Through a critical race theoretical analysis of the early nineteenth century colonial land
administration laws, this work reveals the ways in which property laws in this province supported
and promoted anti-Black racist and White supremacist ideology, which created and exacerbated
racial disparities in land-based wealth in this province. In doing so, the intent is to lay a foundation
on which further work can be developed, and meaningful action can be taken, including
reparations to African Nova Scotians as a first step towards redressing the consequences of
systemic anti-Black racism in the law.

1
2

Beals v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2020 NSSC 60, 2020 CarswellNS 120 at paragraph 22.
Downey v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 2020 NSSC 201, 2020 CarswellNS 488 at paragraph 4.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1

Overview
A legal historian once wrote “the past is not past … contemporary concerns affect

the legal history we produce.”3 In this instance, racial disparities in wealth and poverty in
Nova Scotia are the leading contemporary concerns underlying this legal research.
Canada’s 2016 Census Data shows that African Nova Scotians4 experience poverty at
twice the rate of White5 Nova Scotians, being 32.1% and 17.2% respectively. African Nova
Scotians also experience a higher rate of poverty than other Black people throughout
Canada, which is averaged at 23.9%. When broken down into the 18 to 24 age group,
African Nova Scotian youth experience a poverty rate of 50.2%, while 39.6% of African
Nova Scotian children under the age of 17 are living in poverty.6 Multiple reasons may
account for Nova Scotia’s racial disparities in wealth and poverty, but this research aims
to explore the role of the law as a contributing factor, specifically real property law.
Over the last two decades there has been heightened awareness about property
law issues in African Nova Scotian communities, particularly in relation to land titles.
Many African Nova Scotians hold insecure title to their ancestral lands.7 While African
Nova Scotians have been fighting to perfect their land titles for over 200 years, in 1964 a

3

Sarah E. Hamill, “Review of Legal History” (2019) 28:4 Social & Legal Studies 538 at 541 [“Hamill, Legal
History”].
4
The term “African Nova Scotian” will be used herein to refer to those individuals who are descendants of
free and enslaved people of African descent, including the Black Planters (African descended people who
were enslaved by the British settlers who came from New England to Nova Scotia in the 1760s), the Black
Loyalists (African descended people who escaped enslavement in the United States and sided with the
British in the American Revolutionary War), the Jamaican Maroons (African descended people who escaped
enslavement in Jamaica and deported to Nova Scotia in 1796), the Black Refugees (African descended
people who escaped enslavement in the United States and sided with the British in the War of 1812), and
the Caribbean Migrants (African descended people who migrated from the Caribbean, especially Barbados,
to Cape Breton in the 1920s to work in the steel and coal industries), all of who were settled into roughly
52 land-based African Nova Scotian communities across Nova Scotia.
5
The terms “Black” and “White” are capitalized in this thesis when referring to race, except in direct quotes
of another source using lower case.
6
Statistics Canada 2016 Census Data, 17-06-2019, online <www.statcan.gc.ca/eng/start> [data table 98400-X2016211]
7
The Nova Scotian Supreme Court took judicial notice of this fact in Beals v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General),
2020 NSSC 60, 2020 CarswellNS 120 [“Beals”].
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legislative regime was established through the adoption of Land Titles Clarification Act8
to clarify land titles in designated areas within the province, particularly in African Nova
Scotian communities. The emphasis of this legislation was on simplicity in procedure and
reduction in costs, because the affected residents are in “necessitous circumstances as a
result of lack of property development in the area.”9
The discourse pertaining to African Nova Scotian land title obscurity often
attributes blame to the British colonialists who granted inferior land tenure to African
Nova Scotians in the form of tickets of location or licences of occupation.10 What is often
missing from this discussion is the colonial context and legal framework in which those
decisions were made. The land administration legal system in colonial Nova Scotia was
more complex than the individual decisions made by its institutional actors, and the
consequences afflicted many Nova Scotians, not only African Nova Scotians.11 However,
in the pursuit of clarifying titles as a problem specific to African Nova Scotian
communities, another issue has been subdued.
The subdued issue in the land titles discourse is the role of the law in creating and
reinscribing racial disparities in land-based wealth. In Downey v Nova Scotia12, the
Supreme Court of Nova Scotia held that anti-Black racism is embedded within the law in
this province. Justice Campbell writes:
[4] African Nova Scotians have been subjected to racism for
hundreds of years in this province. It is embedded within the
systems that govern how our society operates. That is a
fundamental historical fact and an observation of present reality.
This thesis explores the anti-Black racism and White supremacist ideology that is
embedded within the origins of property law in this province which resulted in, among

8

Land Titles Clarification Act, RNS 1989 c 250, as amended [“LTCA”].
Ibid Section 3(1).
10
Land tenure is the legal right that a person holds to with respect to land under English common law.
11
For example, Nova Scotia, particularly rural Nova Scotia has a long history of obscure land titles and
boundary disputes (see discussion in Part 4.2.1), but the ensuing cycle of poverty disproportionately
impacts African Nova Scotians.
12
Downey v. Nova Scotia (Attorney General) 2020 NSSC 201, 2020 CarswellNS 488 [“Downey”].
9
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other things, the inferior quantity of land that was allocated to the descendants of African
Nova Scotians, specifically the Black Refugees,13 as compared to White settlers. Land can
be a material capital asset that serves as a springboard toward inter-generational
economic wealth.14 However, while the law created opportunities for land-based wealth
accumulation by White settlers, even poor White settlers, the law excluded Black people
from those same opportunities.
The existence of anti-Black racism and White supremacist ideology in colonial
Nova Scotia is not surprising, and thus it may not be astonishing to find its presence in the
origins of law. The world was immersed in slavery at the time of this province’s colonial
formation and the prevailing attitudes held by colonialists towards Africans and people of
African descent were rooted in assumptions of racial inferiority.15 However, while antiBlack racism may have been common, it was not normal. It did not naturally occur, but
rather was socially constructed and legally reinforced. These anti-Black racist and White
supremacist beliefs influenced the colonialists’ behaviours toward the Black Refugees, as
demonstrated, for example, in their flagrant disregard for compliance with the promises
that were made to the Black Refugees during the War of 1812.16 The anti-Black racist and
White supremacist attitudes then infiltrated the colonialists’ application of ostensibly
race-neutral colonial land administration laws,17 which resulted in, among other things,

13

See Part 2.2 below for discussion about the Black Refugees.
For the purposes of this thesis, the correlation between land and wealth is assumed. The intent is not to
prove whether more land creates more wealth (or to condone the exploitation of land for capitalism or
wealth accumulation), but rather to illuminate the racial disparities in opportunities to create more wealth
from more land. Critical race approaches to scholarship often entail a range of disciplines, and while the
focus in this thesis is on historical-legal analysis of property law through a critical race lens, the work
expands into other fields such as economics, land surveying, and genealogy. It is hoped that scholars in
those fields will contribute to the scholarly discourse from the perspective of their own learned and lived
experiences.
15
See, for example, below in Part 2.2.5 regarding anti-Black racist sentiments expressed by the Nova Scotia
House of Assembly in April 1815 regarding the presence of Black people in the province.
16
See discussion in Part 2.2.3 below regarding the Cochrane Proclamation which promised freedom and
land to the Black Refugees in exchange for siding with Britain against the United States during the War of
1812.
17
See Part 4.2, which discusses how the Surveyor-General of Nova Scotia, the Lieutenant Governor of Nova
Scotia, and the Colonial Office in Britain, decided to grant 10-acre lots to the Black Refugees when the
applicable law allowed (and encouraged) the Lieutenant Governor to grant up to 500 acres of land to each
settler and customary practice was to grant at least 100 to 200 acres of land to each settler.
14

3

inferior land allocations to the Black Refugees. If this behaviour occurred today, it would
have violated fundamental principles of equally, such as Section 15 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedoms.18 And, while it is tempting to counter this argument with assertions
that the Charter did not exist at the time, it is important to remember that society was
still guided by a moral compass rooted in principles of equality and freedom.
Unfortunately, the racially motivated disregard of contractual promises, and the
racially discriminatory application of ostensibly race-neutral laws which gave rise to the
inferior land allocations to the Black Refugees, was only the beginning. Shortly thereafter,
the racial gap in colonial land allocations was exacerbated when the colonialists adopted
colour-blind approaches to law reform which served the interests of newly arrived White
pauper immigrants.19 This law reform created better colonial land acquisition
opportunities for White settlers, but excluded Black people from eligibility because of
their previous racially discriminatory treatment under the law. Finally, after all of the
above, the law further exacerbated the racial disparities in land allocations through the
adoption of a unified system of land sales, which (a) required the Black Refugees to pay
monetary consideration to have their previously issued (smaller) lots confirmed as grants
when ought to have been issued larger lots as free grants, and (b) served to deny the Black
Refugees the opportunity to be relocated to better and larger lots when they sought to
have these racial injustices redressed.20 In all of these ways, the law supported anti-Black
racism by promoting and protecting the interests of a White supremacist ideology, and in
doing so, created and reinscribed the racial disparities in wealth and poverty that exists
in this province.
The role of the law in supporting and promoting anti-Black racism and White
supremacist ideology through the colonial land administration laws in this province was
not the result of overtly racists laws, but rather, the law covertly supported anti-Black

18

The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to
the Canada Act 1982 (UK), c 11.
19
See Part 3.5 and Part 4.2.1 for further discussion.
20
See Part 3.3.6 and Part 4.3.1 for further discussion.
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racism and White supremacy through the acceptance of conditions that allowed these
attitudes to thrive.21 The passive ways in which the law supports and promotes anti-Black
racism and White supremacy are the more insidious types of racism in law, often referred
to as systemic racism. Even when laws are ostensibly race-neutral or “objective”, they
often result in racially disparate effects that advantage White people and disadvantage
Black people, and those effects illuminate the ways in which the law and the structures
that support it promote an anti-Black racist and White supremacist ideology. In the
context of property law, the anti-Black and White supremacist ideology embedded within
the law finds it origins in colonialism, including the colonial land administration laws,
which resulted in Black people not only being denied confirmed title to their allotted land,
but also, and perhaps more importantly, receiving significantly smaller land allocations
than White settlers. This racially disparate effect caused and exacerbated by the law
impacted inter-generational wealth opportunities which contributed to present day racial
disparities in wealth and poverty among White Nova Scotians and African Nova Scotians.
Now over 200 years later, the required action is more than simply attaining
perfected title to land. The economic consequences attributed to the racial disparities in
colonial land allocations, including land quantity, must also be redressed. To be clear, it is
not the intention here to condone colonialism. The unlawful wide-scale colonial land
settlement practices in this province violated the terms of the treaties with the Mi’kmaq
and must be rectified. However, the colonial land settlement activities also oppressed a
significant group of African Nova Scotian ancestors, being the Black Refugees, and
contributed to longstanding and inter-generational racial disparities in wealth and
poverty that must also be redressed. The obscurity in land titles is merely the tip of the
iceberg. A more comprehensive objective is needed, one that is aimed at dismantling the
systemic anti-Black racism in the law and redressing the harmful imbalance that the law
has caused thus far.

21

Barrington Walker, “Introduction: From a Property Right to Citizenship Rights – The African Canadian
Legal Odyssey,” in Barrington Walker, ed, The African Canadian Legal Odyssey: Historical Essays (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2012) at 3 [“Walker, Legal Odyssey”].
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Through an exploration of the role of the law in creating and reinscribing racial
disparities in land-based wealth in Nova Scotia, this thesis aims to reframe the land titles
discourse into a broader understanding of systemic anti-Black racism and White
supremacist ideology embedded within the origins of property law in this province.
Reframing the discourse in this way will provide a foundation on which further work can
be developed, and meaningful action can be taken, including reparations to African Nova
Scotians as a first step towards redressing the consequences of systemic anti-Black racism
in the law.
Chapter 1 of this thesis outlines the methodological approaches used in
conducting this research, being doctrinal, legal history, and critical race theory (including
critical white studies). Chapter 2 sets the stage of analysis by acknowledging the
geography of the subject matter, being the ancestral and unceded territory of the
Mi’kmaq, followed by an explanation of who the Black Refugees are and the
circumstances that gave rise to their settlement in colonial Nova Scotia. The last two parts
in Chapter 2 provide an overview of the recent land titles discourse pertaining to African
Nova Scotian communities, along with a review of existing literature on Black Refugee
land issues as a foundation from which a broader dialogue can ensue.
Chapter 3 aims to identify the applicable land administration laws and situate
those laws within the broader context of colonialism and the origins of Britain’s property
law system in Nova Scotia, being the area of law that regulates how people within the
English common law legal system interact with land. After exploring the imperial
framework underpinning the applicable land administration laws, Chapter 4 seeks to
explore those laws in more detail through a race-conscious theoretical approach, to
highlight the racially discriminatory impact of those laws on the settlement of the Black
Refugees that were settled in Upper Hammonds Plains, being one of over 52 historic
African Nova Scotian communities in the Province of Nova Scotia.22 Lastly, Chapter 5

22

The Black Refugee settlement in Hammonds Plains became known as “Upper” Hammonds Plains to
distinguish it from the White community of Hammonds Plains. In 1946 the area was officially named Upper
Hammonds Plains. Where practical the term “Upper Hammonds Plains” is used in this thesis to when

6

proposes a path forward through reparations as a first step towards redressing the
systemic anti-Black racism in property law.
1.2

Methodology
Theoretically informed approaches to legal scholarship underpin the kind of

research questions one chooses to pursue and informs the method for carrying out the
task.23 Theoretical approaches make the rules of law more coherent and understandable,
which then allows legal scholars to evaluate the application of these rules for different
cases. The legal research methodologies employed in this thesis are doctrinal, legalhistory, and critical race theory (including critical white studies).
1.2.1 Doctrinal
The doctrinal approach to legal research involves the identification and analysis of
primary sources of law such as statutes, regulations, and caselaw, as well as the legal
actors and legal institutions which support it. This approach to legal research is based on
legal positivism and will serve as an important prequel to the critical race analysis of the
law. In simple terms, one must first identify the law before critiquing it.24 The doctrinal
aspects of this research are mostly contained in Chapter 3, which describes the applicable
land administration laws during the timeframe in which the Black Refugees were settled
in Nova Scotia. From this doctrinal launching point, those laws will be critically assessed
through a race-conscious frame of analysis, being critical race theory and critical white
studies.
1.2.2 Legal History
A doctrinal analysis of nineteenth century land administration laws necessitates a
historical-legal methodological approach. Combining the insights and methods of
historical research along side legal analysis will enable a better examination of the role of
the law in creating and reinscribing racial disparities over a prolonged period. By situating
referring to the African Nova Scotian community, except, for example, in direct quotes or reference to
another source using the term Hammonds Plains.
23
Robert Cryer et al, Research Methodologies in EU and International Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011)
at 2 [“Cryer, Research Methodologies”].
24
Ibid at 38.
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the law within its historical context one can better understand the “the very idea of law
itself.”25 Law is more than the positivistic view as a “collection of rules or principles of
conduct established either by legislative authority, court decisions or established
custom.”26 The law articulates values and promotes ideology.27 It “sets a standard of
conduct and morality for the guidance of citizens in a society.”28 Therefore, by unearthing
the role of the law through examination of historical legal records, the values that are
articulated by the law can be revealed, and consequently, the law itself can be implicated
as creating and reinscribing racist values and beliefs alongside the administrative
institutions and actors that implement and enforce them.
The colonial land administration laws served a purpose rooted in White
supremacist ideology which oppressed some people and propelled others into economic
prosperity based on race. That discriminatory treatment is not only now embedded within
the legal system, but also has had racially disparate financial impacts (a benefit and a
burden) that have been handed down from generation to generation. Historical
approaches to law can take us back to the beginning of the law’s original objectives to
expose the root causes of the racial injustices being experienced today. This knowledge
informs our present-day decisions and unearths the systemic anti-Black racism that exists
within the law. The legal system cannot be fully reformed, or its structures dismantled, if
the root causes of the problems are not first identified and understood within the context
in which they arose.
1.2.3 Critical Race Theory
The theoretical approach that is used to critique the historical doctrinal research
in this thesis is as important as the doctrinal research itself. To that end, the applicable
nineteenth century land administration laws that impacted the Black Refugees will be
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assessed through a race-conscious theoretical lens which will illuminate the role of the
law in creating and reinscribing racial disparities in land-based wealth.
Critical race theory is a theoretical approach that was founded by racialized
scholars to better reflect the realities of race and racism.29 Through what is often
“complex and multifaceted”30 work, critical race theorists challenge racial oppression
caused by positive law, as well as the tacit ways in which the law creates and reinscribes
racial inequalities.31 Critical race theory situates race at the centre of legal analysis and
presumes the pervasiveness of racism within our legal system. It critiques the
foundational underpinning of the liberal order,32 including equality theory, colour
blindness, meritocracy, and neutrality, and promotes a more transformative approach to
dismantling racially oppressive systems of law. Critical race theory insists on a contextual
and historical analysis of the law and highlights the linkages between past and present
inequalities.
A guiding approach stemming from critical race theory is to look beyond the law’s
active role in creating racial inequalities (positive law) and examine the passive ways the
law supports racial inequalities through the recognition of seemingly harmless legal
doctrines and social customs.33 Through a race-conscious examination of the law, one can
uncover, for example, the ways in which colonial land administration laws passively
enabled inferior land allocations to the Black Refugees by, among other things, allowing
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ostensibly race-neutral laws to be corrupted by the unfettered application of social
customs which categorized people of African descent into a subordinated racial group.
This legally sanctioned exercise of racial discrimination in the application of a seemingly
race-neutral law disadvantaged the Black Refugees (and, consequently, African Nova
Scotians), but also advantaged the White colonists (and, consequently, White Nova
Scotians), being an outcome known as white privilege.
White privilege “refers to the myriad of social advantages, benefits, and courtesies
that come with being a member of the dominant race.”34 It is an area of scholarship under
critical white studies, which is an offshoot of critical race theory. Critical white studies,
like critical race theory, adopts a race-conscious analytical lens but shifts the focus of
investigation from racial oppression to racial advantage. In this way, critical white studies
examines the privilege that race as a social construct confers on the White race as
opposed to the oppression that race as a social construct confers on non-White races.35
Critical white studies strives to “interrogate whiteness”36 and illuminate the ways in which
a White supremacist ideology serves to justify discrimination against non-Whites for a
variety of White-serving interests, for example, to “facilitate the exploitation of black
labour.”37 White supremacy in this sense is not about white supremacist hate groups, but
rather:
a political, economic, and cultural system in which whites
overwhelmingly control power and material resources, conscious
and unconscious ideas of white superiority and entitlement are
34
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widespread, and relations of white dominance and non-white
subordination are daily re-enacted across a broad array of
institutions and social settings.38
A critical race theoretical lens of the law, coupled with critical white studies,
exposes systemic anti-Black racism in the legal system and unmasks the White supremacy
embedded within the legal system as a structure that produces White privilege.
Understanding both the benefits and the burdens is key to dismantling the anti-Black
racism as well as the White supremacy. As one scholar explains:
[…] our system of race is like a two-headed hydra. One head
consists of outright racism – the oppression of some people on
grounds of who they are. The other consists of white privilege – a
system by which whites help and buoy each other up. If one lops
off a single head, say, outright racism, but leaves the other intact,
our system of white over black/brown will remain virtually
unchanged.39
Exposing and dismantling overt and covert forms of anti-Black racism in the law is
only one part of the equation. Equally important is unmasking and deconstructing the
overt and covert forms of White supremacy in the law. To be clear, “[t]o eradicate
whiteness is not to eradicate those who claim identities as whites but rather their position
of dominance in the world and the prescription of their ways of being and knowing as
normal, civilized, moral – in short, human”.40 Thus the scope of inquiry is not whether an
individual White person holds specific privilege relative to an individual Black person, but
rather, whether one racial group benefits by virtue of belonging to the dominant race
whereas another racial group is burdened by the structures created to serve the interests
of the dominant race. With this critical perspective in mind, “[t]he question that confronts
us in Canada is whether, as proponents of critical race theory argue, the very foundation
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of law itself is inherently designed to maintain white supremacy in its myriad material and
ideological manifestations.”41

41
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Chapter 2: Setting the Stage
2.1

Mi’kma’ki
The events discussed in this thesis transpire in the ancestral and unceded territory

of the Mi’kmaq people, known as Mi’kma’ki. The geographic area of Mi’kma’ki includes
what is now known as the Province of Nova Scotia, which has been inhabited by the
Mi’kmaq people for thousands of years.
In the early days of European arrival to the area, the Mi’kmaq people had limited
contact with the newcomers. In the late 1500s throughout the 1600s, the presence of
English fisherman became more prevalent during fishing season, and eventually led to
increased trade among the groups. However, by the 1700s, Britain developed an interest
in a formal alliance with the Mi’kmaq (as well as the Maliseet and the Passamaquoddy),
primarily in attempts to lure the Indigenous communities away from their growing
relationships with the French. This led to a series of treaties signed in the 1700s between
the British and the three Indigenous communities. The first of the treaties was signed in
1726.42
The purported intention of the treaties was to establish basic laws governing the
relationship between the English and the Indigenous nations, particularly with respect of
land. As one historian explains:
The most important of the treaty's provisions dealt with land. On
the one hand, the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet agreed not to molest His
Majesty's subject in their settlements 'already made or lawfully to
be made.' By this clause, both communities formally accepted the
legality of existing settlements. They also agreed that the British
might establish future settlements, though such settlements could
only be made 'lawfully.' The treaty, however, did not define
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'lawfully.' This issue might have been addressed in the treaty
negotiations but the minutes of these discussions are not extant.
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that the two sides to the
agreement agreed that future settlement would be a subject of
future negotiations.
At the time of signing the 1726 treaty, Britain did not have a strong presence in
Nova Scotia. It was mainly inhabited by the Mi’kmaq and Acadians, hence the enduring
alliance between the Mi’kmaq and France during British-French wars throughout the first
half of the eighteenth century. However, by 1749, much had changed. In June of 1749,
England fortified its presence in Nova Scotia by forceable expansion into the Halifax
region with settlement growth under the helm of Governor Edward Cornwallis, the
British-appointed Governor in Chief over the Province of Nova Scotia.43 This led to
increased conflict between England and many of the Mi’kmaq communities, resulting in
their refusal to sign the 1749 treaty that England signed with the Maliseet and only one
Mi’kmaq community. The 1749 conflict led to the 1752 treaty, which “reaffirmed the 1726
treaty but also modified it by formalizing a commercial relationship between the British
and Mi’kmaq.”44 Then, after the Seven Years War which ended French colonial forces in
Nova Scotia, the British and Mi’kmaq communities signed further treaties in 1760/6145
and again in 1778/79, primarily to discourage attempts by the United States to recruit
Mi’kmaq support in the American Revolutionary War.
With the flood of English settlers into Mi’kma’ki after the American Revolutionary
War, Britain’s interest in a harmonious relationship with the Mi’kmaq began to fade, as
did their compliance with the terms of the treaties. Thus, by the time the Black Refugees
arrived in Nova Scotia, the British empire had already forcibly and systematically inched
their way through the province without any regard for the legal restrictions on settlement
that were outlined in the treaties. As early as 1749, when the British empire sought to
43
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fortify its ostensible control over Nova Scotia by occupying Halifax46, an early step in its
colonization process was the deployment of military engineers to prepare land surveys
and settlement plans. Through these surveys (which defined the boundaries) and plans
(which scattered the people), this strategic attack was vital to Britain’s “seizure, control,
and administration of land.”47 However, at the same time, the land settlement process
was perceived as an act of war against the Mi’kmaq in violation of the 1726 treaty.48
The British system of land surveying and sponsored settlements on Mi’kma’ki in
this manner was an act of White supremacy.49 British colonialists asserted governance
over the land and its resources without consent or inclusion of the Mi’kmaq inhabitants,
in violation of their legally defined relationship. As one scholar writes:
Planners drew up a settlement that was meant to fit beneath the
sovereignty of the colonial state, and that was meant to be
inhabited exclusively by colonial settlers. There was no place in this
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plan for the Mi’kmaw, even as the plan pertained to territory that
they had occupied and claimed for millennia.50
It is trite to say that colonialism has had long-lasting and devasting impacts on the
Mi’kmaq. One impact of particular significance to this thesis is what is referred to as “the
legal fiction” of the Crown’s original title of tenure in Mi’kma’ki.51 As this scholar explains:
In English law, the original title of the Crown is the fundamental
starting point for every subdivision of property rights. This maxim
asserts that every claimant to an interest in land in England and
Canada must show an estate derived from the Crown. All estates
must be evidenced by either a direct royal grant or indirectly
through the Crown grantee’s. These Crown derivative grants must
be registered, and are viewed as the fundamental evidence of
legitimate historical entitlement to land. While a grand and
fundamental maxim, the Crown’s original dominion is a fiction of
English law that has no foundation in realty or truth.52 [emphasis
added]
As concepts such as terra nullius and the doctrine of discovery are re-examined
through an Indigenous-centred analysis, many legal assumptions that have traditionally
supported and promoted the Crown’s ostensible right to distribute land in this province,
and the transactions that flowed from that, start to destabilize. To that end,
decolonization demands renewed analysis of property law principles that are embedded
with legal system.
It is important to remember, however, that while the Mi’kmaq did not cede their
land, by the time the Black Refugees arrived in Mi’kma’ki, the British had been asserting
governance over the land for more than sixty years.53 At this point, the colonial and local
governments were formed, the British-based legal system was established, and the
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Crown lands administration process was in full force. From the perspective of the Black
Refugees, the British officials overseeing their settlement were empowered to grant the
lands that were being allocated to them, and even if that authority was doubted at the
time, the Black Refugees had no power to influence or inform that colonial exercise of
power. While the impacts of colonial deception must now be reconciled as the Province
of Nova Scotia aims to honour its commitments to the Peace and Friendship Treaties
through truth and reconciliation, reconciliation must respect and preserve the rich
heritage and distinct African Nova Scotian culture which is tied to the geography of
African Nova Scotian communities.54 At the same time, those advocating for land-based
racial equity must be inclusive of Indigenous sovereignty, histories, spiritualities, politics,
communities, and relationships to the land.55
2.2

Black Refugees

2.2.1 Terminology
The Black Refugees were a group of African-descended individuals who fled
enslavement in the United States to side with Britain during the War of 1812, in exchange
for Britain’s promises to give them freedom and land in a British colony. By the end of the
War of 1812, at least 3,500 formerly enslaved African-descended individuals had escaped
captivity in the United States using this liberation strategy, and of that number, over 2,000
were settled in Nova Scotia by the end of 1818.56
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It is not without hesitation that the term “Black Refugees” is used in this thesis.
There have been many labels applied to this group, including ‘People of Colour’,
‘Inhabitants of Colour’, ‘Chesapeake Blacks’, ‘Refugee Negroes’, ‘Negro Refugees’, ‘Black
People’, ‘African Americans’57, and ‘African British North American’58 but “Black
Refugees” is the most common. When compared to the heroic term used to describe the
“Black Loyalists”, the term “refugee” is an unfair depiction of those individuals who
courageously decided to flee their captors, aid the British armed forces in a war (either
directly or through weakening the economy with their departure), and thereafter
contributed to the British capitalist economy through, among other things, low-wage
labour. Thousands of European immigrants migrated as settlers to this province in the
early nineteenth century, and while many were often described as “pauper immigrants”
they were not labeled as “refugees” notwithstanding the dire circumstances that caused
them to flee their homes, nor their need for (and receipt of) government assistance when
they arrived.59 However, despite these reservations about terminology, the term “Black
Refugees” has been embraced by the African Nova Scotian community and reclaimed
with pride to describe one of the significant waves of Black migration60 that form the
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distinct African Nova Scotian identity.61 The first wave of migration, commonly referred
to as the Black Loyalists,62 and the second wave, commonly referred to as the Jamaican
Maroons63 are beyond the scope of this research, except to note that their presence in
this province informed and affected the treatment of the Black Refugees.64 The third
wave, the Black Refugees, are the ancestors of most present-day African Nova Scotians.65
While generally considered to be one wave, the Black Refugees can be
conceptually divided into two subgroups: those who arrived during the war and are often
referred to as the “early arrivals” (approximately 1,200), and those who arrived shortly
after the war’s conclusion and are often referred to as the “late arrivals”66 (approximately
800).67 Another approach to grouping can be based on pre- and post- proclamation, using
the date of Sir Alexander Inglis Cochrane’s proclamation as the demarcation point.68 But
that is not the approach adopted in this thesis for two reasons. First, when the British
government, under the helm of Lieutenant Governor Dalhousie,69 decided in November
1816 that its support and assistance were only to be made available to those Black
to 1700; black people in Ile Royale, 1713-1758; blacks in pre-Loyalist Nova Scotia, 1749-1782; the Black
Loyalists’ and Slave Loyalists’ influx, 1783-1793; and the Jamaican Maroon episode.”
61
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Refugees who arrived in response to the Cochrane Proclamation and remained settled on
the land they were allotted, they effectively divided the group into pre-proclamation
Black Refugees and post-proclamation Black Refugees.70 However, a significant flaw in
this approach is that it ignores the possibility of a constructive contract that induced
formerly enslaved African Americans to join the British armed forces before the Cochrane
Proclamation was issued. Evidence suggests informal representations were made by the
British military to the formerly enslaved Black people in the United States, particularly
considering the precedent of similar proclamations that were made only thirty years prior
during the American Revolutionary War.71 The early arrivals who were brought to Nova
Scotia by the British military ships before the Cochrane Proclamation (April 2, 1814) may
have done so legitimately in reliance on implied or verbal representations made on behalf
of the British Crown, as opposed to the express representations that were made in the
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Cochrane Proclamation.72 A second reason for subdividing the group based on early
arrivals and late arrivals, rather than pre- and post- proclamation, is that it is relatively
easy to glean from the literature the approximate number of early arrivals (those who
arrived during the war) and late arrivals (those who arrived shortly after the war).
However, it is more challenging to determine how many of the early arrivals fled captivity
before or after the Cochrane Proclamation, but delayed in their departure from the
United States or their arrival to Nova Scotia.73
2.2.2 The War of 1812
The War of 1812 is a defining event for the Black Refugees. As is often the case
with post-war peace treaties, the strained relations between Britain and the United States
after the American Revolutionary War reached a peak on June 19, 1812, when the United
States formally declared war against Great Britain. By 1813, and through to 1814, the
Chesapeake Bay on the east coast of the United States became a main strong hold for the
British army under the direction of Admiral J. B. Warren.74 Admiral Warren was instructed
to not incite a slave rebellion but was authorized to receive aboard the British ships any
African American who asked to do so.75 He was also instructed to receive them “as free
men, not as slaves, and send them to any of several of His Majesty’s colonies.”76
Thousands of formerly enslaved African-descended Americans seized this opportunity to
flee the United States,77 but it was not until Vice-Admiral Cochrane relieved Admiral
Warren on April 1, 1814 that the British actively induced the African-Americans to act in
reliance on specific representations.

72

See Part 2.2.3 below for discussion on the Cochrane Proclamation as a contract.
Grant, Immigration and Settlement, supra note 59 at 46 provides some data on the early arrivals who
came after the Cochrane Proclamation, which appears to be a few hundred people.
74
Ibid at 38.
75
Whitfield, Blacks on the Border, supra note 54 at 32.
76
Grant, Immigration and Settlement, supra note 59 at 39.
77
Ibid at 40 cites Captain Robert Barrie to Vice-Admiral J. B. Warren, 14 November 1813, Adm. 1, 506, “The
slaves continue to come off by every opportunity and I have now upwards of 120 men, women and children
on board, I shall send about 50 of them to Bermuda in the Conflict . . . there is no doubt but the blacks of
Virginia and Maryland would cheerfully take up arms and join us against the Americans.”
73

21

2.2.3 The Cochrane Proclamation
While many African Americans were escaping enslavement long before the British
expressly asked them to do so,78 on April 2, 1814, Vice Admiral Cochrane issued the
monumental proclamation during the War of 1812 which formalized the arrangement.79
While the Cochrane Proclamation was not explicitly directed towards the enslaved African
Americans, it was clearly intended for them.80 It states:
By the Honorable Sir Alexander Cochrane, K. B. Vice Admiral
of the Red, and Commander in Chief of His Majesty’s ships
and vessels upon the North American station, etc., etc., etc.,
A Proclamation
Whereas it has been represented to me that many persons
now resident in the United States have expressed a desire
to withdraw therefrom with a view to entering into His
Majesty’s service, or of being received as free settlers into
some of His Majesty’s colonies. This is therefore to give
notice that all persons who may be disposed to migrate
from the United States, will with their families, be received
on board of His Majesty’s ships or vessels of War, or at the
military posts that may be established upon or near the
coast of the United States, when they will have their choice
of either entering into His Majesty’s sea or land forces, or
of being sent as free settlers to the British possessions in
North America or the West Indies where they will meet
with due encouragement. Given under my hand at
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Bermuda this second day of April, 1814, by command of
Vice Admiral.81 [emphasis added]
Thousands of enslaved African Americans escaped captivity in the United States
and fought their way to British vessels after the Cochrane Proclamation, including “those
who departed on their own initiative, those who were enticed by their fellows to escape,
(sent back for that purpose) and those who had freedom forced upon them as a result of
the continuous raids of the British marines.”82 It is important to note that joining the
British armed forces was not a pre-requisite to the promises made in the Cochrane
Proclamation. The Black Refugees had a choice between joining the military forces or
being sent as free settlers to a British colony where they will be met with due
encouragement.
There is much to consider from a contract law perspective whether the Cochrane
Proclamation created an enforceable contract in law. While more research is needed on
this issue,83 for the purposes of this thesis, the starting presumption is that the
proclamatory promises were contractually enforceable.84 When Vice Admiral Cochrane
issued his proclamation, it was done with the intent of inducing the African Americans to
flee enslavement. From an objective standard of analysis, a reasonable person would
interpret those statements to be enforceable, particularly given the severity of risk that
the Black Refugees incurred by accepting the offer. Fleeing enslavement, separating from
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family and friends, making the long journey through the battlefields to reach the
shoreline, are all extreme acts of performance and would not have been undertaken
without an expectation of enforceable promises. A reasonable person would expect that
once the Black Refugees arrived at the vessel, the British military had to accept them
onboard and not turn them away. If that aspect of the proclamation is enforceable, then
so too are the promises for encouragements.
The basic premise in contract formation under common law (which was in effect
at the time of the proclamation) is that a contract arises when there is a meeting of the
minds.85 A meeting of the minds, known as mutual assent, results when one party makes
an offer to the other, and the other accepts it. While there are nuances to the basic
premise, such as intention to make an offer, the applicable standard of review is an
objective one, not a subjective one. Thus, the guiding question is whether a reasonable
person would conclude that the parties intended the offer to be binding.
It is reasonable to conclude that the enslaved African Americans understood the
meaning of the statements that were made in the Cochrane Proclamation and intended
those statements to be honoured when accepted. They would not have risked their lives
otherwise. While some terminology, such as ‘encouragements’, may not have been
precisely understood by everyone, the concept of ‘land ownership’ would have been
known to most enslaved African Americans who, at this point, lived many years on land
owned by White settlers in the United States. Likewise, it is trite to say that they would
have also known the concept of ‘freedom’, since they actively fought for freedom
throughout their enslavement. There is little doubt that the enslaved African Americans
knew what was meant by the promises made in the proclamation, particularly since many
would have witnessed the earlier exodus of enslaved African Americans in response to
the American Revolutionary War Proclamations. As this scholar explains:
When the Refugees escaped from the United States, they believed
the British promise that they would enjoy meaningful liberty,
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reunify their families, receive land, and be accorded equal
treatment. Several observers commented that the Refugees’ main
objectives revolved around hopes for land and freedom.86
[emphasis added]
In terms of Britain’s intentions, there are two pieces of evidence that suggest
Britain also intended the proclamatory promises to be binding. First, When Vice Admiral
Cochrane wrote to Nova Scotia’s Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke87 in October 1814, he
reiterated the terms of his proclamation, stating:
I consider it my duty to acquaint Your Excellency that Lord Bathurst
informed me that orders would be sent here, also to Trinidad, to
furnish the Refugees from the United States with the [necessaries?]
they might require, until they could provide for themselves; which
I conclude comprised food, clothing and a place to shelter them
from the weather, also that they were to be admitted as settlers
in the Colonies; in consequence of this assurance I issued the
enclosed Proclamation which has induced them to come over. I
hope it will be in Your Excellency’s former to relieve their [present?]
[illegible], without which [illegible] must suffer from the
approaching season and the [illegible] of every necessary to carry
them through the Winter.88 [emphasis added]
It is clear from this correspondence that Cochrane intended the proclamatory
commitments to be binding and that he made the promises with the intention to induce
the Black Refugees to act. Some scholars have pointed out that Vice Admiral Cochrane
was not authorized by the Colonial Office89 to issue the proclamation. Nevertheless, from
an objective standard of legal analysis, Cochrane had apparent authority to do so.90 As
one of the highest ranking British military officers in the region during the war, Cochrane
was presumed to have decision-making authority over military tactics, including
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weakening the opponent by weakening its economy through a mass exodus of enslaved
African Americans.
A second evidentiary consideration regarding contractual intention, relates to
Britain’s use of the word ‘encouragement’ in the proclamation. An interpretation of this
word is found in a letter from Britain’s Secretary of State for War and Colonies, Henry
Bathurst91 to Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke, dated May 10, 1815, which instructed
Sherbrooke to provide the Black Refugees with the same “encouragements – free land,
implements, and (for a limited time) provisions – that had been given in the eighteenth
century to disbanded soldiers.”92 It is clear from this letter that Britain knew what was
meant by the word ‘encouragements’, and it is important to note that this interpretation
aligned with the Black Refugees’ understanding of land and freedom in exchange for
accepting Britain’s offer.
A third aspect of contract formation is consideration, being something of value in
exchange for the contractual promise. While the doctrine of consideration has more
historical significance than practical significance, suffice it to mention here that
consideration can take many forms, including a promise to do something or to refrain
from doing something.
A cursory legal analysis of the Cochrane Proclamation reveals that all three
elements of a contract were met: (1) offer (migrate from the United States in exchange
for being allowed to join the British armed forces or settle in a British colony with
encouragements); (2) acceptance (board the vessel), and (3) consideration (the risks of
migration, and the benefit attained by weakening the United States economy).93
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Ultimately, the law of contracts aims to protect the reasonable expectations of
the contracting parties.94 While there may be other legal issues to consider in the
contractual analysis, such as whether enslaved individuals at the time had legal capacity
to enter into contracts, it important to remember that equity principles in contract law
also existed at the time and served to protect vulnerable parties when the circumstances
warranted, for example, promissory estoppel.95 As mentioned, more research is needed
in this area. However, based on the foregoing analysis, it is objectively reasonable that
the parties expected the terms of the Cochrane Proclamation to be enforceable.
Lastly, before moving on from the legal implications of the Cochrane
Proclamation, it is important to note here that when Britain offered freedom and
encouragements to the enslaved African Americans in exchange for their allegiance to the
British Crown, it did not compensate them for the free labour and carnage that Britain
profited from for the centuries prior. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade was a key contributor
to the enrichment of Britain’s economy through the capitalist-driven exploitation of Black
people, which resulted in (among other horrors) the kidnapping, captivity, forced labour,
torture, and death of people of African descent in pursuit of a profit-driven slave-based
economy.96 Yet, despite the coerced Black labour at the expense of Black lives, from which
Britain derived monetary benefit for centuries, the British government did not
compensate or otherwise repair the damage that it caused through its participation in the
slave trade when it offered freedom and encouragements in exchange for siding with
Britain in the War of 1812. Britain did, however, compensate American slave owners to
the tune of $1,204,960, for aiding the Black Refugees in their flee from captivity during
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the War of 1812,97 and again, in 1833, Britain paid £20,000,000 to British slave owners in
connection with the emancipation of 800,000 enslaved Africans from which Britain
previously enabled, encouraged, and profited from their enslavement.98 This point is
particularly relevant to the discourse pertaining to reparations that are owed to African
Nova Scotians, which is discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
2.2.4 Early Arrivals
During the War of 1812, hundreds of Black Refugees from the Chesapeake Bay
landing were being directed to Nova Scotia aboard British vessels many months before
Alexander Cochrane arrived to issue his proclamation.99 Archival records indicate that
some Black Refugees arrived in September 1813, being fifteen months after the war’s
commencement, but five months before Cochrane’s proclamation.100 Since the first
arrivals in September 1813 and during the ensuing fifteen months before the war’s
conclusion, approximately 1,200 Black Refugees found their way to Nova Scotia. 101
With the booming war economy many of the early arrival Black Refugees were
sent to the interior parts of the province in search of employment,102 because Lieutenant
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Governor Sherbrooke had “no doubt that they will be able to maintain themselves
comfortably by their labours.”103 Many scholars have assumed that the early arrivals
found employment. Most of these assumptions rest on the understanding that Halifax
had a strong economy at the time. For example, historian J. S. Martell writes:
[c]oming near the end of the long conflict from military conflict
with Napoleon, when the town was already flush with profits from
military contracts and proceeds from French prizes, the War of
1812 was like an exciting dream.104 [emphasis added]
However, while employment opportunities may have existed at the time, the
corresponding cost of living was likely higher than usual as well:
Trade was active. Prices rose. The fleet increasing, provisions were
in great demand…rents of houses and buildings in the town were
doubled and trebled.105
Whether the early arrivals were able to sustain themselves sufficiently or not
through labour during the economic boom of the war years, and for how long, is not
known. The literature only shows that while the early arrivals who arrived between
September 1813 through to the Summer of 1814 were sent to the interior of the province
in search of employment, the early arrivals who came in the Fall 1814 were often
unemployed and in distress.106 Historian John Grant writes:
As no evidence exists to the contrary, it is assumed that the
refugees who arrived in Nova Scotia before the spring of 1814 were
able to obtain sufficient employment or private charity to render
government assistance unnecessary during the winter of 1813-
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1814. This was not the case the following year. By October 1814,
many of the black refugees were in distress.107
In October 1814, when Vice Admiral Cochrane learned that the Black Refugees he
sent were in the “greatest misery and destitute of clothing, food and shelter” 108, he wrote
to Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke in October 1814 expressing his concern for
Sherbrooke’s inaction, stating:
I consider it my duty to acquaint Your Excellency that Lord Bathurst
informed me that orders would be sent here, also to Trinidad, to
furnish the Refugees from the United States with the [necessaries?]
they might require, until they could provide for themselves; which
I conclude comprised food, clothing and a place to shelter them
from the weather, also that they were to be admitted as settlers
in the Colonies; in consequence of this assurance I issued the
enclosed Proclamation which has induced them to come over. I
hope it will be in Your Excellency’s former to relieve their [present?]
[illegible], without which [illegible] must suffer from the
approaching season and the [illegible] of every necessary to carry
them through the Winter.109 [emphasis added]
The following day, Vice Admiral Cochrane also wrote to Secretary Bathurst
informing him of the situation in Nova Scotia and asked him to direct Lieutenant Governor
Sherbrooke “to provide for these poor people until they are settled, when they will
become valuable subjects.”110 In attempts to defend his (in)actions, and seemingly torn
between assurances he made to Vice Admiral Cochrane regarding his proclamation and
assurances made to Secretary Bathurst to keep colonial expenses low, Sherbrooke wrote
to both Bathurst and Cochrane explaining that he directed to the Poor House of Halifax
those Black Refugees who were ill or otherwise in need of assistance and supplied them
with provisions on the same basis as those provided to the soldiers and their families.111
However, despite these claims, between October 1814 and February 1815 there was only
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a daily average of 55 Black Refugees accommodated at the Poor House with 20 on the
sick list.112 This represents only a small fraction of the approximately 1,200 Black Refugees
who arrived before the war’s end. Thus, it is probable that most of the early arrivals were
not given their ‘encouragements’ as represented in the Cochrane Proclamation, but
rather were sent to the interior of the province in search of work that likely profited White
settlers in the cultivation of the land that was allocated to them.113 As Lieutenant
Governor Sherbrooke explained to the House of Assembly on February 24, 1815, “[a]
great proportion of these people, active, healthy, and endured to labour, have gone to
the interior of the Province, affording, I trust, a large accession of useful labour to the
agriculture of the Country.”114
It may never be known whether the British government ever honoured its
contractual representations to the early arrival Black Refugees who “indulged the hope
that they will be admitted as free settlers” but were instead sent to the interior of the
province as active and healthy labourers.115 Some of them ended up in the Poor House
for a period, and some ended up at Melville Island with the special permission of the
Lieutenant Governor when “the Commissary of the Poor refused to consider them
transient paupers and receive them into the Poor House.”116 Thus, they may have been
regrouped with the late arrival Black Refugees and included in the community
settlements. However, those who were healthy and found employment may have never
received their government rations, nor their land allotments.117
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It is also important to note from the literature that while many of the 1,200 early
arrivals were sent to the interior part of the province in search for work, many of them
ended up at the Melville Island118 in the face of illness and distress after the war’s
conclusion. On April 6, 1816, Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke reported to Secretary
Bathurst that “upward of a thousand refugees who arrived previous to the establishment
of the Melville Island center, instances of sickness and distress among them had forced
some to seek and asylum at the depot.”119 Correspondence from Sherbrooke to Bathurst
in July 1815 also suggests there were at least intentions to regroup the early arrivals with
the late arrivals before being relocated to their settlements. When Sherbrooke cautioned
Bathurst that settlement plans may take a while because “the negro on the first arrival
seem to dread so arduous an undertaking as the tilling of ground of this description
appears to be,” 120 he stated:
[I am] hopeful, however, that many of the blacks, after being
employed in the country and seeing the potential of the soil,
might desire to cultivate it.121 [emphasis added]
Thus, it is possible that Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke meant to include the early
arrivals in his settlement plans, assuming (according to Sherbrooke) that the Black
Refugees could be convinced of the potential in doing so.
2.2.5 Colonial Marines (Black Soldiers)
A discussion about the War of 1812 is incomplete without the mention of the
Colonial Marines. In his seminal book, A Documentary Study of the Establishment of the
Negroes in Nova Scotia, historian Charles Bruce Fergusson122 references the Black soldiers
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who served Britain in the War of 1812. He explains that in response to the Cochrane
Proclamation, some of the formerly enslaved Black people in the United States were
transported to the Bahamas or other British colonies, “while many remained with His
Majesty’s Sea and Land forces at their stations and posts in the United States.”123
Historian John Grant in The Immigration and Settlement of the Black Refugees of
the War of 1812 in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick elaborates on the origins,
accomplishments, and eventual settlement of one significant group of these Black
soldiers, known as the Colonial Marines:
Cochrane was determined to remove the slaves [from the United
States], not only to reduce the American work force, but also to
employ blacks as active soldiers and marines. In late April or early
May 1814, he ordered his second-in-command, Admiral Sir George
Cockburn “to endeavor to raise a Corps of Colonial Marines, from
the People of Color who escaped to us from the Enemy’s shore in
this neighbourhood [Chesapeake Bay] and to cause such as . . . may
enlist for the purpose to be immediately formed, drilled and
brought forward for service…124
John Grant proceeds to explain that by May 9, 1814, a “considerable number” of
formerly enslaved Black people in the United States had enlisted with the British armed
forces, under the leadership of an officer of the Royal Marines, William Hammond.125 The
Colonial Marines “quickly proved a valuable addition to the British fighting force”126 and
“proved to be effective contributors to the triumphant war against the United States of
America.”127 However, as the end of war approached in December 1814, Vice Admiral
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Cochrane had to find a place to settle the disbanded Colonial Marines. As John Grant
explains:
When news of the signing of the Treaty of Ghent arrived, Cochrane
was faced with the problem of dismantling his war machine.
Regular troops could be returned to Europe where they were
needed to recapture Napoleon, recently escaped from Elba and
busily gathering another army. Colonial troops raised for duty only
in North America had to be disbanded and provided for. The usual
method was to provide incentives for their establishment as
settlers in some part of the British possessions, often where they
were raised. But in the case of the Colonial Marines, the latter was
not possible.128
Vice Admiral Cochrane first sent the Colonial Marines to Ireland Island, Bermuda,
being “the site of the British naval establishment where, as in the case of Halifax,
hundreds of the refugees who had not joined the forces had been sent.” 129 There the
Colonial Marines assumed the jobs that employed many of the Black Refugees, until their
numbers were ultimately reduced, and the Colonial Marines were ultimately settled in
Trinidad.130
Meanwhile, the arrival of the Colonial Marines at the naval site in Bermuda
displaced hundreds of Black Refugees who had already been working there as civilian
employees. This presented Vice Admiral Cochrane with a new challenge of what to do
with those civilian employees. Since Bermudian law prohibited the settlement of free
Black people, Cochrane was forced to find another British colony that could legally permit
the granting of land to the Black Refugees.131 Thus on March 25, 1815, Vice Admiral
Cochrane sent correspondence to Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke informing him of his
intention to send between 1,500 to 2,000 Black Refugees from Bermuda to Halifax.132
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2.2.6 Late Arrivals
On April 1, 1815, after Vice Admiral Cochrane wrote to Lieutenant Governor
Sherbrooke, but before Sherbrooke received his letter, the Nova Scotia House of
Assembly had expressed to Sherbrooke their sentiments regarding the presence of Black
people in the province, stating:
the proportion of Africans already in this country is productive of
many inconveniences; and that the introduction of more must tend
to the discouragement of white labourers and servants, as well as
to the establishment of a separate and marked class of people,
unfitted by nature to this climate, or to an association with the rest
of His Majesty’s Colonists.133 [emphasis added]
Thus, the Nova Scotia House of Assembly asked that no more Black people be sent to the
colony.134 However, as Martell explains,
A day or so later, Sherbrooke received word from Cochrane that,
“agreeably to the Instructions” of the Imperial government, fifteen
hundred to two thousand of the American Negroes were being sent
from Bermuda to Nova Scotia. Realizing that nothing could now be
done except to make the best of a bad situation, Sherbrooke
hurriedly arranged to send 500 of the new lot of Negroes to New
Brunswick and to place the others temporarily under the care of
the Collector of Customs at Halifax who, as an Imperial official, was
to draw on the Treasury in London for his expense.135
The economic situation in Nova Scotia at the time of the late arrivals was much
worse than it was during the war when the early arrivals were sent to the interior parts
of the colony:
The earlier arrivals, who generally came in smaller numbers and at
scattered intervals, apparently had no trouble in obtaining
employment in the booming war economy of Nova Scotia. Those,
however, who landed in the year that followed April 1815, were
not so fortunate, as peace brought a general decline in business
and prosperity. These refugees were housed at the former
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military prison on Melville Island until positions could be found
for them.136 [emphasis added]
There was disagreement between the imperial government in Britain and colonial
government in Nova Scotia as to which level of government should satisfy the
representations made in the Cochrane Proclamation.137 Ultimately, they were placed
under the care of the imperial government under the charge of Britain’s Collector of the
Customs to be maintained and provided for in accordance with British regulations which
treated Africans as prizes of war or forfeiture to the Crown. John Grants writes:
Thus, with the authority of Castlereagh’s circular of 1808 and with
the approval of the Colonial Office, Sherbrooke placed the
responsibility of caring for the expected refugees in the hands of
the Collector of Customs at Halifax, Thomas N. Jeffery. Jeffery
chose Melville Island as the depot to which the black refuges were
to be taken for food, shelter, and medical care.138
However, the first group of late arrival Black Refugees were not sent to Melville
Island, but rather, because of the House of Assembly’s refusal to accept more Black
people into the province, approximately 500 Black Refugees were redirected by
Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke to New Brunswick instead.139 The rest were eventually
sent to Nova Scotia and institutionalized at Melville Island, a compound for prisoners-ofwar, under the charge the Collector of Customs. With the imperial government paying
the bills, the Collector of Customs received one guinea per person for his wardenship over
the Black Refugees at Melville Island, and additional funds were paid to local merchants
who supplied food and clothing.140
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Out of the late arrival Black Refugees to be directed to Melville Island, roughly 727
were placed there between April 1815 to July 1815, and another 76 Black Refugees were
redirected there at some point from the Poor House of Halifax.141 Of that number, an
average of 39 Black Refugees a day were in Melville Island’s hospital, and an estimated
76 Black Refugees appeared to have died during their stay in the facility.142 Finally, by the
Fall of 1815, Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke’s attempts to settle the Black Refugees
“were successful to the point that on 18 November 1815, he was able to reduce the
Melville Island establishment.”143 Most of the Black Refugees were settled on lands in
Beechville, Cobequid Road, Upper Hammonds Plains, Refugee Hill, and Preston.144 By the
following year, in April 1816, there were only 64 Black Refugees still living at Melville
Island,145 and by May 21, 1816 only 26 Black Refugees remained.146 On June 5, 1816,
Sherbrooke, believing that most of the remaining occupants were needlessly relying on
the facility to avoid labour, relocated two residents to the Poor House of Halifax to
continue their rations in that facility, and six to the military hospital to receive care in the
same manner and cost as other sick soldiers.147 The Melville facility closed on June 20,
1816, and the few remaining soldiers were settled in the Black Refugee settlement in
Preston.148 Sherbrooke’s term as Lieutenant Governor came to an end in June of 1816,
141
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and after a few months under the charge of an interim administrator, Major-General G.S.
Smyth (the Administrator of the Government of New Brunswick), the next Lieutenant
Governor of Nova Scotia, Lieutenant Governor Dalhousie, arrived in September of 1816
to govern the colony for the following four years.
The cost of institutionalizing the Black Refugees in the Melville establishment for
the first three months was significant, totalling over £2320 with an additional £848 to the
Collector of Customs “for his trouble”.149 It was primarily local merchants who financially
benefited from this arrangement, by profiting from the supply contracts for food and
supplies.150 Two months after the Melville establishment closed in June 1816, an
additional group of 36 Black Refugees arrived in August 1816 from Charleston, North
Carolina and Wilmington,151 who appear to have been the last government sponsored
influx of the Black Refugees into the colony of Nova Scotia.152
During the brief 22-month period between September 1813 and November 1815,
roughly 2,000 formerly enslaved African-descended individuals had courageously fled
enslavement in reliance upon the contractual representations made in the Cochrane
Proclamation. Those individuals are known today as the Black Refugees in Nova Scotia.
Some actively fought in the British armed forces, others chose settlement in a British
colony, but both decisions triggered Britain’s promises to grant them ‘encouragements’,
meaning free land, implements, and (for a limited time) provisions.153 However, instead
of receiving their contractual entitlements, the Black Refugees were met with racial
hostility combined with unpreparedness and neglect that was rooted in an anti-Black
established settlements or, if physically unable, to the Military Hospital for medical attention. Governor
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racist and White supremacist ideology that resulted in the Black Refugees first being
institutionalized in a poor house or a military prison, and then, finally, on remote small
lots of land with insecure title.
2.2.7 Colonial Attitudes Towards Black People
There is considerable scholarship on the racist ideology that influenced White
colonialists’ treatment toward the Black Refugees, as well as the Black Loyalists and
Jamaican Maroons before them.154 Those racist ideas and attitudes not only shaped the
development of overtly racist laws and policies, but also the racist implementation of
ostensibly race-neutral ones. British and Nova Scotia laws were formed to serve and
facilitate an economic system that relied on Black enslavement. For example, in the royal
commissions to Governor Cornwallis in 1749, the Colonial Office wrote to ensure the
appeasement of slave merchants as follows:
Whereas Acts have been passed in some of Our Plantations in
America for laying Duties on the Importation and Exportation of
Negroes to the great Discouragement of the Merchants Trading
thither from the Coast of Africa, […] it is Our Will and Pleasure that
You do not give your Assent to or pass any Act imposing Duties
upon Negroes imported in Our said Province under Your
Government payable by the Importer, or upon any slaves exported
that have not been sold in Our said Province and continued there
for the Space of twelve Month.155
As previously discussed in Part 2.2.2 of this thesis, the primary objective of the
Cochrane Proclamation was not the liberation of Black people that were being enslaved,
but rather the weakening of the American economy through the exodus of their highly
profitable workforce.156 Likewise, sending the Black Refugees to the British colonies
served a purpose that benefited Britain, being to grow the economy as settlers and
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labourers.157 As will be elaborated below, the land administration laws are one of the
many ways in which the legal system supported and promoted these anti-Black racist
attitudes.
2.3

Background on Land Titles Issue158

2.3.1 Land Titles Initiative
Many individuals of African descent who migrated to Nova Scotia during the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries never received fee simple interest to their
allotted lands.159 For over 200 years since, African Nova Scotians have been fighting to
clarify and confirm legal title to the land on which their ancestors were settled. Most
recently, a government program called the Land Titles Initiative160 was developed to help
residents acquire perfected title to their land through the Land Titles Clarification Act
(“LTCA”).161 The LTCA is remedial legislation that was adopted in 1964 to create a
simplified procedure for ascertaining legal title to land in designated communities within
Nova Scotia, predominately African Nova Scotian communities.
The LTCA regime was not the first time that Nova Scotia’s government sought to
clarify land titles in this province. For example, in 1821, colonial officials established a
Board of Commissioners to resolve title and boundary disputes that resulted from
previous land administration policies that were interfering with Britain’s colonization
plans.162 Also, in 1903, the Nova Scotia government created a legislative regime through
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the Land Titles Act,163 which involved the appointment of regional Master of Titles to hear
and determine applications for registration of land title, and settle disputes involving
other persons claiming interest in the land. While these legislative regimes were not
specific to African Nova Scotian communities, they illustrate that Nova Scotia, particularly
rural Nova Scotia, has a long history of obscure land titles and boundary disputes, and a
general reluctance (or inability) of the government to effectively resolve the problem.164
For example, in his testimony for the 1839 Buller Report,165 then Provincial Secretary,
Rupert George166 was asked how he would propose to remedy the “evils” of squatting
immigrants. Provincial Secretary George responded:
In the first place the extent of such irregular occupation of the
Crown Lands, and the exact position of every lot held without
authority, or under some incomplete title, with the name of the
163
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occupant, should be ascertained, in order that steps may be take
to quiet all such possessions, and secure to every settler, so
situated, 100 acres of land, including his improvements, on
condition of his taking out a title within a specified time, support
three years. The acquisition of this information would be a work
of great labour, and attended with much expense; but it must be
obtained, or the consequence will be deplorable.167
The warning from Provincial Secretary George appears to have been ignored, since
the land titles issue in this province persisted throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and
twenty-first centuries. However, while the problems are not isolated to African Nova
Scotian communities, nor do all African Nova Scotians communities experience the same
problems, there are racial disparities in the land titles issue that have exacerbated the
problems in African Nova Scotian communities.
The land titles discourse often attributes blame for the racial disparities in land
titles to the colonial officials who allocated inferior land to the Black residents in terms of
quality, quantity, and tenure. However, while racially biased actors no doubt contributed
to the racial discrimination experienced by the Black Refugees and their descendants,
African Nova Scotians, there is a system of law in which those actors operated which
served to legitimize and exacerbate their wrongdoings. That system of law, which
continues, is rooted in anti-Black and White-supremacist ideology that resulted in, among
other things, the inferior land allocations to the Black Refugees as compared to White
settlers. The land titles issue is merely the symptom of a broader existence of systemic
anti-Black racism in the law which created and reinscribed racial disparities in land-based
wealth in Nova Scotia.
2.3.2 Beals v Nova Scotia (2020)
Beals v Nova Scotia168 is a key judicial decision pertaining to the application of the
LTCA in African Nova Scotian communities. In this case, the husband and wife who owned
the subject property died intestate. After the wife's death, the son and daughter resided
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on property but without registered title. The Nova Scotia Department of Lands and
Forestry169 denied the son's application under the LTCA through the LTI for a certificate
of claim in relation to clearing title to the property. The son brought application for judicial
review. The court dismissed the application on the basis that the LTCA was not intended
to clarify title when title was clear but not perfected. Essentially, the court held, the
Intestate Succession Act170 and Probate Act171 placed legal title of the land to the mother’s
estate, which the son could perfect through the probate process. Thus, according to the
court, title was clear such that it was reasonable for the responsible minister to deny the
application under the LTCA. Unfortunately, the court’s decision overlooked the
underlying problem, being the financial requirements under probate laws that effectively
barred the applicant from transferring title from the estate to him and his sister as the
estate’s beneficiaries. Financial barriers such as this have been raised repeatedly
throughout land titles discourse and reflects the cycle of poverty that results from antiBlack systemic racism in law.
Notwithstanding the disappointing outcome in Beals, the Supreme Court of Nova
Scotia in this case discussed at length the land titles issues affecting African Nova Scotian
communities and, in doing so, it took judicial notice of the following facts:172
•

Many individuals of African descent who migrated to Nova Scotia during the late
18th and early 19th centuries experienced racism and discrimination upon arrival
and after.

•

While the government of Nova Scotia often provided white settlers with 100 acres
or more of fertile land, it gave black families ten-acre lots of rocky, infertile soil.
The land given to black families was segregated from that given to white families.

•

The government of Nova Scotia gave white settlers deeds to their land but did not
give black settlers title to their land. Instead, black settlers were given tickets of
location or licenses of occupation.

169

The Department of Lands and Forestry is the government department responsible for the administration
of the LTCA.
170
Intestate Succession Act, RSNS, c 236.
171
Probate Act, SNS 2000, c 31.
172
Beals, supra note 168 at para 36.

43

•

Although a limited number of land titles were eventually issued in Preston, and
some settlers were able to purchase land, most black settlers never attained clear
title to their land.

•

Without legal title to their land, black settlers could not sell or mortgage their
property, or legally pass it down to their descendants upon their death.

•

Lack of clear title and the segregated nature of their land triggered a cycle of
poverty for black families that persisted for generations.

•

Black communities in rural areas were isolated and remote, lacking typical
community developments such as water, sewage, sanitation, garbage removal,
road improvements, and other related services regularly provided in white or
mixed communities.
The court based these historical facts on four secondary sources that were

submitted to the court as evidence. First, a thesis submitted to Dalhousie University in
2006 by Erica Colter entitled A State of Affairs Most Uncommon: Black Nova Scotians and
the Stanfield Government’s Interdepartmental Committee on Human Rights, 19591967.173 Second, an article by Lindsay Van Dyk entitled Shaping a Community, Black
Refugees in Nova Scotia.174 Third, a report prepared for the United Nations Human Rights
Council by the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent setting out its
findings following a visit to Canada in October 2016.175 Fourth, a report prepared by then
law student Angela Simmonds entitled This Land is Our Land: African Nova Scotian Voices
from the Preston Area Speak up dated August 19, 2014.176 While these sources provide
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helpful information pertaining to the present-day land titles issues within the scope of the
LTCA, there remains a dearth of comprehensive consideration of the broader historicallegal context in which those land titles issue arose, and the role of law in creating and
reinscribing the racial disparities pertaining to land. The search for secondary sources in
the Beals decisions reveals a gap in historical knowledge. More importantly, the use of
these resources without the historical-legal context sets the African Nova Scotian land
issues narrative too narrowly.
2.3.3 Downey v Nova Scotia (2020)177,
Shortly after the Beals decision, the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia released a
second decision pertaining to the application of the LCTA in African Nova Scotian
communities, Downey v Nova Scotia.178 In this case, the applicant applied for a certificate
of claim under the LTCA (through the LTI) for a small portion of larger parcel of land. The
Minister of Lands and Forestry denied the application, stating that minimum 20-year
limitation period to establish ownership based on adverse possession had not been met.
The applicant sought judicial review of the decision. The court overruled the Minister’s
denial, pointing out that the LTCA does not specifically require a period of possession over
20 years, and so the Minister was applying a higher standard than set out in the legislation
which made the decision unreasonable. While this was a positive finding in favour of the
applicant (as well as all past and pending applicants in the LTCA process), the outcome
only allowed the applicant to re-submit their application to the Minister for
reconsideration under the proper legislative standard. The court did not rule on the title
issue. Nevertheless, the court in Downey advanced the land titles discourse, particularly
the issue of systemic racism in Nova Scotia and its effects on land ownership by African
Nova Scotians. Through a reiteration of the historical facts that the court found in Beals,
the court in Downey concluded:
[4] African Nova Scotians have been subjected to racism for
hundreds of years in this province. It is embedded within the
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systems that govern how our society operates. That is a
fundamental historical fact and an observation of present reality.
[5] That has real implications for things like land ownership.
Residents in African Nova Scotian communities are more likely to
have unclear title to land on which they may have lived for many
generations. That is because in those communities, informal
arrangements were more common. Financial and other obstacles
made it less likely that people in those communities would retain
lawyers and surveyors to research title, register deeds or wills, or
to survey boundaries. People may have lived on land for
generations without having title registered. No one else might claim
it and it may be that no one in the community disputes their
entitlement to it. But they still have no formal title. [emphasis
added]
While the court’s finding that racism is embedded within the law is supported by
the research contained in this thesis, the court’s assumption that African Nova Scotians
“are more likely to have unclear title” to their land is not. Nova Scotia has a long history
of unclear title to land across the province, and many initiatives over the last 200 years
have attempted to rectify the long-term consequences of flawed colonial settlement
policies and practices. It is likewise debateable whether African Nova Scotians
disproportionately engage in “informal land arrangements” compared to other Nova
Scotians, and furthermore, whether those informal arrangements caused the unclear
titles issue in African Nova Scotian communities. There is no empirical research to
support these claims. The reason these inaccuracies matter is because the court’s
unsubstantiated claims perpetuate the narrative that unclear land titles is a problem
isolated to African Nova Scotian communities, and furthermore, that once the titles are
cleared the “cycle of poverty” will be resolved. In actuality, the land titles issue (to the
extent it can be isolated to African Nova Scotian communities) is merely a symptom of a
larger problem, which is anti-Black racism within the legal system, specifically property
law originating with the colonial land administration laws. Until the problem, being antiBlack racism in law, is dismantled and redressed, the “cycle of poverty” will persist even
after land titles are resolved. The narrative needs to change and the problem must be
redefined.
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The failure of the government to confirm land titles for over 200 years no doubt
contributed to racial disparities in land-based wealth, but it is not the only reason and
likely not a significant one. It is also a difficult factor to quantify because of variables such
as demand for resale in the secondary market, as well as the impact of anti-Black racism
in collateral-based lending practices such as mortgages. Another symptom of anti-Black
racism in property law that likely had greater impact on the racial disparities in land-based
inter-generational wealth, is the significant differential in lot sizes, as elaborated in this
thesis. This disparity is more quantifiable and hence a viable option to consider for
reparatory justice, as discussed in Chapter 5 below.
2.4

Literature Review on Black Refugees and Land
The purpose of this section is to review relevant historiography pertaining to the

land settlement of the Black Refugees in Nova Scotia. Since the turn of the twenty-first
century, scholarship about the Black Refugees has advanced significantly through
contributions by, for example, historian Harvey Amani Whitfield, whose work has
fundamentally reframed the scholarly portrayal of the Black Refugees in a more positive
light.179 Prior to this, leading scholarship regarding the Black Refugees, while seminal and
monumental, often made “sweeping negative judgments” about the Black Refugees and
relied too heavily on the portrayal of the Black Refugees through the biased lens of White
colonial officials “rather than carefully mining the documentary evidence to write a more
dynamic study of the Refugees.”180 Prominent historians such as C.B. Fergusson and Robin
Winks contributed to this disappointing scholarly foundation in African Nova Scotian
historiography, yet at the same time, produced the work from which many subsequent
scholars have based their scholarship, including Whitfield.181 While there is much to be
discovered in the African Nova Scotian scholarship beyond the issue of land settlement,
this section is limited to literature on land issues pertaining to the Black Refugees.
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2.4.1 Martell, J.S. (1937)
One of the earliest accounts of land allocation to the Black Refugees can be found
in the 1937 work of J.S. Martell regarding military settlements established after the War
of 1812.182 In drawing connections between land promises and military service, Martell
writes:
The officers and men who survived Britain’s battles in the 18 th and
early 19th centuries could count on at least one tangible reward: an
offer of free land in the colonies.183
Martell proceeds to explain how this offer of land in Nova Scotia was extended to
the British soldiers who fought in the War of 1812, but that the offer was not entirely
altruistic, writing,
The advantages of settling disbanded men in the interior of Nova
Scotia appealed to both local and Imperial officials in 1815.
Attempts had already been made to penetrate the inland forests.
[…] Given land along the newly surveyed route that ran diagonally
across the peninsula from Annapolis to Halifax, they would make a
passable forest road which in time might become a main artery of
communication.184
A key priority for colonial settlement in Nova Scotia was the cultivation of land
located in the interior part of the province, including a road between Annapolis and
Halifax.185 Thus when Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke wrote to the Secretary Bathurst,
on March 15, 1815, shortly after the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent ending the War of
1812, he asked London to direct many “active and industrious settlers” to Nova Scotia to
help cultivate the land.186 And, assuming, as many British officials did at the time, that
disbanded soldiers made good settlers, Sherbrooke suggested that the disbanded soldiers
from the War of 1812 be granted land in Nova Scotia with accompanying provisions,
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similar to the discharged soldiers after the American Revolutionary War.187 However, as
historian J.S. Martell explains, unbeknownst to Sherbrooke, Britain recalled its Britishborn military back to Europe to join the war efforts closer to home. Therefore,
Sherbrooke’s initial plan to receive a massive influx of disbanded soldiers into the interior
parts of Nova Scotia was interrupted.188 Martell claims that this change in Sherbrooke’s
plans created an opportunity for the settlement of the Black Refugees on that land
instead, writing:
At the time of writing, March 15, 1815, Sherbrooke did not know
that only the week before Napoleon had escaped from Elba and
landed in France, and that all available regiments were being
recalled from the colonies. […] Soldiers, for the present at least,
could not be spared for settlement […]. The refugee negroes,
whose fate Sherbrooke had discussed in a later letter, were
another matter. Bathurst agreed to follow the Governor’s
suggestion and grant them the ‘Encouragements which at an
earlier period were given to military Settlers in the Province.’189
[emphasis added]
The “later letter” that Martell is referring to in this statement is a letter from Sherbrooke
to Bathurst dated April 6, 1815, wherein Sherbrooke suggests to Bathurst:
as encouragement to those who are industrious and may be willing
to settle and cultivate land, that they should on being located
receive rations gratis for themselves and families in the same
proportions and for the same period as was allowed to the
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disbanded soldiers and their families who settled in this Province
at the Peace of 1783.190 [emphasis added]
However, Martell does not discuss the April 6, 1815 letter within the context of
settling the Black Refugees, he only cites it in support of his following statement regarding
the expected influx of, and perceived inconveniences caused by, the late arrival Black
Refugees:
Sherbrooke was no doubt glad to hear this, for the negroes, who
had escaped from southern plantations by boarding British patrol
ships, were becoming a serious problem. Employment had been
found for the first arrivals, but by the spring of 1815, when 1500 to
2000 more were expected, there was no further call for negro
labour. As the late comers were bound to become an immediate
burden on the Government, Sherbrooke believed it best to boost
them as quickly as possible into a state of self-sufficiency.
Instead of pointing out that the April 6, 1815 letter from Sherbrooke to Bathurst
demonstrates a clear disregard by the government to fulfill its contractual
representations that were made to the Black Refugees one year prior in the Cochrane
Proclamation, Martell simply attributes the renewed land settlement decision to
Sherbrooke’s desire to be relieved of the financial burden combined with a vacancy
created by the delayed disbanded soldiers. While these rationales may be accurate, the
critical race analysis of these historical details is also important. The allocation of land to
the Black Refugees should not have depended on the unexpected vacancy of land
earmarked for the disbanded soldiers, or fears of economic dependency on government.
The contractual commitment to allocate land on terms comparable to White settlers was
already established through the Cochrane Proclamation, if not before,191 and the
persistent refusal of government to comply with its terms demonstrates a pattern of
racist ideology should have been emphasised in early scholarship pertaining to the land
settlement of the Black Refugees.
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Returning to Martell’s depiction of the events occurring in the Spring 1815, after
explaining that Sherbrooke wrote to Bathurst on March 15, 1815 regarding settlement of
the disbanded soldiers, and briefly referencing the April 6, 1815 letter from Sherbrooke
to Bathurst regarding the settlement of the Black Refugees, Martell provides an account
of Bathurst’s response to Sherbrooke on May 10, 1815, which is one of the earliest
accounts of Britain’s post-war instructions to Nova Scotia’s Lieutenant Governor
regarding the land settlement of the Black Refugees. Again, seemingly to have forgotten
(or ignored) the contractual representations that were made to the Black Refugees one
year prior in the Cochrane Proclamation, Bathurst agrees with Sherbrooke’s plan to finally
grant “encouragements – free land, implements, and (for a limited time) provisions” to
the Black Refugees, and, notably, on terms analogous to encouragements that were
granted to eighteenth century disbanded solders.192 It is important to note that,
notwithstanding his request for imperial sanction, Sherbrooke was already legally
empowered (and encouraged) to grant land pursuant to the 1807 Land Administration
Laws.193 The request for permission, however, may have been more for the supply of
rations or waiver of fees then for the land itself.
Notwithstanding the absence of critical race analysis in J.S. Martell’s depiction of
these historical events, his work helpfully connects the land settlement decisions that
were made in respect of the Black Refugees with the land settlement preparations that
were made for the disbanded soldiers. As Martell explains, when Sherbrooke wrote to
Bathurst on April 6, 1815, informing him that while employment had been found for the
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early arrivals Black Refugees194 the late arrivals should be settled to not be a burden on
the government,195 Martell claims,
Having secured the Imperial sanction, he [Sherbrooke] established
two negro settlements before the year was over: one at Preston,
near Dartmouth, and the other at Hammonds Plains, on the Halifax
end of the projected road to Annapolis. The land along this route
had already been recommended by Surveyor General Charles
Morris as suitable for the settlement of soldiers, but no soldiers
were settled there in 1815.196 [emphasis added]
Therefore, according to Martell, the suitable lands at Hammonds Plains and
Preston, that were initially earmarked and prepared for the disbanded soldiers, were
reallocated to the Black Refugees.
The plans for the disbanded soldiers that Sherbrooke wanted to settle in the
interior parts of the province, did ultimately come to fruition. The subsequent three years
saw the disbanded soldiers197 settled (with government support) in three primary
locations. In keeping with the vision to populate the interior of the province, and build a
road between Annapolis and Halifax, Martell writes,
Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke, and his successor, Lord
Dalhousie, both military men who had served under Wellington,
ordered the land along this route to be laid out for disbanded
soldiers, and within the space of three years, three settlements,
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appropriately named Sherbrooke (later New Ross), Dalhousie, and
Wellington came into being.198
Interestingly, these three military settlements proved to be a “discouraging
experience”199 which is a detail often absent from the land settlement discourse
pertaining to African Nova Scotians communities. African Nova Scotians were not the only
people who struggled in colonial Nova Scotia, yet they seem to have been
disproportionately impacted by the cycle of poverty that followed.
J.S. Martell’s depiction of historical events that gave rise to the land settlement
decisions of the Black Refugees in Hammonds Plains and Preston provides a useful
foundation from which the experience of the Black Refugees land settlement can be
assessed relative to a comparator group such as the disbanded soldiers. Unfortunately,
however, while Martell attributes the government decisions to grant land to the Black
Refugees on the unexpected vacancy of available land that was earmarked for the
disbanded soldiers, along with a desire to abscond from responsibility to properly launch
the Black Refugees into financial prosperity after enslavement, his analysis ignores the
fact that Cochrane’s Proclamation had already promised land to the Black Refugees and
that the government seemingly had no intentions to fulfill its contractual commitment.
But for the unexpected opportunity to reassign the disbanded soldiers’ land, there
appears to have been no intentions and no preparations made to grant land to the Black
Refugees who acted in reliance on the contractual representations in the Cochrane
Proclamation.
Another issue to highlight from Martell’s work in Military Settlements is the
reference to the suitability of the land. According to Martell, Sherbrooke believed the
interior parts of the province contained suitable land for settlement, notwithstanding the
absence of road infrastructure.200 This understanding seems to have been based on
evidence from Nova Scotia’s deputy surveyor, John Harris, who on December 20, 1814, in
the course of Sherbrooke’s planning to settle the disbanded soldiers, had vouched for the
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quality of the land as “worth settling.”201 This claim was supported by the testimony of
his superior, Surveyor General Charles Morris, as Martell explains:
The Surveyor General, Charles Morris, added his testimony two
months later, when he assured the Lieutenant Governor that he
was not aware of ‘any Range of Country (in every View of it)’ more
favourable for the settlement of farmers from the surrounding
districts or for ‘any of His Majesty’s German or highland or Fensible
Corps’ that might be disbanded. In the event of the legislature
being disposed from ‘a conviction of its great public utility’ to open
and improve it, he [Morris] recommended that ‘the whole of the
improvable Lands be laid out into Compact and regular alotments
not exceeding two hundred acres each, and in the proportion of
front prescribed by his Majesty’s Instructions – that is one fifth of
the length – or one quarter of a mile front to each lot – and no land
to be granted but to those who can give satisfactory proof of their
becoming actual Settlers, or who will contribute to its immediate
improvement.202
This work helps to explain why Hammonds Plains and Preston were the locations
of choice to settle the Black Refugees, as well as describes the quality of that land, which
is likely more applicable to the Hammonds Plains settlement than Preston. However,
there are two other important points to highlight from this excerpt which Martell did not
discuss in his work, being lot size and tenure.
First, in March of 1815, Surveyor General Charles Morris recommends to the
imperial government that compact and regular allotments not exceeding 200 acres each
should be laid out and granted to the disbanded soldiers. However, a few months later
in September 1815, in respect of the Preston lands to the Black Refugees, the Surveyor
General Charles Morris advises the imperial government that compact lots be laid out so
as to form a village, each lot to contain about 10 acres.203 The 10-acre model was then
replicated in the land allotments to the Black Refugees in Hammonds Plains. The disparity
in lot size recommended by Surveyor General Charles Morris’ ignores the imperial
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instructions to treat the Black Refugees similarly to the disbanded soldiers and is
inconsistent with the 1807 Land Administration Laws which empowered (and
encouraged) the Lieutenant Governor to grant lot sizes ranging from 100 to 500 acres.
Furthermore, at that point, the scarcity of land in Nova Scotia had not yet reached its
peak, so there is little motivation for the Surveyor-General to preserve land in the same
way that existed in the late 1820s when agricultural land was rare.204
A second point to highlight from J.S. Martell’s work pertains to Surveyor General
Morris’ advice regarding tenure to the disbanded soldiers, which was consistent in his
treatment of tenure to the Black Refugees.205 In March of 1815 in respect of the
disbanded soldiers, Morris recommends that “no land to be granted but to those who can
give satisfactory proof of their becoming actual Settlers, or who will contribute to its
immediate improvement.” And, in September 1815, in respect of the Black Refugees in
Preston, Morris recommends that “no Land be confirmed to them by Grant – until they
are actually settled and satisfactory proof afforded to your Excellency of their fixed
determination to make a permanent Settlement.”206 Martell does not provide
explanation as to why the Surveyor General sought to withhold the fee simple grants that
the 1807 Land Administration Laws sought to encourage, but he does shed some light on
potential underlying rationales. Although he was writing in respect of settlement
decisions that were made seventeen months after Morris’ March 1815 advice on tenure
for the disbanded soldiers, who had a reputation of deserting their land grants, Martell
writes:
Captain Ross, who was the principal man in that district [New Ross],
was apparently concerned about the abandoned lots, for on August
204
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28 [1816], the Surveyor General [Morris] wrote to assure him that
they were to be given to men who meant ‘to become immediate
Setlers’. This was a simple process because no grants of lands had
yet been made. Pending the escheat of the old loyalist grants, the
Government was giving out temporary tickets of location, for
which the men drew lots.207 [emphasis added]
This statement suggests a rationale that may have contributed to the issuance of
tickets of locations instead of freehold grants to the disbanded soldiers, which could be
inferred as a potential rationale for issuing temporary tickets of location to the Black
Refugees. If the government needed time to acquire legal title through a land
escheatment process208 then it could explain why the Lieutenant Governor was not in a
legal position to issue freehold grants at the time of settlement, and, alternatively issued
temporary tickets of location instead. It is not clear whether the land that was allocated
to the Black Refugees in either Upper Hammonds Plains or Preston was subject to prior
land grants awaiting the escheat process. J.S. Martell’s statement refers to land located
in New Ross. However, historian Dorothy Evans suggests that the land in Upper
Hammonds Plains may have been previously encumbered:
There was one difficulty about the Hammonds Plains site. It was
not ungranted land. True, the first white settlement there, that of
Vieth and his men, had failed, and the whole acreage had
escheated to the Crown. But it had been re-granted to other white
settlers, although they people living on it may not have been the
grantees themselves. One of them was John Liddell.209
Regardless of the reasons or their validity, J.S. Martell’s works shows that the
disbanded soldiers were also issued tickets of location, and after a few years of
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government rations, many disbanded soldiers abandoned their lots and some never had
their tickets of location converted to land grants, prompting J.S. Martell to write “Their
merry-making was over, and the day of their departure at hand. Only the industrious
could wait long enough to reap their just reward, a permanent grant of land.” 210 A
noticeable difference between the disbanded soldiers and the Black Refugees, however,
is that while the disbanded soldiers had mobility options to move elsewhere when the
rations ended and the land proved too difficult to cultivate enough to earn the grant, 211
the Black Refugees did not.212
The disbanded soldiers who stayed long enough to improve and cultivate their
land ultimately attained freehold grants. J.S. Martell points to one example in Sherbrooke
where a grant of 13,000 acres was made to 67 soldiers in October 1819 (average lot size
194 acres), after the government had finally completed the escheat of the loyalists
grants.213 Other examples include the grant of 26,760 acres in 1821 to 179 fencible
soldiers in Dalhousie (average lot size 149 acres), 6,900 acres in January 1822214to the 50
German soldiers settled in Lunenburg (average lot size 138 acres), and 2,100 acres to 14
soldiers in Wellington in 1822 (average lot size 150 acres).215 It is important to note that
at this point, the land granted to the Black Refugees was still not confirmed, despite being
settled on the land before the disbanded soldiers.
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Lastly, Martell’s work also reveals that some early arrival Black Refugee were
labourers in the Hammonds Plains area before the Black Refugee settlement. It arises in
the context of road construction between Annapolis to Halifax following surveyor John
Harris’s survey. Martell explains:
Before the [Assembly] session of 1815 was over, they [Assembly]
had made good the expenses of John Harris’s survey and voted
£135 to start the work of building, besides £950 to improve the
three crossroads […]. No soldiers were available in 1815, but John
Harris, now in the role of a road builder, pushed through the forest
from Annapolis to the Liverpool road, and the negroes felled trees
and built huts at the other end, beyond the well established white
settlement of Hammonds Plains.216 [emphasis added]
The Black settlement in Upper Hammonds Plains seems to have had some
significance to the soldier settlements. For example, when Martell was describing the
location of the disbanded soldiers’ settlements, he explains:
Disbanded soldiers, not native farmers or ambitious immigrants,
had been given a virtual monopoly of the new road. Two of their
settlements, Dalhousie and Sherbrooke, ran from the southern
boundary of the Township of Annapolis to the Chester cross road,
while the third, Wellington, straddled the short space between the
North East River and Indian River, beyond the black settlement at
Hammonds Plains.217 [emphasis added]
Additional helpful information from J.S. Martell’s work pertains to the land
settlement of the Black Refugees comes from his statement about one particular
disbanded solider group, the Royal York Ranger. Martell writes:
How many soldiers, in all, settled along the military road after 1815
will probably never be known. Scores of them came and went
within a few weeks. When the Royal York Rangers were disbanded
at Halifax in 1819, they probably met many a man from the military
settlements strolling the streets of the capital. After hearing the
accounts they must have heard, it is small wonder they
unanimously chose cash instead of land. Despite the statements
of the Surveyor General and his deputy, John Harris, poor land was

216
217

Ibid at 84.
Ibid at 88.

58

seemingly plentiful in the tract between Halifax and Annapolis.
[emphasis added]
It is not mentioned whether the Black Refugees or other disbanded soldiers were given
the option to receive monetary payments instead of land.
2.4.2 Martell, J.S. (1942)
Five years after publishing Military Settlements, in 1942 J.S. Martell produces his
often-cited scholarship pertaining to African Nova Scotians, Immigration to and
Emigration from Nova Scotia 1815-1838.218 The purpose of this book was to study archival
information about the number of immigrants to Nova Scotia between 1814 and 1838. In
doing so, Martell delved into the historical information pertaining to the Black Refugees
more than he did in Military Settlements.
In Immigration and Emigration, Martell situates the Black Refugee experience into
the broader context of Nova Scotia’s changing attitudes toward immigration generally in
the years after the War of 1812. He explains how the Nova Scotia House of Assembly first
wanted the imperial government to direct immigrants to Nova Scotia, but then “[t]he
opinion was freely expressed in the 1820s that, while small capitalists were always
wanted, the province had had its fill of poor people.”219 The “first problems”, according
to Martell, were the Black Refugees who arrived during and directly after the War of 1812.
Martell proceeds to sketch out the migration events of the early and late arrivals of Black
Refugees into Nova Scotia, along with the hostility and destitute circumstances they faced
once they arrived. Most importantly for the purposes of this thesis, however, is Martell’s
account of a letter from Secretary Bathurst to Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke on May
10, 1815, sanctioning the plan to settle the late arrival Black Refugees on terms consistent
with the disbanded soldiers, which states:
If the Negroes, did not wish to become miners, but preferred to be
farmers, then, Bathurst continued, they were to be given the same
encouragements – free land, implements, and (for a limited time)
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provisions – that had been given in the eighteenth century to
disbanded soldiers.220 [emphasis added]
This is an elaboration of Martell’s work from “Military Settlements” when he first
references this letter in the context of Sherbrooke’s plans to reallocate land that was
originally earmarked for the disbanded soldiers. Martell proceeds to explain that:
[a]ccordingly, the Negroes, who no doubt wisely insisted on being
near the centre of Government, were settled at Preston,
Hammond’s Plains, and along the Windsor and Truro roads.221
On the one hand, Martell is suggesting that the Black Refugees had their choice of
settlement location, yet, elsewhere, particularly in Military Settlements, he suggests the
location was a decision made by the Lieutenant Governor and Surveyor-General based on
their plans to settle the disbanded soldiers.
Furthermore, as was the case in Military Settlements, Martell fails to acknowledge
the Cochrane Proclamation as the legal authority which obligated the imperial
government to grant land and provisions to the Black Refugees, and not Bathurst’s
mistaken belief one year later that the Black Refugees preferred land for agricultural
purposes instead of labour in the coal mines. However, despite this shortcoming, the
archival information produced in Martell’s Immigration and Emigration provides useful
evidence pertaining to land administration policies that aimed to serve the interests of
pauper European immigrants, while ignoring the needs of the Black Refugees. In his
overview of the problems facing pauper immigrants regarding land scarcity and high
costs, Martell notes that by 1819, the Nova Scotia government, frustrated with the
inactivity by the imperial government, “was now taking its own steps to facilitate the
settlement of immigrants.” He writes:
Escheats, mostly of Loyalist land, freed over 70,000 acres in 1819
and perhaps 20,000 acres in the two years that followed, and
thousands of pounds were being spent annually in improving the

220

Ibid at 17, citing CO 217/96, Bathurst to Sherbrooke, May 10, 1815. This instruction to allocate land was
repeated in Bathurst’s letter to Sherbrooke 13 June 1815 PANS RG1 Vol 63 Doc 12. See discussion below
under Part 2.4.3 Fergusson, C.B. (1948).
221
Ibid at 17.

60

old highways and making new roads.”222 […] Two years later the
government made what was probably its most helpful move. Board
of Land Commissioners were set up in the different localities to iron
out irregularities in settlement, discourage land-jobbing [the
practice of buying and selling land for the purpose of speculation],
and assist poor people and immigrants in becoming established.
Henceforth, instead of petitioning the Governor for land or walking
many miles to the capital to make a personal appeal, prospective
settlers could apply to their local Board for a temporary ticket of
location, and when the time came to take permanent possession,
they were allowed to join with others (five was the limit) in one
grant for the ordinary fee which was split between them. This
system remained in effect until 1827 when, in reluctant conformity
with Imperial instructions, the Surveyor-General of the peninsula
ordered that Crown Lands be sold.223 [emphasis added]
While Martell refers to tickets of location, he draws no connection between the
tickets of location that were issued to the disbanded soldiers as discussed in his Military
Settlements article five years prior, and he appears to be introducing a new rationale
behind the issuance of tickets of location. In Military Settlements the implied rationale
behind tickets of location to disbanded soldiers (and Black Refugees by inference) was
either a temporary measure awaiting the escheat process, or due to the Surveyor
General’s presumptions that soldiers were unreliable long-term settlers. However, in
Immigration and Emigration, Martell is suggesting that bureaucratic efficiency (ie., the
ability to obtain tickets of location more quickly from the local boards than grants from
the Lieutenant Governor) and cost savings (ie. allowing groups of settlers to split the cost),
caused the issuance of temporary tickets of location to newly arrive pauper immigrants.
It is possible that the rationale differs among the different groups, but Martell offers no
insight on the matter. There is further discussion on tickets of location and pauper
immigrants in the context of the land administration laws below in Chapter 3, but for now
it is important to understand that Martell’s work lays a foundation from which a
comparative experience can be assessed between the Black Refugees, disbanded solders,
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and pauper White immigrants in terms of racially disparate effects of ostensibly raceneutral laws, which disadvantaged Black people and advantaged White people.
2.4.3 Fergusson, C.B (1948)
There is much that can be said about C.B. Fergusson’s foundational, yet
controversial, archival research that he prepared for the Public Archives of Nova Scotia in
1948. While self-proclaimed as a “study” on the origins and status of the Black Refugees,
subsequent scholars have critiqued the lack of depth of Fergusson’s analysis on this
archival compilation. For example, historian Harvey Whitfield explains:
In the 1940s, archivist and historian Charles Bruce Fergusson [sic]
began research on his history of the War of 1812 Black Refugees. A
monumental piece of research, but somewhat thin on
interpretation.224
The shortcomings in Fergusson’s work are not belaboured here but suffice it to
mention that other scholars have critiqued, among other things, Fergusson’s disregard
for the Black Refugees’ agency in their migration patterns and settlement,225 have
determined his portrayal of the Black Refugees to be unfair,226 and argue that he failed to
contextualize the Black Refugees’ struggles relative to the struggles of White immigrants
and in the context of a complex and chaotic colonial atmosphere. Whitfield writes:
Fergusson emphasized the struggles that the Black Refugees faced
and examined the amount of money the government spent on
relief. While not denying the discrimination black people faced,
Fergusson did not fully contextualize their struggles with those of
other white immigrants who also struggled – especially if they
224
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migrated to Nova Scotia with little capital. […] The reality of early
settlement in Nova Scotia shows that many settlers struggled
regardless of race. For example, in 1817, Lord Dalhousie
commented that without government rations a settlement of
disbanded white soldiers would completely collapse.227 [emphasis
added]
Other scholars have pointed out that Fergusson’s work reflects White settler colonialism
embedded within the Nova Scotia Archives itself and that the work was “brought forward
to defend the honour of the Crown.”228
Notwithstanding its flaws, Fergusson’s book remains a foundation from which
many scholars in the field of African Nova Scotian studies have based their work, including
its critics.229 For the purposes of this thesis, the review of Fergusson’s work is limited to
the issue of land allocated to the Black Refugees.
2.4.3.1 Lot Size
It will be recalled that historian J.S. Martell attributes the colonial decision to grant
land to the Black Refugees on terms similar to the disbanded soldiers to a series of
correspondence between Secretary Bathurst to Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke in the
Spring of 1815 (March 15, 1815; April 6, 1815, and May 10, 1815). However, in doing so,
J.S. Martell discounts the validity of the contractual representations that were made in
the Cochrane Proclamation one year prior. C.B. Fergusson, however, attributes this
reawakened proclamatory promise to a different letter, being one from Bathurst to
Sherbrooke dated June 13, 1815, which instructs Sherbrooke (again) to allocate “small
grants” of land to the Black Refugees but omits the part about analogous treatment to
that of the disbanded soldiers. Relying on this letter in isolation misconstrues the royal
instructions about land to the Black Refugees and understates the harm caused by
ignoring the representations that were made in the Cochrane Proclamation.
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Secretary Bathurst’s June 13, 1815 letter that Fergusson produces is often cited in
land title discourse to support claims that Britain intentionally allocated 10-acres lot to
the Black Refugees. However, those conclusions appear to be based on inference from
this one letter, absent the benefit of context provided in the earlier correspondence that
J.S. Martell produces in his less-often cited work, Military Settlements. On June 13, 1815,
after both Secretary Bathurst and Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke had already agreed in
earlier correspondence to allocate land and provisions to the Black Refugees on terms
analogous to the disbanded soldiers, Bathurst writes to Sherbrooke as follows:
The only other point in these Dispatches to which it is in any degree
[illegible] relates to the disposal of the negroes landed in the colony
by Sir Alex. Cochrane, and on this, while I equally approve the [line]
adopted by you and the Instructions given in consequence
[illegible], I wish merely to call your attention to the advantage
which might result from giving to those persons, who are mostly
accustomed to agricultural labour, small grants of land by the
cultivation of which they might in a short time be enabled to
provide for their own subsistence and to promote the general
prosperity of the province in which they might be settled.230
[emphasis added]
While Secretary Bathurst instructs “small” grants of land, some have inferred this
to mean 10-acres lots. For example, historian Harvey Amani Whitfield cites this letter as
support for his following statement:
In 1815, at the beset of Colonial Secretary Lord Bathurst, the
Lieutenant Governor Sir John Sherbrooke decided that placing the
Refugees on ten-acre farms in Preston and Hammonds Plains might
allow the government to save money.231 [emphasis added]
However, Secretary Bathurst did not stipulate 10-acre lots, rather the 10-acre plan
seems to have originated with the Surveyor General, Charles Morris, in contradiction to
Secretary Bathurst and Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke’s agreement to treat the Black
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Refugees analogous to the disbanded soldiers who were being allocated over 100 acres
of land each. As C.B. Fergusson explains, when Sherbrooke received Bathurst’s June 13,
1815 letter, he asked the Surveyor General Morris about the availability of land in Preston
(there is no mention of Hammonds Plains). It was Morris who, by letter to Sherbrooke
dated September 6, 1815, suggests the 10-acre lots and unconfirmed grants:
I would propose that compact Lots be laid out so as to form a village
– each Lot to contain about ten acres – and regularly drawn for in
the usual manner and that a Reserve of Fifteen hundred acres be
made as a Common to afford them fuel, fencing & Building
materials when that on their own Lots is exhausted – and that no
Land be confirmed to them by Grant – until they are actually
settled and satisfactory proof afforded to your Excellency of their
fixed determination to make a permanent Settlement […].232
[emphasis added]
In addition to shedding light on the role of the surveyor general in the
discriminatory land allocation decisions, Fergusson’s work also sheds light on why
Surveyor General Morris may have recommended 10-acre lots in the Preston settlement.
Fergusson explains:
Eight years later [1823] Surveyor General Morris stated that ‘in the
day this settlement [Preston] was forming these people were
appraised that there was not land sufficient for half their number
but they were so urgent to be placed near each other, that the Lots
were necessarily reduced for their own convenience and
accommodation.233 [emphasis added]
While this rationale may explain Morris’ advice to allot 10-acre lots in Preston, it does not
explain why the same method was adopted in other settlements such as Hammonds
Plains. This is especially the case when it is remembered that Hammonds Plains was
originally planned as a soldier settlement who would have been granted at least 100 acre
lots, not 10. One can only assume that Morris or one of his deputies’ went through the
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added effort of revising the surveys to reduce the lots once it was decided that the
occupants would be Black Refugees.
The plan to allow only 10-acre lots in Preston may have originated with SurveyorGeneral Morris, but the decision was sanctioned by London and later by the law through
the property documentation process.234 Fergusson writes:
The Earl of Bathurst gave his sanction to the measures being taken
in the province for the settlement of the Negroes. ‘I entirely
approve the measures you have taken with respect to the Location
of the Negros (sic), and the means you propose to give them for the
Cultivation of the Ground allotted for their Settlement.235
It is not clear whether Secretary Bathurst was fully informed of the precise size of the lots
or the tenure of holding, but that does not absolve him of accountability. It is also
important to note that at this point, it appears from Fergusson’s work that the Preston
land was already escheated so the rationale that Martell intimates for tickets of location
(ie. pending escheatment) is not sensible for the Preston settlement.236
2.4.3.2 Proclamation Ignored
Having regard to the pivotal nature of Fergusson’s work from which other scholars
based their own, Fergusson’s reference to the June 13, 1815 letter from Bathurst to
Sherbrooke, and the reproduction of the September 6, 1815 letter from Morris to
Sherbrooke in Fergusson’s book, are important contributions to the discourse on land
issues in African Nova Scotian communities, particularly Preston. Equally important,
however, is Fergusson’s omission to include the Spring 1815 letters between Bathurst to
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Sherbrooke which more clearly defines the parallel between the disbanded soldiers and
the Black Refugees, particularly those settled in Hammonds Plains. What is most striking
from Fergusson’s work, as well as Martell’s, is that while both authors point to 1815
imperial instructions on ‘encouragements’ to the Black Refugees, neither of them drew
attention to the fact that these contractual commitments stemmed not from the 1815
letters, but from the Cochrane Proclamation which, seemingly from Martell’s and
Fergusson’s work, the British government had no intentions of fulfilling until subsequent
unexpected circumstances compelled it into existence.
In the case of Martell’s work and the March 15, 1815 letter from Secretary
Bathurst, it appears that but for the change in settling the disbanded soldiers, the Black
Refugees may have never received the land in Hammonds Plains. Similarly, from
Fergusson’s work and the May 10, 1815 letter from Secretary Bathurst, if the Black
Refugees had not been so “frequently dependent for subsistence”,237 as Fergusson
unfairly portrays them, then they may have never received the ‘encouragements’ that
were promised to them on the battlefield.
2.4.3.3 Quality of Land
C.B Fergusson’s work serves as an important early source for present day claims
that the land allotted to the Black Refugees was of inferior quality compared to land
granted to white settlers. Fergusson writes:
The small size of their lots and the sterility of the soil were major
causes of the distress of the people at Preston during these
years.238 [emphasis added]
While Fergusson’s statement was based on documents specific to Preston, many scholars
have inferred that these challenges existed in other African Nova Scotian communities
without confirmation of the same. This is particularly problematic because the quality of
the soil varied throughout the province.239 Similarly, Fergusson is often cited as the source
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for claims that the Black Refugees petitioned for better quality land.240 Again, Fergusson’s
work in this area is specific to Preston, but is often assumed applicable in other African
Nova Scotian settlements. This is not to suggest that the quality of land was good in other
African Nova Scotian communities, only that Fergusson’s work does not support claims of
poor-quality land in communities other than for Preston.
The claims of poor-quality land in Upper Hammonds Plains and Beechville is
possibly inferred elsewhere from Fergusson’s work. For example, he notes that there
were discussions in 1837 to relocate some of the residents from Preston, Upper
Hammonds Plains and Beechville to “better lands” in the province,241 suggesting that
Upper Hammonds Plains and Beechville may have also experienced barren land.
However, this reference is over 20 years after the Upper Hammonds Plains settlement
was established, and “better” in this sense may be in reference to the quantity of land,
not the quality of land.242 To support this later interpretation, Fergusson specifically
mentions that residents in Upper Hammonds Plains “soon began to ask for more land”243
suggesting both dissatisfaction with lot sizes, as well as a believed capability to handle
more. He is silent, however, about the fertility of the soil in Upper Hammonds Plains.
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2.4.3.4 Tenure
Of particular importance to the land titles discourse, Fergusson is a prominent
source for claims that the Black Refugees were issued tickets of location and licences of
occupation rather than freehold grants. While Fergusson does not define either term or
distinguish between the two, it is in Fergusson’s work where early assertions are made
about the Black Refugees’ insecure landholdings and delayed conversion of these
insecure holdings into fee simple, notwithstanding continual petitions to do so by the
Black Refugees. C.B. Fergusson writes:
[…] the settlers at Preston continued to hold their lands by tickets
of location and licences of occupation; but their grants had never
been confirmed. […] The Negroes continued to request that their
grants might be confirmed.244
It is in this aspect of Fergusson’s work that two crucial documents pertaining to
the land titles discourse are exposed. First, a Memorial from the Black Refugees in Preston
(undated)245 in which the writers explain that the residents in Preston were settled in
1815 and 1816, at which time they received “licence tickets”246 with the expectation that
their lands would be granted to them in three years after they had occupied them by
licence. The correspondence proceeds to explain that although they repeatedly asked for
their grants, they had not received them and are still occupying their lands, “without any
title except their possession.” A bracketed note at the bottom of this document (also
undated) states:
(The Lieut. Governor desires that all the Black People who have got
Tickets of Location in this Province for lands may immediately be
confirmed in the same agreeable to the Directions of the
Government.)
On the one hand, it can be assumed that this document predates the 1827 Land
Sale Regulations which ended land grants in favour of sales by public auction.247 This

244

Ibid at 50, citing PANS vol 422, doc 46 and Box – “Crown Lands – Peninsula of Halifax 1840-1845” (And
see Appendix XX and Appendix XXI).
245
Ibid, Appendix XX [“Memorial”].
246
Later in the correspondence the term “tickets of location” is used.
247
See Part 3.6 below for discussion on the 1827 Land Sale Regulations [“1827 Land Sale Regulations”].

69

assumption is consistent with the general refusal on the part of government officials to
contravene the 1827 Land Sale Regulations when asked to do so in 1837 for the purposes
of relocating some Black Refugees from Preston to another part of the province. 248 On
the other hand, if this document post-dates the 1827 Land Sale Regulations, then an
extraordinary exception was being ordered by the Lieutenant Governor to enable the
conversion of tickets to freehold grants. Fergusson’s work shows that it was unlikely that
government officials would contravene the 1827 Land Sale Regulations to grant additional
lands to the Black Refugees, even to redress the problem of small lot sizes. For example,
Fergusson notes that when Surveyor General John Spry Morris,249 under the direction of
Lieutenant Governor Kempt,250 began a survey of lots (again) in Preston in 1828 in
response to land titles petitions, Morris wrote:
There can be no doubt that in this severe climate at least 100 acres
would be required for each family […]. I am not aware of there
being any authority for passing Free Grants to them.251 [emphasis
added]
This letter demonstrates the government’s strong commitment to a strict interpretation
of the law when applying it to the Black Refugees, notwithstanding the unique
circumstances which necessitated an equitable interpretation of the law.
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Nevertheless, Fergusson’s work also shows that government officials appear to
have been willing to contravene the 1827 Land Sale Regulations in at least one instance
to redress their previous omissions on confirming titles, being the 1842 Confirmatory
Land Grant that was issued in Preston.252 It is important to note that while Fergusson
produces two examples to support his claim that tickets were confirmed as grants, namely
the 1834 Land Grant in Upper Hammonds Plains253 and the 1842 Confirmatory Land Grant
in Preston,254 it is only the Preston document that is a confirmatory land grant specifically
intended to confirm title to previously allotted land. The 1834 Land Grant in Upper
Hammonds Plains is not a confirmatory grant, but rather a land grant that was purchased
for consideration, being 60 pounds sterling for 600 acres. Fergusson mischaracterized this
document as a confirmatory grant when he relied on it to state ““[l]and was held at
Hammonds Plain by tickets of location or licences of occupation until 1834 when a grant
of 600 acres was made to 30 men.”255
A second significant document reproduced by Fergusson in support of his claims
that Black Refugees petitioned for confirmatory titles can be found in Appendix XXI to his
book, which is a Petition from certain Black Refugees in Preston dated March 1, 1841
where petitioners refer to the barrenness of the land, the smallness of their lots, and
requests (again) to have their titles confirmed so “that those who wish to sell and remove
to better locations or follow other employments (might) dispose of (their) lands and
improvements to those who remain.”256 Fergusson writes, paraphrasing this petition,
At present, holding under Tickets of location, (they could not) sell
to advantage, (they are) tied to the land without being able to live
upon it, or even vote upon it, without being at every Election
questioned, browbeaten and sworn.257 [emphasis added]
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In reference to tickets of location and petitions for conversion, Fergusson (and
other scholars) rely on the 1841 Petition from Preston, and often infer that the Black
Refugees throughout the province were disproportionately issued tickets of location or
licences of occupation.258 Fergusson relied on this petition to make sweeping remarks
such as “from shortly after the arrival of the Refugees of the War of 1812 a large number
of the Blacks obtained such tickets.”259 However, Fergusson did not provide any analysis
or situate this statement in the context of colonial land administration practices more
generally. Consequently, subsequent scholars have adopted this statement as definitive
evidence that tickets of location were an endemic within all African Nova Scotian
communities, and only within the African Nova Scotian communities, which is not
accurate.
2.4.3.5 Upper Hammonds Plains
While Fergusson’s information pertaining to land allocation to the Black Refugees
relates mostly to the Preston settlement, there are some key aspects of his work that
pertains to the Upper Hammonds Plains settlement. For example, Fergusson writes:
By 1815 a number of the Refugee Blacks had settled at Hammond’s
Plains. In November of that year George P. Brehm surveyed and ran
the lines for the people settled there.260
Fergusson’s work provides a copy of an undated licence of occupation that was
granted to 75 Black Refugees during the administration of Lieutenant Governor Dalhousie
(1816-1820), showing that their lands were divided into 10-acre lots,261 which was
consistent with Surveyor General Morris’ advice regarding 10-acres lots in the Preston
settlement. However, the version of the Hammonds Plains Licence of Occupation that
Fergusson includes in his book is incomplete and does not contain the legal terms and
conditions of the licence, only the names and assigned lots. A similar licence that was
issued to Black Refugees settled in Refugee Hill dated March 27, 1818, which Fergusson
258
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includes in his book, does include legal terms, including a five year limitation period at
which time the licence was to be confirmed as a grant.262
Fergusson’s work pertaining to Upper Hammonds Plains also references a letter
from Dominic De Broker, a Black Refugee settled in Upper Hammonds Plains, and 35 other
Black residents who, on December 4, 1819, petitioned the government for more land in
the area that was owned by John Liddell and reverted to the Crown.263 Fergusson writes:
They [Black Refugees] declared that several of them had built
houses and made improvements on the relinquished tract.264
This statement suggests that there was some squatting by some Black Refugees in the
Hammonds Plains settlement,265 but also indicates that the Black Refugees desired to
have more land. Fergusson also notes that none of the thirty-six petitioners in De Broker’s
letter had received prior land grants,266 and that “they [Black Refugees] stated that when
the Hammond’s Plains people had been settled by John Liddell and others, these
landowners did not feel disposed to settle more than eighty families, with ten acres for
each family.”267 Without the benefit of Fergusson’s analysis of this research, it is not
known whether the “maximum eighty families” includes the thirty-six petitioners in De
Broker’s letter (but that their land had not yet been confirmed), or whether the
“maximum eighty families” are the same as the seventy-five settlers listed in the
(undated) Hammonds Plains Licence of Occupation.268
Perhaps one of the most revealing statements from Fergusson in terms of land
located in Hammonds Plains is his claim that “[l]and was held at Hammonds Plain by
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tickets of location or licences of occupation until 1834 when a grant of 600 acres was
made to 30 men.”269 In support of this claim, Fergusson reproduces a partial copy of the
1834 Land Grant that was issued to 30 residents in Upper Hammonds Plains,270 but then
proceeds to write:
In the next year [1835], Joseph Thomas prepared a report on
eighty-two lots there. He furnished the names of the people to
whom they had been originally assigned, the names of those by
whom they were then occupied and the names of those by whom
they were then owned. In addition to those who had been
‘regularly settled by Government’ on those lots, Thomas thought
they there were about 24 other families settled on lots for which
they had no cards. In 1831 and 1833 surveys had been made at
Hammonds Plains; and in 1836 John Spry Morris received payment
for office fees relating to a grant there of 126 allotments
containing 1323 acres of land.271 [emphasis added]
Fergusson provides a copy of Joseph Thomas’ report on lots, which shows that the lot
distribution and ownership was still in a state of confusion.272 However, Ferguson does
not produce of copy of the land grant for the additional 126 lots that J.S. Morris received
payment for, which would have helped clarify ownership of all the lots and would have
confirmed whether the licenses where converted into grants, or purchased for monetary
consideration as in the case of the 1834 Land Grant in Upper Hammonds Plains.
Admittedly, it is difficult to reconcile the number of lots (confirmed or
unconfirmed) that were allocated to the Black Refugees in Upper Hammonds Plains,
based on the information provided to date. But a cursory examination reveals that the
1834 Land Grant did not resolve all tickets of location or licences of occupation in Upper
Hammonds Plains as Fergusson suggests. His subsequent information on Thomas’s 1835
Report on Lots reveals that more work was needed to ascertain titles to the lots in the
community. Furthermore, the calculations from Thomas’ report shows that even if the
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remaining 126 lots were confirmed as grants, there were at least 20 other lots that
remained unconfirmed.
Little is learned from Fergusson’s work as to why the Refugees in Upper
Hammonds Plains did not have their title confirmed upon settlement or shortly
thereafter, only that there were some residents in Upper Hammonds Plains who, by the
mid-1830s did not have fee simple title to their land. Fergusson writes that a plan and
description for lots laid out in Upper Hammonds Plains was submitted to the Surveyor
General sometime in 1835, “but he [J.S. Morris] did not appear to know why the grants
were not confirmed.”273
Fergusson’s assertion that the 1834 Land Grant confirmed title to the previously
issued licences is problematic, particularly because subsequent scholars relied on his
work to perpetuate the misinformation. Unlike the 1842 Confirmatory Grant in Preston,
the 1834 Land Grant in Upper Hammonds Plains was purchased for considerable value
(sixty pounds), and there was no indication in the document to suggest it was a gratuitous
grant intended to confirm title to previously issued land. Furthermore, the 1834 Land
Grant was for a different parcel of land than the lots that were assigned with tickets of
location. Fergusson and subsequent scholars who relied on his work, have
mischaracterized the 1834 Land Grant that was purchased by the Black Refugees in Upper
Hammonds Plains as a confirmatory grant. If the grants for the additional 126 lots in
Upper Hammonds Plains were structured in the same way, the conclusion is that the Black
Refugees who were settled in Upper Hammonds Plains have never received “free” land
grants, but rather paid monetary value for the small lots of land that they were allotted
through licenses of occupation. This means that not only are the representations in the
Cochrane Proclamation still not met, but even the lower standard of instructions to treat
the Black Refugees analogously to the disbanded soldiers are also unfulfilled.274
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2.4.3.6 Surveyors
There is much information to be gleaned from Fergusson’s work. In addition to all
the above, one crucial aspect from Fergusson’s work which has largely escaped scrutiny
is the role of the surveyors, particularly Surveyor General Charles Morris, in the land
decisions that adversely impacted the Black Refugees in terms of location, size and
tenure. Further discussion will follow on this point, but suffice to mention now that, thus
far, both Martell’s and Fergusson’s work shows that the Surveyor General Charles Morris
played a significant role in the discriminatory application of the law towards the Black
Refugees. In addition, Martell’s work provides a possible rationale as to why the surveyor
general would recommend issuing tickets of location or licenses of occupation, which is
that it could have been a temporary measure pending completion of the escheat
process.275 However, it appears from Fergusson’s work that the Preston land was already
escheated so this rationale for that community is less convincing.276 Furthermore, while
Fergusson’s work reveals a possible rationale for why the surveyor would recommend
small lot sizes in townships, being less land to divide among many residents, Martell’s
work demonstrates this rationale is not relevant for the Upper Hammonds Plains
settlement. The Upper Hammonds Plains lands were originally planned for disbanded
soldiers and so already determined capable of accommodating larger sized lots.
2.4.4 Grant, John N. (1970)
John Grant’s Immigration and Emigration277 is an essential contribution to “the
development and dissemination of knowledge on Nova Scotia’s black history.” 278 While
his book was published in 1990 by the Nova Scotia Black Cultural Centre, the research was
performed in pursuit of a Master of Arts degree in 1970.279 Consequently, at the time of
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publication, the research was twenty years old and, as Grant writes, “this fact is
represented by the material listed in the bibliography.”280 Grant acknowledges that the
work of historians Robin Winks (discussed below) was available to him at the time of
publication, but that John Grant’s book was completed before the publication of Robin
Winks’ Blacks in Canada: A History (1971).281
Unlike Martell and Fergusson, Grant reproduces a copy of the Cochrane
Proclamation, explaining that although not issued directly to the African Americans,
“Cochrane did instruct raiding parties to distribute it among the slave population.”282 John
Grant’s contribution also reframes the role of many Black “refugees” who ultimately
served as British soldiers and fought in the war.283 However, notwithstanding his inclusion
of the Cochrane Proclamation, Grant fails to acknowledge the government’s breach of its
contractual promises therein. For example, when discussing the reasons for land
settlement, he writes “[a]s additional numbers arrived, with no work available for them,
land was procured for settlement.”284 This statement overlooks that fact that land was
already owed to the Black Refugees the moment they accepted Cochrane’s offer, and
Britain had seemingly never intended to satisfy this commitment.
Nevertheless, there is much information to be learned from John Grant’s work
pertaining to land and the Black Refugees. For example, it will be recalled from C.B.
Fergusson’s work that the Surveyor-General, Charles Morris, played a significant role in
determining the location, lot size, and tenure of the Black Refugees. Grant’s work builds
upon this information by explaining the Surveyor General’s role in decisions to settle the
Black Refugees together as a group. Grant writes:
Land was obtained to settle the blacks together, as Morris had
suggested, at Preston. It was felt that they would prefer that
arrangement to settling among strangers, perhaps far from the
market and the public roads, and would be able to ‘assist, comfort
280
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and support’ each other. This arrangement, followed in the military
settlements set up by the Nova Scotia government, was used in this
the first government-planned community.285 [emphasis added]
Unfortunately, Grant does not produce any new knowledge on the issue of tickets
of location. He relies on the work of C.B. Fergusson, specifically the undated Memorial
from Preston residents,286 when he writes:
Moreover, the refugees were, in effect, tied to the land. Possessing
their holdings by tickets of location only and not by grant until
1837, they were unable to leave unless they were prepared to give
up any improvements they had made. This provision not only kept
many where there was little profit to be gained by their remaining,
but also proved harmful to those who wished to work the land.287
[emphasis added]
John Grant, like many scholars, relied on the Memorial from Preston to make
assumptions about the existence of the tickets of location, the delayed (but eventual)
conversion of them into freehold grants, as well as the presumed adverse impact that
tickets of location had on the ability to convey the land. Similarly, in the context of the
government’s failed attempts to relocate the Black Refugees to Trinidad, Grant writes:
[…] any who did have any interest in emigrating often found that
they would not be able to sell their land and did not wish to leave
their improvements to be used by others. Also, it was reported
‘they seem to have some attachment to the soil they have cultivate,
poor and baren as it is’. [emphasis added]
Again, unverified assumptions are made about the legal effect of tickets of location.
However, it is from this statement that Grant’s work begins to connect the importance of
the land with the distinct identity of African Nova Scotians,288 something that years later
scholars such as Harvey Amani Whitfield would build upon.
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In terms of land quality, Grant’s work begins to situate the quality of the land that
was allocated to the Black Refugees within the context of land in the rest of the province.
He writes “The land obtained [….] was like much of the land on Nova Scotia’s Atlantic
coast. It was uncleared, rough, rocky and infertile.” However, he offers no critical analysis
to explain his subsequent statement pertaining to small lot sizes: “[i]n addition, the ten
acre lots assigned were far too small […].” There are no attempts to understand how or
why the Black Refugees received only 10 acres, and similar analysis is lacking in respect of
land tenure and tickets of location.
Nonetheless, a noteworthy aspect of John Grant’s work relevant to this thesis is
his comparisons between the Black Refugee settlements and those of the disbanded
soldiers. While he does not provide comparative analysis on the land allotments to each
group, Grant does compare their relative success and failure, particularly the
disappointing outcomes for the disbanded soldier settlements. He writes “Thus,
comparatively speaking, the black settlements were not the failure they would first
appear to be; but this is not to term the black settlements successful because the others
were an even more dismal failure.”289
It is important to also note that while John Grant’s work refers to Martell’s Military
Settlements for his information pertaining to the disbanded soldier settlements, he does
not include Secretary Bathurst’s May 10, 1815 dispatch to Lieutenant Governor
Sherbrooke to settle the Black Refugees on terms analogous to the disbanded soldiers.
Like C.B. Fergusson, Grant cites only the June 13, 1815 dispatch from Secretary Bathurst
that most scholars rely on regarding “small grants”.290
While outside the scope of this thesis, Grant’s work also lays a foundation by which
the land settlement experience of the Black Refugees in Nova Scotia can be compared to
that of the Black Refugees who were sent to New Brunswick. While land was eventually
made available to those Black Refugees who were sent to New Brunswick in the Spring of
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1817, only 112 lots (mostly 55 acres each) were allotted to 112 different people held by
tickets of location. Much of the delay was caused by arguments among the levels of
government as to which should pay the expense of professionals such as the surveyors.
By 1904 only 20 Black families remained on the settlement in Loch Lomond, New
Brunswick.291 Not all the refugees took up settlement, however, and instead remained on
vacant land in Saint John.
2.4.5 Winks, Robin W. (1971)
Robin Winks’ The Blacks in Canada is heralded as “one of the most significant
books about African Canadian history to date.”292 But, it is not without its shortcomings.
As one scholar writes:
Prior to the publication of The Blacks in Canada, Winks authored a
series of articles that formed the basis for his book. In these
articles, Winks made sweeping negative judgments about the
African Diaspora in the Atlantic region and the rest of Canada. In
his 1969 overview, Winks argued “The Canadian Negro as a whole
does not seem to have shown the cumulative pride, energy,
enterprise, and courage that the catalog of individual acts of
defiance would lead one to expect.” Winks viewed African
Canadians as somehow deficient in comparison to their African
American counterparts.293
In his work, Winks illuminates the existence of slavery and anti-Black racism in
Canada, but at the same time negatively portrays the Black Refugees, among other Black
people, who fought bravely to escaped captivity. As one scholar points out, “[t]hese
sweeping generalizations were incorrect and simplistic. Winks relied too heavily on
growing white racism and the words of colonial officials like Lord Dalhousie rather than
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carefully mining the documentary evidence to write a more dynamic study of the
Refugees.”294
While Winks’ work lacks racial scrutiny and ignores the realities of anti-Black
racism in this province, his work remains an important contribution to the historiography
of African Nova Scotians.295 Much of Wink’s work pertaining to land is in respect of the
Black Loyalists, and thus outside of the scope of this thesis except to note the repetitive
behaviour of the Crown’s unpreparedness, indifference, and malfeasance towards its
contractual representations that were made to the ancestors of African Nova Scotians.296
Whereas Winks often attributes blame to “misunderstandings” and “inefficiencies”, and
claims that “circumstance, not design, led to these retarded and stunted land grants,”297
other scholars claim otherwise. For example, George Elliott Clarke writes:
[I]t is unlikely that any of them were “confused” about the reason
for their differential treatment. Nor is it kosher to accuse them of
being poor farmers when the best land – in grants of 100 to 200
acres – went customarily to whites, or to castigate them for being
lousy fishers when they were permitted no access to anchorage, let
alone boats. Where Winks sees Black failure or Caucasian
bureaucratic ‘inefficiency and circumstance, not design,’ leading to
‘retarded and stunted land grants’, it remains the case that when
Black people received land it was on an apartheid-style basis, so
that they had to barter their labour for subsistence supplies.298
In terms of land grants to the Black Refugees, Winks adds little in terms of new
information, but reveals much in terms of his analytical racial bias. He writes:
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Nor did the plan to place the Refugees on the land succeed. The
Surveyor-General Charles Morris was too optimistic about the work
habits of the Refugees, and they, in turn were displeased with the
fact that they did not receive outright grants; for most held land on
tickets of location or licences of occupation. The plots were too
small in any case, and the soil was sterile; most lots were of ten
acres, even though Morris later estimated that no family, however,
industrious, could live on less than a hundred acres and have a
proper fuel supply.299
As with many other scholars, Winks focused on the Preston settlement and assumed
analogous situations in the other Black settlements.
A noteworthy contribution that Winks does make pertaining to land grants is his
claim that “In 1828, Lieutenant-Governor Kempt ordered a survey of all holdings so that
he might confirm land grants, but after surveying fifty lots and finding the expense higher
than expected, the surveyor-general stopped.”300 Winks’ claim that Lieutenant Governor
Kempt sought to clear titles in Black communities, however, lacks supporting evidence
and supplementary analysis. Instead, he simply cites the 1841 Petition301 concerning
Preston to support his claim that all Black Refugees were “tied to their land” by having no
money to buy new land and no clear title to the land they occupied. In addition, as with
other scholars, Winks points to the 1842 Land Grant in Preston as evidence that all title
was converted, prompting Winks to conclude “[m]any must have sold almost immediately
and left, for in the next census in 1851, the population of Preston had fallen to its
lowest.”302 Thereby, proving his claim that unclear title to land was the only barrier
obstructing the Black Refugees’ opportunities for “betterment”.
Of the scholars reviewed thus far in this thesis, Winks appears to be the first to
draw distinctions between Preston and other Black settlements, such as Upper
Hammonds Plains. He writes “[b]ut all was not entirely bleak. While Preston declined, the
Refugee settlement at Hammond’s Plains grew, slowly and painfully, toward a kind of
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stability.”303 Winks then proceeds to explain how the Black Refugees in Upper Hammonds
Plains “had a slightly more favourable location, for they were near the main road to the
interior and their timber cover was more varied.” He also explains that “[w]hile they too
received only ten acres at first, the settlement was smaller, escheated land was granted
to them more quickly, and there were more competitive white settlers nearly.”304 In terms
of land confirmations, Winks points only to the 1834 Land Grant in Upper Hammonds
Plains that many other scholars rely on, and, as with other scholars, misinterprets this as
a conversion grant rather than the grant that was purchased by the Black Refugees for
valuable consideration.
2.4.6 Whitfield, Harvey A. (2006)
Historian Harvey Amani Whitfield contributes to the land titles discourse by,
among other things, exploring possible motivations behind the land settlement decisions
that impacted the Black Refugees.305 He situates the Black Refugees’ receipt of inferior
land within the context of racial hostility, and in doing so, emphasises two motivations
behind the land disparities between the Black Refugees and White settlers. First,
Whitfield points to the desire of government to use the Black Refugees “as a captive labor
force tied to uneconomical land, with their only option being to work on the larger farms
of white neighbours or as domestic servants.”306 Second, Whitfield claims that because
the government hoped the Black Refugees (like the Black Loyalists and Jamaican Maroons
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before them) would be only temporary settlers, they perceived them as undeserving of
comparable amounts of land307 and did not comprehensively prepare for their
settlement.308 Guided by these motivations, Whitfield concludes, the colonial
government intentionally gave inferior land to the Black Refugees in terms of size, quality
and tenure.
In terms of size, Whitfield writes: “In 1815, at the beset of Colonial Secretary Lord
Bathurst, the Lieutenant Governor Sir John Sherbrooke decided that placing the Refugees
on ten-acre farms in Preston and Hammonds Plains might allow the government to save
money.” 309 The reference to “save money” had less to do with lot size than with the cost
of institutionalizing the Black Refugees at Melville Island, and the reference to “10 acres”
was not an express direction from Secretary Bathurst but more this scholar’s inference
from Bathurst’s instruction to issue “small grants”.
In terms of quality, Whitfield writes “the lands given to the Refugees at Preston
and Hammonds Plains were among the worst in the entire colony. Earlier settlements of
white Loyalist and former soldiers on these lands had failed miserably, with each group
abandoning their farms as unimproved after the Revolutionary War. Rocky and barren,
the land at Preston and Hammonds Plains was surrounded by thick forests. The poverty
of the soil in these areas was well known, with topographical studies of the time
describing the soil as ‘inferior and stony.’”310
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In terms of tenure, Whitfield cites earlier scholarship in his claim that the colonial
government “gave the Refugees tickets of location (licenses of occupation) instead of
freehold grants, which they regularly gave to white settlers.”
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However, Whitfield

emphasizes the motivational nature of these decisions as deliberate policy decisions that
were made to ensure that the Black Refugees “would subsist not as owners of land, but
as squatters in constant need of menial employment.”312 While Whitfield does not appear
to elaborate on the degree to which the Black Refugees received tickets of location, nor
provide a comparative analysis of the Black Refugees’ initial land tenure relative to White
settlers, he does connect the consequences of tickets of location with the alleged
motivations underlying their issuance. He writes, “[t]ickets of location did not allow the
Refugees to sell their lands and move to other parts of British North America. Instead,
they were forced to remain on their farms whether the land was partly productive or
sterile.”313
Setting aside Whitfield’s first explanation for the land disparities, being the
government’s aim to keep the Black Refugees in a perpetual state of dependency as cheap
labourers, his second explanation that the Black Refugees were expected to be temporary
residents seems to conflict with the overarching aims of the land administration policies
more generally. While there is little doubt that the colonial and local governments sought
to relocate the Black Refugees away from Nova Scotia, it is unlikely that the Colonial Office
would have allocated any land to the Black Refugees, even inferior land, if they expected
the Black Refugees to depart shortly thereafter. It was an expensive and arduous task to
survey, plot and assign land, and while the Black Refugees may have been denied grants
at the outset, efforts were still expended to assign them their 10-acre lots. Why would
the colonial government have gone through that effort if they expected the Black
Refugees to immediately abandon them? Furthermore, in Nova Scotia, land was scarce
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and so, from London’s perspective, all land had value, even that which may have required
better tools and more time to cultivate.
Despite this irreconcilable assertion, Whitfield’s claim that the application of the
land settlement policies to the Black Refugees embodied the “contradictory and
indecisive nature of the colonial government’s attitude toward the Refugees” is not
disputed here. He writes:
On the one hand, the government expected the African American
settlers to provide for their own subsistence by occupying small
farms; on the other hand, the government placed them on land
that had very limited potential for agricultural production.
Moreover, the occupation of ten acres of land simply could not
provide enough food for individual families.314
2.4.7 Girard, Philip et al (2018)
The African Nova Scotian land-related scholarship reviewed up to this point has
been produced by historians. However, legal historians such as Philip Girard, Jim Phillips
and Blake Brown add an important legal lens to the historical analysis and helpfully
connect the law to the experience of the Black Refugees in relation to land settlement.
They write:
The Black refugees who came after the War of 1812 were granted
land but received very different treatment from white settlers.
While the standard size of grant in this period when free grants
were still operative was 100 acres, and could be more, depending
on the size of families and military service, the Black refugees got
10 acres per family, despite the fact that many had indeed served
in the army.315
In terms of physically inferior land, the authors claim the land “was poor, rocky,
and swamp-ridden, unproductive land,” that “would be impossible for any person to
support families on.”316 In terms of legally inferior land, the authors write:
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Blacks’ legal tenure was also tenuous; they were not given fee
simple grants but tickets of location. Providing a ticket of location
initially to a new settler was standard practice, but these were
quickly converted for whites by the issuance of a patent for fee
simple tenure when one had been applied for and the fees paid.317
While dipping their toe into potential rationales for the anti-Black racism, the
authors take a similar position to Whitfield in claiming that “differential treatment of
Blacks was the result of the government viewing them as a permanent cheap labour
pool.” Not much is offered, however, in terms of the legal implications of tickets of
location or licences of occupation.
2.4.8 Conclusion
There are other scholars in addition to those listed above who have contributed
to the African Nova Scotian land discourse. However, most literature to date about the
land settlement of the Black Refugees is incomplete in two significant ways. First, it fails
to critically assess the legal implications of possessory title through licences of occupation
or tickets of location. Many scholars assume that possessory title was insecure and
prevented the Black Refugees from capitalizing on their asset which contributed to a cycle
of poverty. For example, historian Bridglal Pachai writes:
The land experience of the black loyalists had been repeated in the
instance of the black refugees with even greater severity. While it
was common up to 1827 for heads of white families to receive 100
acres of land free of cost, with 50 acres for each dependent, blacks
were never accorded this facility. Instead, they were granted
“tickets of location” and licenses of occupation” in holdings of 10
acres per family. This conferred on them the legal status of
squatters without the right to sell, lease, mortgage or bequeath
their holdings. Land titles, covering about 1800 acres in Preston
were issued to some blacks in 1842, twenty-eight years after they
had settled in Preston. Even then hundreds of other blacks never
received legal titles to the land apportioned to them in Preston and
in other parts of Nova Scotia.318 [emphasis added]
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Similarly, historian James Walker writes:
The lands assigned to the Black Refugees were given on “licenses
of occupation” rather than grants, which meant that although they
had full use of the land they lacked outright ownership and
therefore could not sell it or use it for collateral. In any case the
land distributed to them came in tiny plots of only eight to ten acres
per family, neither large enough nor fertile enough for subsistence
agriculture, and they were clustered in segregated tracts on the
fringes of larger white towns, sufficiently close to commute as
labourers but sufficiently remote to avoid social contact. And so
Black Refugee settlements evolved, as had Black Loyalist
settlements beginning a generation earlier, in physical
circumstances that consigned them to isolation, poverty and
economic dependence, but that at the same time encouraged the
development of institutions and cultural styles suited to their own
specific needs.319 [emphasis added]
And further,
In 1842, following requests and petitions from black settlers and
their white sympathizers, legal grants were given to those who
were qualified. This permitted some to sell their land, if a buyer
could be found, to finance a move to a more advantageous
location. A few families in this way were enabled to relocate
closer to Halifax, purchasing about thirteen acres along the shores
of the Bedford Basin. Though no better for farming, the new
location was more convenient for Halifax employment, it offered a
readier market for produce and crafts, and it provided fishing
opportunities in the Bedford Basin. In 1848 the earliest black deeds
were registered, and in 1849 a Baptist church was established. The
community took the name of Campbell Road, from its
thoroughfare, and by 1851 it showed a population of 54. This
represented almost exactly one per cent of the African Canadians
living in Nova Scotia at that time.320 [emphasis added]
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Even legally trained historians mention the inferior legal status of Black-owned
land without digging deeper into the legal implications of their possessory title. For
example, these legal historians write:
The Black refugees were very much aware of the second-class
treatment afforded them and campaigned for better terms. As one
petition of 1841 stated, proper tenure mattered: ‘Holding under
Tickets of location, we cannot sell to advantage, we are tied to
the land without being able to live upon it.’ The government did
finally accede, after a number of years of petitioning, and granted
the land in fee simple in 1842.321 [emphasis added]
Scholars in this field often place greater emphasis on the absence of confirmed
title as the impediment to capitalist prosperity and less emphasis on the other realities of
racism that served to oppress African Nova Scotians despite their land tenure, such as
limited mobility for Black people, inaccessibility to quality loans, and the lack of potential
buyers in the secondary market who were interested in buying land situated in
predominately Black communities. Without factoring in those other elements of capitalist
prosperity, it is then easy to assume that clarifying titles through initiatives such as the
Land Titles Initiative will lead to economic prosperity for Black people in the same way it
does for White people with secure title, which is not necessarily the case.
Secondly, the literature to date about the land settlement of the Black Refugees
is incomplete in that it fails to properly situate the colonial land decisions pertaining to
the Black Refugees into the broader context of colonial land administration laws,
specifically the 1807 Land Administration Laws that were in effect at the time of the Black
Refugees arrival, as well as the subsequent amendments in 1821 and 1827. In doing so,
the scholarship ignores the role of the law as a system that created and reinscribed the
racial disparities in land ownership, which in turn played a pivotal role in the racial
disparities in wealth and poverty in this province.
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Chapter 3: Land Administration Laws (1807-1826)
3.1

The Law in Nova Scotia

3.1.1 What is the Law?
While it is acknowledged that legal pluralism exists in Canada,322 English common
law will form the doctrinal framework of this thesis. English common law is the legal
system that created the colonial land administration framework at the time of the Black
Refugees’ arrival and is the legal system from which existing property laws in this province
are based.323
In simple terms, the English common law is a collection of rules and principles
established by parliamentary or legislative authority and court decisions. The law is
supported by an infrastructure consisting of administrative institutions and actors, which,
together with the law, is referred to as the legal system.324 The legal system, like any
system is “an interlocking set of parts that together make a whole.”325 The parts
continuously operate within the whole based on its pre-programming, being the
“established way of doing something, such that things get done that way regularly and
are assumed to be the ‘normal’ way things get done.”326 In this way, the legal system is
an automated system that can operate by itself based on its programming.
However, the law is not simply a collection of rules and principles that serve to
regulate human behaviour through an established and self-propelling interlocking system
of parts. It also articulates values and sets a standard of conduct and morality. The
principles expressed by the law are choices that have been made which serve the interests
of lawmakers who created it, and in doing so, reflect the lawmakers’ values and beliefs.
322
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To explain, if the lawmaker values the monarchy and believes in the supremacy of the
Crown, then the laws will reflect those ideals through, for example, the principle of royal
assent. If the lawmaker values land exploitation for individual economic profit, then the
law will reflect this ideal through, for example, the principle of land tenure and regulated
alienation of land, while at the same time, condemn and criminalize squatting and
trespassing, being activities which interfere with the land tenure values which the law
aims to uphold.
3.1.2 Racism in the Law
Not surprisingly, “Canada’s legal system has not managed to escape the racism
that permeates Canadian life.”327 The legal system often burdens some and benefits
others based on race,328 and thus, as both a product and a promoter of anti-Black racism,
the legal system is also a product and a promotor of a White supremacist ideology. The
idea that White people, and the interests, values, and beliefs of White people, are
superior to those of another race is an idea that is deeply embedded within the legal
system, from its origins.329 This White supremacist ideology, and consequently, Black
inferiority ideology, manifests itself in various ways throughout the legal system and is
supported actively through positive law (such as the adoption of overt anti-Black
discrimination laws), as well as passively through the acceptance of conditions that allow
White supremacy to thrive.330 As this scholar explains in the context of slavery:
Slavery was legally supported in one of two ways: through positive
law, and more passively through the recognition of the customary
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use of slaves (including the recognition of the property right that
slave-owners held in their slaves).331
The passive ways in which the law supports and promotes anti-Black racism (or,
conversely, White supremacy), are the more insidious types of racism in the law, often
referred to as systemic racism. Even when laws are ostensibly race-neutral or “objective”,
they often result in racially disparate effects that advantage White people and
disadvantage Black people, which illuminate the ways in which the law and the structures
that support it promote an anti-Black racist and White supremacist ideology.
While there are examples of positive law in this province that actively support antiBlack racism,332 legal remedies to address those laws are relatively recent and
predominately arose in the mid-twentieth century during the civil rights era.
Furthermore, such legal remedies focused mainly on achieving formal equality (ie.
treating likes alike), notwithstanding its ineffectiveness in achieving substantive equality
for African Nova Scotians (ie. equality in outcomes).333 As these legal historians conclude:
It may be doubted that the law could ever prevent people acting
out their beliefs that some people were racially, culturally, or
socially inferior, and less deserving of the benefits of progress and
prosperity. But whether it was or was not possible, extra-legal
actions by some better positioned in society were ignored,
tolerated, and unmitigated by law. […] “Yet there was no legal
regime to assist Blacks in a positive way in their search for
equality, and white society was largely free to discriminate. Blacks
encountered discrimination and unequal treatment in many
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aspects of the application of the law, and even more so in the
administration of government policies.334
As difficult as it is to dismantle and redress the law when it actively supports antiBlack racism, it is even more difficult to identify, dismantle, and redress the law when it
passively supports anti-Black racism through the acceptance of conditions that allow antiBlack racist attitudes and White supremacist ideology to thrive. It is through this latter
method, often referred to as systemic racism, that the law tacitly creates and reinscribes
racial disparities.
The colonial land administration laws discussed in this thesis were not overtly
discriminatory based on race, but the legal system surrounding it created racially
disparate effects that disadvantaged the Black Refugees and advantaged the White
settlers. In its failure to act in response to these effects, the law supported anti-Black
racism and validated White supremacist ideology in the colonial land administration laws,
and for over 200 years since, the law has yet to effectively serve the needs and interests
of African Nova Scotians. Even in the context of reparations for historical racial injustices,
the law fails to provide African Nova Scotians with effective solutions.335 Until the racial
disparate effects of the colonial land administration laws are redressed, systemic antiBlack racism in property law will persist well beyond the land titles issue.
3.1.3 Real Property Law
Real property law is the area of law that governs how people interact with land. It
is the system of rules, and supporting institutions and actors, that govern how people
acquire, use, and transfer their interest in land. The British landholding system that was
enacted through the process of colonialism in Canada is tenurial, meaning the Crown
owns the land subject to Indigenous treaties, and grants permission for others to “hold”
the land in accordance with the rules of the tenurial regime.336 A holder of an interest in
land is thus a holder by permission of the Crown, not an owner of the land per se. The
permission to hold land is referred to as an “estate”. Conceptually, the doctrine of tenure
334
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describes how a person holds an interest in land,337 and the doctrine of estates describes
the scope and duration of rights tied to that interest in land.338
An estate, being an interest in land, encompasses several rights and obligations
between the holder and the land, as well as the holder in relation to other people. There
are different types of estates that a person can hold. The greatest interest in land is the
fee simple estate, often referred to as freehold estate, and is the closest thing to absolute
ownership in common law.339 Keeping in mind the tenurial system, however, even a fee
simple interest is subject to the government’s right of expropriation,340 and
escheatment.341
The legal right to possess land depends on the type of estate one holds in that
land and the associated bundle of rights and obligations connected with their estate. The
rights and obligations are not static, nor are all estates absolute. They could attach various
conditions or, for example, be subject to co-tenancy considerations. 342
There is ideological significance to the type of estate that one holds in real
property. As described by these scholars:
Like the notion of ‘free’ tenure, these concepts were invested with
considerable ideological significance. Holding a fee simple in a free
tenure came to represent the acme of liberty, embodied in the
Jeffersonian ideal of the virtuous yeoman farmer who embodied
economic and political independence – an ideal that also resonated
in the settler colonies to the north. Meanwhile, tenancy was
traditionally associated with dependency because of the obligation
to pay rent and the insecurity of leasehold tenure.343
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Thus, holding fee simple interest in land formed an integral part of European
liberal ideology, notwithstanding the cost of such liberty to Indigenous peoples,344 and
the connection between land and freedom is one that likely set root into the minds of the
enslaved people of African descent in British colonies. Thus, when weighing the risks of
fleeing captivity, the offer for ‘encouragements’ in the Cochrane Proclamation was a
significant term enticing the Black Refugees to accept it.
The law of real property today in Nova Scotia is built upon the doctrine of estates
in land and reflects the hierarchical structure that values freehold interest above
leasehold interest. The law operates to protect freehold interest, for example, by
condemning such acts which erode its value such as squatting or trespassing.345 The law
also operates to promote freehold interest, for example, by facilitating access to capital
through mortgages and collateral based lending. Thus, it is not surprising that there are
some people who benefit from property law, such holders of large quantities of freehold
land, and others who are burdened by it, such as those who do not own land but need a
place to live.
3.1.4 Land Titles System
A vital component to the estate-based land system in Nova Scotia is the method
by which interests in land are registered, confirmed, and recorded with minimal risk of
fraudulent activity. Without a trusted system to prove who has the coveted freehold
interest, the law would be challenged in protecting those who are privileged enough to
hold it. Therefore, as colonialists implemented Britain’s land administration laws in Nova
Scotia, a corresponding land registry system evolved in this province to serve its distinct
interests. As these scholars describe, while many features of England’s land laws were
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embraced in British North America, other features that gained little traction in England
emerged in the colonies. They write:
[…] deed registration was not nearly as threatening in British North
America as in England, such that registries of deeds regularly
sprang up alongside the county courthouses established in the
colonies of settlement, providing a publicly accessible means of
ascertaining the state of title to any given property. They also
served, whether consciously or not, to confirm settlers in the view
that they, rather than Indigenous inhabitants, were the ‘true’
owners of the land.346
While England had trouble launching its land registry system in the same way,
Nova Scotia inherited the English common law doctrine of land registries which underlies
its land registry system, specifically the ‘chain of title’ approach which required backward
investigation title searches to prove a landholder’s right to convey title in the land. Under
this system, land is conveyed by deed, but the deed is not valid unless the grantor had the
legal right to convey it, which was established by proving they legally acquired it from the
previous holder who had legal right to convey it. This process of confirmation would go
back in time until the first “sale” of land, being the Crown grant, or until the longest period
under statutory limitations for undiscovered claims. For example, in Nova Scotia, the
Marketable Titles Act347 specifies a precise period for a backward investigation of title.348
The ‘chain of title’ system in Nova Scotia can be thought of as “a system of dependent
titles; that is, a system in which everyone’s title to land depended on the validity of the
title of all the people who had sold it beforehand.”349
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Eventually, the ‘chain of title’ system was thought to be problematic and
rudimentary. Land registry records can be lost or damaged, causing disastrous effects on
a landowner’s ability to prove title throughout the chain. Also, although this need not be
the case, the process of establishing the chain of title has traditionally been very
expensive, particularly the costs of hiring a legal professional to search the land registry
records, as well as a lawyer’s time to examine and assess the validity of the earlier deeds
in the chain. Additionally, as this scholar explains:
[f]laws in earlier titles were carried on down the line even if later
purchasers knew nothing of them. And because the documents
were in private hands, the potential for fraud and forgery was
great. In the nineteenth century, reform of the law in this field was
one of the burning issues in all countries that had inherited the
English common law. The difficulty was to find a workable
replacement.350
While mortgage lenders welcomed the idea of a more reliable and efficient land
registration system, lawyers and insurance companies have historically resisted this
change. Lawyers have financially benefited from a consistent demand for ‘chain of title’
services, and where title remained uncertain, insurance companies filled that gap with
high premium title insurance. From their perspectives, the land registry system was good
enough.
Reform eventually found its way to Nova Scotia in 2001, with the adoption of Land
Registration Act,351 commonly referred to as the Torrens system. Under the new land
registration regime, the relevant information is indexed by land parcel (known as a PID)
instead of by the deed holder’s name. More importantly, however, registration of the
land interest in the public registry certifies legal ownership. Thus, the Torrens system
eliminates (or at least reduces) the need to perform backward title investigations in
search of possible flaws in title, because the registration process confers good title and
cures defects. As one Torrens scholar explains:
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All that one has to do as a buyer of Torrens system land, therefore,
is to check that the person selling the land is the person named in
the public register as the owner of it, and get on the register after
the sale. There is no need to check whether that seller bought it
from someone else who was the ‘true’ owner of the land, for as
long as a buyer does those things the buyer can be quite sure of
obtaining a good title upon registration.352
While sometimes referred to as a hospital that cures title invalidities, 353 or a
conveyor belt that cleanses messy titles into pristine condition,354 the land registration
system does have its flaws. With the promise of guaranteed title comes the rigorous
controls and risk management (or risk avoidance) measures that are adopted by legal
professionals, in large part due to the professional liability risk imposed on them for errors
and omissions. As with all risks, there are times when after due diligence is completed,
and risks are identified and mitigated, an educated and experienced judgement call is
made as to whether one proceeds despite the remaining risks. In the context of land titles,
this means proceeding to the registration stage with imperfect, but adequate, title to the
property.
There are misconceptions in Nova Scotia that only perfectly clean titles can be
migrated into the Torren’s-based land registration system. However, the land registration
system accepts messy titles.355 It only expects that those flaws are transparent in the
registry records.356 It is important to note here the discretionary decision-making power
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held by lawyers as gatekeepers to clear title through the land registration system. If racial
bias (unconscious or not) leads lawyers to assess African Nova Scotian land as higher risk
than land in White communities, for example, on the basis that title is imperfect, even
though it may be adequate, it could have adverse affects on African Nova Scotian
landowners being able to take advantage of the title cleansing and verification benefits
that underlie the reformed land registration system. The new land migration system
depends on lawyers to certify titles. The decision belongs to them, at their discretion,
having regard to the applicable professional standards. Certification involves risk, for
which professional liability insurance has its limits. Risk involves risk management, and if
those risks are not managed to the lawyer’s satisfaction, the outcome will be risk
avoidance. It is important to acknowledge the possibility of racial bias in the application
of this discretionary power.
3.1.5 Crown Land Grants
It will be recalled that property law regulates interactions involving land. It will
also be recalled that property law in Nova Scotia is rooted in the British tenurial system
which places ownership of land with the Crown who grants permission for others to hold
the land in the form of estates, with a freehold estate being the greatest form of estate
that a person can possess. Through the process of colonization and the implementation
of British land administration laws, a landowner would typically acquire a freehold estate
from the Crown through the receipt of a land grant.357 The initial land grant from the
Crown would then serve as the point of origin from which subsequent legal conveyances
are made and present-day estates are determined valid, or, at least valid enough, through
a backward investigation known as a ‘chain of title’. Changes to the land registration
system over the last thirty years in Nova Scotia have since altered this basic reliance on
the initial land grant to some extent, particularly for land that has been migrated into
Nova Scotia’s land registration system, but in most instances, the backward investigation
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into the chain of title to the initial land grant is still often thought necessary for the
purposes of migrating land into Nova Scotia’s land registration system.
A land grant is distinct from a property deed. A deed is the document which
conveys legal interest in land from one person to another. A land grant is issued by the
Crown and is conveyed by letters patent.358 While colonial Crown land grants are often
characterized as gifts, incentives, or rewards, they were often subject to settlement
conditions, such as cultivation milestones and quit rent payments, and thus liable to
escheatment if those conditions were unfulfilled. A noteworthy example is land that was
granted pursuant to the land regulations that were conveyed to Governor Cornwallis in
1979.359 Those land regulations prescribed conditional grants reserving one shilling per
annum for every fifty acres granted, payable at the expiration of ten year from the date
of grant. The grantees were also obligated to clear and cultivate one third of their lands
within each ten-year period, or otherwise forfeit their land.360 Thus, at year thirty, a
landowner could, in theory, have their land forfeited for failing to cultivate a remaining
one third acreage, notwithstanding making two previous payments of one shilling at the
ten- and twenty-year marks, as well as the two third acreage that had already been
cultivated. This highlights a legal conundrum with those early land grants. The conditions
created uncertainty about the title, especially when the conditions were regularly
unenforced, or unfulfilled without consequence.361 A similar conundrum arises when land
is occupied before the grant the issued, as this scholar explains:
Moreover, since the usual practice was to settle on the strength of
an informal location ticket, habitants found themselves subject to
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tenure terms that were spelled out only after they had invested
substantial labor and capital into a piece of seigneurial land.362
In any event, it is important to note for the purposes of this thesis that colonial
Crown land grants were complicated, not only in the practice of issuing them but also in
the legal interpretation of their terms and conditions. It is also important to remember
that Crown grants are called “grants” even when they are issued for valuable
consideration.363
3.2

The Origins of British Law in Nova Scotia
To understand the colonial land administration laws in nineteenth century Nova

Scotia, the laws must be situated into the context of the province’s colonial formation
within the British Empire, and, in doing so, one must look to the colony’s constitutional
documents.364 A British colony is formed by constitution, which can arise from
parliamentary statute or royal prerogative. In Nova Scotia, it was royal prerogative.365
A constitutional framework that arises through royal prerogative, can be
established from the royal commissions and instructions that were issued to the colonial
administrators who were appointed to lead the colony.366 In Nova Scotia, these
constitutional origins are found in the royal commissions and instructions that were
issued to Governor Cornwallis in 1749.367 These early constitutional commissions and
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instructions prescribed, among other things, the following elements of colonial
formation. First, they required the governor to comply with the Crown’s instructions.
Second, they empowered the governor to select and appoint a maximum of twelve
people to serve as the Majesty’s Council.368 Third, they authorized the governor, with the
advice and consent of the Council, to summon a General Assembly. Forth, they granted
the General Assembly legislative power to make, constitute and ordain laws for the public
peace, welfare, and good government of the province, provided such laws were not
repugnant to the laws and statutes of Britain. Fifth, they authorized colonial officials to
make provision for the administration of finance. And, sixth, they empowered colonial
officials to make provision for the disposition of Crown lands.369
These early instructions on colonial formation reveal the prescriptive nature of
Britain’s control over the creation and administration of law in Nova Scotia, as well as its
colonial activities. This control was exercised through, among other means, the
appointment of local and British-born officials to do its bidding. Individual actors, such as
the Governor and members of the Majesty’s Council and General Assembly, served at the
instruction of and in the interest of the Crown, and at the same time, acted on behalf of
the Crown. However, as will be evident in the land administration practices, by virtue of
distance and time370, the colonial officials situated within the province (and their staff),
were afforded a significant amount of discretion in how they implemented those royal
directives, which, when combined with anti-Black racist sentiments, created conditions
conducive to the racially discriminatory application of ostensibly neutral laws.
The legal system in Nova Scotia at the time of colonial settlement was rooted in
English common law (and still is), but there were some variations in the law applicable to
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the British colonies to accommodate the specific circumstances as colonies. Legal
historians, Girard et al write:
[…] all colonies had legal systems that, while based on English
models, were adapted to local circumstances and were dominated
at every level by personnel who made their life permanently in the
colony. All had also created a distinctive local body of statute law
[…]. There remained, of course, many differences among the
colonies. What law applied and how it was used in particular
places at particular times for particular activities was an always
complex question, and the history of law in this period cannot be
reduced to any simple and overriding theme or formula.371
[emphasis added]
While the legal system in colonial Nova Scotia was complex and multi-faceted, the
Crown ultimately controlled both the executive and legislative branches of government
through the appointment and loyalty of its colonial administrators.372 In doing so, the
Crown dictated not only the creation of colonial laws through its veto power known as
royal assent,373 but also controlled the implementation and administration of all laws in
the province (British-imposed and locally adopted) through its command over the
executive branch of government.
3.2.1 The Majesty’s Council
The Cornwallis Instructions (1749)374 authorized and empowered Cornwallis to
appoint a council to serve the interests of the British crown,375 and to assist the Governor
in the administration of the colonial affairs.376 This council became known as the
Majesty’s Council. London retained control over administration through its instructions
and dispatches and kept close oversight over the Council’s membership and governing
activities. For example, the instructions to Governor Cornwallis ordered that the Surveyor

371

Girard et al, History of Law, supra note 53 at 375.
Rieksts, Maritime Constitutions, supra note 365.
373
Ibid at 24: “the pre-confederation constitutions of the Maritime provinces provided the machinery of
government for these British colonies of North America, and defined the relationship between the Crown
and early legislative assemblies.”
374
Supra note 155.
375
In the instructions from Britain the Council is referred to as “Our council”.
376
Cornwallis Instructions (1749), supra note 155 at para 59.
372

103

General who was selected by London, was required sit on the Majesty’s Council in Nova
Scotia.377 Additionally, while the Governor could fill vacancies on the Council, he could
not increase or decrease the overall number, nor could he suspend a Council member
from service unless the Council member was habitually absent from the province, which
was a prescribed prohibition in the royal instructions. Not surprisingly, Council members
were expressly permitted “to have and enjoy freedom of debate and vote in all affairs of
public concern that may be debated in Council”378 being a cornerstone of England’s belief
in liberty of conscience.379
3.2.2 Imperial Control Over Legislative Assembly
With respect to the Legislative branch of government, the Cornwallis Instructions
(1749)380 authorized and empowered the governor to summon and call General
Assemblies of elected “freeholders and planters” within the province,381 for the purposes
of making laws. As this legal historian writes:
On the legislative front, Cornwallis’s Commission granted the
Governor the authority, with the advice and consent of the Council,
to summon a General Assembly of the “freeholders and planters
within your government according to the usage of the rest of Our
colonies and Plantations in America.” The Governor, with the
advice and consent of the Council and Assembly, was given the full
power and authority to “make, constitute and ordain Laws,
Statutes and Ordinances for the Publick peace, welfare of our said
province and of the people and inhabitants thereof.” Through this
latter provision, legislative authority for Nova Scotia was vested in
the Governor, the Legislative Council, and General Assembly.
However, so that “nothing may be passed or done by our said
council or assembly to the prejudice of us (the Crown), our heirs
and successors”, the Governor was given a general veto power over
any laws so passed.382
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The royal commission to create an elected General Assembly remained in placed
throughout the balance of the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century. Sir
John Coate Sherbrooke, who served as Lieutenant-Governor of Nova Scotia between 1811
to 1816 and George Ramsay, Earl of Dalhousie, who served as Lieutenant-Governor of
Nova Scotia between 1816 to 1820, both received similar instructions pertaining to the
establishment and operations of the Majesty’s Council. As such, the representative
government in this province was not the product of statute, but rather royal prerogative.
It is also important to note that representative government was not for the betterment
of the local residents, but rather, “[i]t was recognized that the new settlements could not
be governed effectively from Westminster and that a measure of local representative
government was needed.”383 However, as this same author points out, “[a]t the same
time there was no room for rival sovereignty. The colonial government had to be limited
to local matters and be subordinate to the central government and parliament.”384
As a result of its origins in royal prerogative, “[t]here were legal limitations upon
the colonial legislative power.”385 The prerogative could be revoked or altered by
subsequent royal instruction, and furthermore, was subject to political restraint through
the exercise of veto power and disallowance of statutes. 386
3.3.3 Imperial Control Over Laws
While the General Assembly in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century is
described as an immature group who “strove somewhat amateurishly and not always
consistently to enhance its privileges, powers, and prestige,”387 it was empowered to pass
legislation, albeit subject to royal assent by a colonial representative bound by loyalty to
royal instructions.388 One notable example where this veto power served to protect Black
383
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people from the anti-Black racism of the Nova Scotia House of Assembly relates to the
Abolition of Slavery Act in 1833. When the British empire was taking steps to emancipate
formerly enslaved African-descended people throughout its colonies, including West
Indies, Bermuda and the Bahamas, the Nova Scotia legislature was taking steps to ward
off an influx of Black migration. In March of 1834, a legislative committee introduced An
Act to prevent the Clandestine Landing of Liberated Slaves, and other Persons therein
mentioned, from Vessels arriving in the Province, which passed the Assembly of Nova
Scotia on April 16, 1834. However, the British House of Assembly disallowed the Act and
thus it never received royal assent.389
While this example served to protect the interests of Black people, the Imperial
veto power over Nova Scotian lawmaking has not always had a positive outcome for Black
people in this province. For example, in the context of land, the Imperial control impeded
the ability to pass local laws which sought to reduce the price of land,390 and had a
detrimental impact on the land issues in Black Refugee communities. Additionally, during
attempts to confirm land titles or relocate them to better land in the province it was this
veto power that was used as an excuse to prevent the Black Refugees from receiving
better opportunities for improved landholdings.391
Britain carefully set strict parameters around Nova Scotia’s ability to make laws.
For example, the Cornwallis Instructions (1749)392 state:
You are to observe in the Passing of all Laws, that the Stile of
enacting the same be by the Governor, Council and Assembly; You
are also strictly to observe in the passing of all Laws, that whatever
may be requisite upon each different Matter be accordingly
provided for by a different Law without intermixing in one and the
same Act such things as have no proper Relation to each other, and
You are more especially to take Care that no Clause or Clauses be
inserted in or annexed to any Act which shall be foreign to what the
Title of such respective Act imports, And that no perpetual Clause
389
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be part of any Temporary Law, and that no Act whatever be
suspended, Altered, continued revived or repealed by Gen’ Words,
but that the Title and Date of such Act so suspended, altered,
continued, revived or repealed be particularly mentioned and
expressed in the enacting Part.393
These early royal instructions prohibited legislative practices such as omnibus bills,
which has notably been on the rise in the last few decades.394 Similarly, Britain prohibited
the passing of any laws to be enacted for less than two years,395 any laws which a royal
predecessor refused,396 or any laws “of an unusual and extraordinary nature and
importance.”397
3.3.4 Imperial Control Over Revenue
The imperial control over Nova Scotia’s executive and legislative branches of
government, and consequently the laws in this province, was fortified through its power
over the public finances. All public money had to be spent by warrant under the seal of
the governor398 and the early Assembly was prohibited from passing any law that
collected revenue from colonists, unless the funds were paid to the British crown.399
Britain prioritized the need to defray the costs of colonization through revenue that was
generated in and from the colony, at the same time prioritizing the needs of British
capitalists.400 Britain’s primary objective was to ensure its own paramountcy. For
example, the early commissions to Governor Cornwallis stated:
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It is Our Will and Pleasure that you do not upon any pretense
whatsoever on Pain of Our highest displeasure give your assent to
any Law wherein the Natives or Inhabitants of the Province of Nova
Scotia or Island of Prince Edward and Cape Breton are [put] on a
more advantageous footing than those of this Kingdom or whereby
Duties shall be laid upon the Shipping or upon the Product or
Manufactures thereof upon any pretense whatsoever.401
3.3.5 Legacy of Imperial Control
The paramountcy of the British Crown was heavily embedded within the early
legal structures of Canada, and consequently, remnants persist today in Nova Scotia’s
legal system. Not surprisingly, this is evident in the way anti-Black racism is effectuated
through the law. When compared to the more overt racist laws in the United States, Nova
Scotia inherited Britain’s more subtle, subconscious, and covert types of racism that are
deeply embedded within our legal system and thus more difficult to identify and even
more difficult to dismantle. For example, on its face, the applicable land administration
laws in effect at the time of the Black Refugees arrival to Nova Scotia did not explicitly
discriminate against the Black Refugees based on race. However, a closer examination of
the effect of those laws on the Black Refugees reveals the covert and systematic ways
through which the government oppressed one racial group and benefited the other. AntiBlack racism (or, conversely, White supremacist ideology) may not have been the express
intent of lawmakers, but the effect remains that Black people were disadvantaged by the
law and White people were advantaged law. Disparate racial outcomes such as this are
the result of subtle, shifting, and systematic circumstances that are complex, varied, and
difficult to detect and dismantle, more so than the explicit racially discriminatory laws
that are more prevalent in the United States.
Systemic racism in law is the result of a carefully crafted colonization process that
spanned time and distance of enormous magnitude. In Nova Scotia, this colonization
process ultimately formed the basis of law in this province stemming from the province’s
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colonial constitution which was derived from royal commissions, instructions, and
dispatches to colonial governors. These instructions and dispatches from Britain to Nova
Scotia were prescriptive, not optional. Their terms “required the Governor to comply with
its provisions, and to govern according to the Instructions therewith, or thereafter
given.”402 Furthermore, “the Governor was the King’s servant, acting for and in the name
of the Crown.”403 “‘Pure’ self-help was not condoned, and this may explain why a vigilante
tradition never evolved in British North America.”404
It is tempting to think that this imperial influence ended with Confederation, but
that is not the case. While colonial Nova Scotia was granted representative government
in mid-eighteenth century, it was not until almost 100 years later that self-government
arose through responsible government in mid-nineteenth century. The 1839 Lord
Durham's Report405 is thought to have played a significant role in that constitutional shift,
as one author writes “[w]ith the publication of Lord Durham’s Report the era of colonial
self-government officially began, and with self-government the idea that the colonies
should control their own land policy and land revenues.”406
While the British North America Act played an integral role in the growth of law in
this province, the roots were laid long before 1867. As Mark Rieksts points out, “[t]he
early constitutions of the Maritime provinces are still relevant to the post-Confederation
constitutional framework, since they were retained (with only slight modifications) as
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each province entered confederation.”407 When Nova Scotia joined with other colonies
to form Canada, the colonial constitution remained, albeit modified by the British North
America Act. Mark Rieksts writes:
The colonial constitutions of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and P.E.I
were continued after their admission to the Canadian union,
subject to the provisions of the BNA Act, 1867. […]. There have
been other changes to the constitutional machinery of the
government in the Maritime provinces over the years, but the
broad outlines of the colonial constitutions have remained. By
virtue of the nature and scope of their provincial constitutions, in
the Maritime provinces, it can truly be said that the choices of the
future are rooted in the decisions of the past.408
It is within this context of imperial control over the creation and implementation of the
legal system in Nova Scotia that the early nineteenth century land administration system
can be better understood.
3.3

Pre-1807 Land Administration Laws
To better understand the land administration laws that the Black Refugees arrived

into, it is important to go back to the beginning of Britain’s process of colonization through
land regulation in this province. As one historian writes,
since land was the most valuable natural resource of a colony, the
way in which crown lands were administered had a profound
effect, not simply on colonial prosperity and the progress of
settlement, but also on the successful promotion of current
imperial designs.409
However, the system of granting lands in this province has “long been a source of
much dissatisfaction.”410 It was complex and messy, and the problems were exacerbated
with time and distance between London and Halifax. As explained by legal historians
Girard et al:
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[…] land granting and settlement was not a simple or tidy
process, and the eighteenth century bequeathed a
variety of land administration problems to its successor,
while at the same time the nineteenth threw up new
challenges. […] [c]entral to all these controversies was
the question of title to land. […] In the Maritimes and
Newfoundland it was the need to deal with those who
were without formal titles or who had ‘imperfect’ ones
but occupied and developed the land nonetheless.411
Two primary considerations influenced colonial settlement decisions in British
North America. First, a settled population in the colonies would create an economic
market for manufacturers in England.412 Second, using colonial lands as a source of
revenue would help defray the costs of imperial administration.413 However, after the loss
of the more valuable American colonies during the American Revolutionary War in 1783,
British attitudes towards the remaining colonies in the region began to change. Historian
Riddell writes:
[t]he remaining colonies were thought to be of little
value for settlement, and the expense of administering
them was a constant source of concern. […]. In this mood
of indifference and preoccupation the imperial
government after 1783 accepted its responsibility for the
administration of the land of the colonies.414
The attitude of the imperial government toward the distribution of “waste lands”
in its colonies, was one guided by self serving interests. Riddell explains:
No policy in regard to land was ever formulated by the
British government in the period between 1783 and
1825. If, however, the whole set of regulations and
instructions applying to land in the various colonies is
taken and considered, it is possible to discern four
general objectives that were more or less consistently
present These are, first, that land should be distributed
in such a manner as to encourage settlement; second,
411
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that it should be distributed in such a manner as to
produce revenue; third, that it should be regarded as an
asset upon which the crown could draw to subsidize
special projects, to reward officials, or to pension
servants; and, fourth, that land should be used to endow
either the government itself, or institutions which it
desired to establish.415 [emphasis added]
Ironically, as Riddell also points out, “The fact that these objectives are inconsistent or
mutually incompatible was no cause of concern to a government only dimly aware that it
had a policy at all.”416
The colonial administration of land in British North America “was a process driven
by economics and politics but effected and legitimized by law.”417 In this way, the law,
and the legal institutions and legal actors that support it, facilitated the allocation of land
in Nova Scotia.
As described above, the origins of British law in Nova Scotia derive from a series
of royal commissions, instructions, and dispatches issued to colonial governors. These
documents were “rules of law”, accepted as such and acted upon by those who
administered crown lands. J. Murray Beck writes:
After the session, [LG] Kempt forwarded Chief Justice
Blowers' opinion that colonial constitutions should rest
on statute [of the UK parl.] rather than on the governors'
instructions which the assemblies considered to be
binding on the governors only and not on themselves.
But Kempt strongly disagreed. Many colonists, he said,
believed the instructions to be the more secure
foundation of a constitution. Although the British
Parliament could always change a statute, it would be
difficult for His Majesty to repeal any rights which he had
granted by his instructions.418 [emphasis added]

415

Ibid at 387.
Ibid at 387.
417
Girard et al, History of Law, supra note 53 at 374 “The settlement of tens of thousands of Europeans on
Upper Canadian land once occupied by Indigenous peoples was a process driven by economics and politics
but effected and legitimized by law.”
418
J. Murray Beck, Politics of Nova Scotia, 1st ed., vol 1 (Four East Publications, 1985) at 92.
416

112

Thus, the “law” that the Black Refugees arrived into were the royal instructions and
dispatches which empowered the governor to grant land at his discretion, but subject to
the prescriptive details instructing him how to do so.419 In this way, the law instructed the
actors to allocate the land in a prescribed manner but gave discretionary authority to
determine the suitability of eligible recipients.
3.3.1 Instructions to Governor Cornwallis (1749)
To better understand the legal framework through which the Black Refugees were
being allotted land in the early nineteenth century, it is helpful to first look at the colony’s
land policies that emerged sixty years prior to their arrival, in the late eighteenth century.
The early land regulations instructed the governor to distribute colonial lands through an
administration system set up in the colony. While these regulations were detailed and
prescriptive, the “governors were given discretionary power to make extensive grants to
worthy settlers, and this power was used with great freedom.”420
The British primary objective in distributing land in Nova Scotia to British
colonialists through the Cornwallis Instructions (1749)421 was to assert dominance
through supported settlement of “better people”.
for the better Peopling Our said Province with British
Subjects and improving and extending the valuable
Fishery thereof We have thought fit to give certain
Encouragement to such of the reduced Officers and
private Men lately discharged Our Land and Sea Forces,
and others Our Subjects as are desirous of accepting
Grants of Land and settling with or without their Families
in Our said Province.422 [emphasis added]
The goal was to populate the province, with British settlers, to develop the land for
economic profit. To this end, surveying the land and describing its quality to London was
a primary task for the new governor of Nova Scotia.423
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The early land grants were generous in size and low in cost. The prescribed
amounts varied (based on rank in military service) from 630 acres for captains of the sea
force with families to 60 acres to private soldiers or seaman with families, all grants in fee
simple free from the payment of any quit rent or taxes for a term of ten years,424 and at
the end of ten years they were required to pay no more than one shilling per annum for
every fifty acres of land granted. 425 There was extensive discretion in the size of land
grants to other non-military settlers,426 provided the governor did not grant more than
1,000 acres to one individual.427
In terms of cultivation milestones, grantees were obligated to clear and cultivate
one third part of their lands within 10 years, another third part within the 20 years, and
the remaining third within the 30 years. 428 Land surveyors played a significant role in the
province’s land administration process and continue to do so today. The appointment of
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surveyors429 and the commencement of survey activities430 were among the top priorities
in the Cornwallis Instructions (1749).431 There was special emphasis instructing surveyors
to create townships sized at 100,000 acres on the “best and most profitable Land”, and
the surveyors were given strict orders to return surveys “as soon as possible, with a
particular Description of each Township and the Nature of the Soil within the same,
distinguishing the profitable and unprofitable part thereof.”432 The work of surveyors was
so essential that they were exempt from juries and military so as to focus solely on the
task of surveying, describing and preparing the land for allocation.433:
The Surveyor General in Nova Scotia was appointed by Britain and had a
designated seat on the Majesty’s Council.434 The first Surveyor General in Nova Scotia was
Charles Morris (1711-1781), who served as surveyor-general from 1749 until 1781, when
he was succeeded by his son, Charles Morris (1731-1802), who served as surveyor-general
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get with Relation to its Extent and Situation.”
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Ibid at para 109: And Whereas several Complaints have been made by the Surveyor General and other
Officers of Our Customs in Our Plantations in America, that they have been frequently obliged to serve on
Juries and Personally to appear in Arms whenever the Militia is Drawn out, And thereby are much hindered
in the Execution of their Employments, Our Will and Pleasure is, that You take Effectual Care and giver the
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Ibid at para 110: “And Whereas We have thought it for Our Royal Service that all the Surveyors General
of Our Customs in America for the time being should be admitted to sit and vote in the respective Councils
in the several Islands and Provinces within their Districts as Councillors extraordinary during the time of
their Residence there; Now We do hereby constitute and appoint Our Surveyor General of Our Customs in
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from 1781 until 1802, when he was succeeded by his son, Charles Morris (1759-1831),
who served as surveyor-general from 1802 until 1831, when he was succeeded by his son,
John Spry Morris who held the position from 1831 until the position merged with the
Commissioner of Crown Lands in 1851. The Morris family held the position of Surveyor
General of Nova Scotia for its entire existence, spanning over four generations.435 Land
surveying is a leading cause of unclear land titles in this province, with problems dating
back to original land surveying practices.436
Another important element of the early land administration laws was the need to
uphold the legal principle of tenure in land. Early instructions to Governor Cornwallis
prescribed severe penalties for “squatting” on land,437 being a practice that England often
sought to discourage, despite its repeated failures in being able to so. The early land
administration laws also reflected principles of colonialism. It promoted the use of land
grants as a tool to incentivise intermarriages between Indigenous peoples and White
settlers,438 and to convert French settlers from Roman Catholicism to the Protestant
church.439
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436
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3.3.2 Moratorium on Free Land Grants (1790)
After 1783, the generous land granting practices of the mid eighteenth century
gave way to smaller land grants and a renewed emphasis on “actual settlers.” Historian
R.G. Riddell writes:
The instructions that were issued to governors after
1783 regularly made provision for small grants to actual
settlers. As a protection against the engrossing of large
quantities of land, and to guarantee that the land-holder
had both the ability and intention to improve his holding,
elaborate lists of settlement duties were set forth in the
instructions.
The revised land administration system was one based on the theory of
meritocracy. A genuine hardworking colonist could obtain land “free of any cost other
than a small annual quit-rent a grant of 100 acres plus 50 acres for each member of his
family” but disingenuous or lazy colonists were to receive no land at all. However, in
practice, the application of this system succumbed to the neglectful oversight of the
British government and widespread chaos in the allocation of and settlement on land in
this province.440
Eventually, amidst the chaos of lavish land allocations to underserving colonists,
and upon realization that the cultivation conditions were not enough to curb land
speculation, England placed a moratorium on large freehold grants in March 1790.441 The
Colonial Office instructed colonial governors to refrain from further grants of land.442 This

further means of brining the said Inhabitants to a due Obedience to Our Government, You are also hereby
directed to give all possible Encouragement to Intermarriages between them and Our Protestant Subjects.”
440
Riddell, Land Policy, supra note 390 at 387. "In practice, however, the British government paid very little
attention to the application of this system. The settlement regulations were cumbersome and unpractical,
and they were included in the instructions to governors without any apparent intention that they should
be enforced.”
441
Brown, Cape Breton, supra note 410 at 404. “…the issuing of grants had been discontinued since the
month of June 1790, when instructions were received from the Secretary of State ‘to restrain further grants
except completing those for which warrants had been issued’.”
442
Girard et al, History of Law, supra note 53 at 240: “In 1790 London instructed its British North American
governors to refrain from further free grants of land and did not lift this fiat until 1807. This policy, which
arrived ‘like a bolt from the blue,’ was influenced by the U.S. example of charging a dollar an acre for lands
granted in the western territories. Dorchester refused to apply it in Canada, and in Nova Scotia most of the
good lands had already been granted.”
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dramatic shift in colonial land administration laws created a serious disconnect between
possession and title of many occupants in the province, particular in the Cape Breton
region, causing situations of occupation by licence or unauthorized settlement.443
3.4

The 1807 Land Administration Laws
As many legal scholars can attest, changes in the law are often the result of shifts

in strategic planning. The changes to laws governing the distribution of Crown lands in
1807, exemplifies this statement. To explain, the 1790 moratorium on land grants created
more problems than it sought to resolve. Rather than halting the distribution of colonial
lands to reign in bad behaviour, it created an underground system of governor-issued
licenses of occupation and settler-initiated squatting. This resulted in situations where
the lands were occupied and cultivated without ownership, on the hope that one day a
grant would be issued, or in other instances, the lands fell into the hands of land
speculators with no intentions to occupy and cultivate it.444 Consequently, by the turn of
the nineteenth century, the distribution of colonial land to settlers was in a state of
disarray. It is within this context that Secretary Bathurst sent to the colonial governor of
Nova Scotia royal instructions dated August 29, 1807,445 with the opening paragraph as
follows:
Whereas in order to prevent irregularities in the mode of
passing Grants of the Waste Lands of the Crown, and to the
end that we might avail ourselves of the advantages which
would arise to Us Our Heirs and Successors by the
introduction of some further Regulations to be observed in
the disposal of the said Lands.446
The royal instructions proceeded to describe how the Colonial Office had earlier
sought fit to suspend until further notice the governor’s power to grant lands vested in
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him for disposition,447 but they had since decided to lift the suspension in the hope that
the population in the province would grow, and, consequently, Britain’s financial
investment in the colony would improve.448 Thus, upon reflection of the earlier land grant
moratorium and the renewed desire to increase settlement in the colony, the Colonial
Office thought fit to revoke the March 6, 1790 restraining order, and furnish new
instructions for the disposal of Crown lands in the province.449 With that change, the 1807
Land Administration Laws in Nova Scotia were adopted.
3.4.1 Objective of Regulations
The 1807 Land Administration Laws were designed to rapidly increase settlement
and promote the economic progress of the colony and, in turn, Britain.450 With the 1790
restraining order lifted, the power of the governor to issue free land grants to settlers was
revived, but with some notable restrictions. The Colonial Office, still uneasy with the failed
settlement policies of the eighteenth century, writes:
And whereas great inconveniences have arisen in some of
Our Colonies from granting large quantities of Land to
persons who have been unwilling or unable to settle and
cultivate the same whereby the prosperity of the Colony
has been checked and retarded to the manifest injury of the
active and industrious settlers and of the publick Interest.451
[emphasis added]
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Ibid at para 1: “[…]; We thought fit by Our Order and Instructions under our Signet and Sign Manual
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Burroughs, Administration of Crown Lands, supra note 164 at 80, commenting also about the correlation
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The 1807 Land Administration Laws, supra note 193 at para 3.
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This undertone of caution and restraint prompted the Colonial Office to lift the
ban on land grants, but subject to the precise instructions and a strengthened
bureaucratic administration to ensure compliance in the application of law. Note,
however, despite this short leash aimed at protecting its financial investment, the
imperial oversight neglected to implement measures that would curb the impacts of racial
discrimination in the application of those laws.
3.4.2 Bona Fide Settlers
It is important to note that while the 1807 Land Administration Laws did not
expressly exclude Black people from eligibility to receive land grants; land grants were
available only to those persons “as shall be desirous of improving and cultivating the
same.” The interpretation of this concept likely had less to do with the individual’s desire,
and more to do with colonial administrator’s idea as to the individual’s capability to
accomplish the objective. Britain had pre-conceived notions as to who was a bona fide
settler,452 which likely did not include African descended individuals who recently fled
captivity and enslavement. As this concept evolved over the 30 years following the 1807
Land Administration Laws, the bona fide settler was understood to be resident colonists
and emigrants from the British Isles, both voluntary capitalists and government assisted
pauper emigrants. There was special emphasis on encouraging Britain’s poor and working
class to emigrate to the colony, primarily to alleviate Britain’s population during peak
unemployment periods.453
3.4.3 Land Grant Process
The legally prescribed process of obtaining land grants under the 1807 Land
Administration Laws started with a person filing a written petition in the office of the
provincial secretary, addressed to the governor, pointing out the property they desired
to receive. In keeping with the eligibility requirements to improve and cultivate the
land,454 the petitioner would need to state their ability to do so, either through their own
452
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capability or with the help of servants. The land petitioner would also need to produce
proof of loyalty to the Crown, by oath of allegiance, and, having regard to the overarching
fear of land speculation and absentee landowners, the land petitioner would have been
required to show (by oath) that they were not seeking the grant with the intention of
selling the land immediately thereafter, but rather with a genuine intent to cultivate and
improve.
The land petition was then submitted to the governor and council for deliberation,
and if approved, a record was made in the journal of executive business describing the
number of acres to be allotted to the land petitioner. A warrant of survey was then signed
by the governor, directed to the surveyor general of the province, authorizing and
requiring him or his deputies to survey to make a “faithful and exact” survey of the land
in such warrant, and to return it within six months with surveyed lot and plan description
annexed thereto.455 Meanwhile, the petitioner had six months to apply for and take out
the grant for the lands surveyed by virtue of the warrant of survey,456 which the petitioner
was incapable of doing until the survey was complete, hence the practical outcome that
many petitioners took possession of their land years before receiving confirmed title
through the grant.457 It is possible that at this point a colonial administrator granted a
licence of occupation (express or implied) to the settler pending completion of the formal
process.

Warrants of Survey for such Lands as shall be vacant and ungranted to such Person or Persons as shall be
desirous of improving and cultivating the same Provided that all and every person and persons who shall
apply to you for any Warrant or Warrants for Lands shall previously to their obtaining the same make it
appear to you in Council that they are in a condition to cultivate and improve the Lands according to the
conditions specific in these Our Instructions or by establishing thereon a sufficient number of Settlers either
servants or others according to the proportion herein after prescribed and shall at the same time produce
such proof of their loyalty to Us and attachment to Our Government as shall be required by you and Our
Council and also take several Oaths required by law.”
455
Ibid at para 2.
456
Ibid at para 2: “And it is Our further Will and Pleasure that the several persons to whom you with the
advice and consent of Our said Council shall grant such Warrants of Survey shall within six months apply for
and take our Grants for the Lands surveyed by virtue of such Warrants.”
457
Murdoch, Epitome of Laws, supra note 46 at 242: “Upon the survey taking place, the settler usually took
possession of his lot, and sometimes many years would intervene, before he could meet the further
expenses of a grant.”
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When the surveyor general made a return of his survey to the governor, it then
had to be directed to the surveyor general of woods and forests to confirm that the land
was not included in the timber reserves that were under his care for use in the royal
navy.458 If the land was not included in the timber reserves, then the return of the survey
and the confirmatory certificate from the surveyor general of woods and forests were
sent to the provincial attorney-general who was responsible for preparing the draft grant
in prescribed form and in strict compliance with the terms and conditions of the law.459
The provincial secretary then finalized the grant, which was signed by the governor and
affixed with a seal, and then recorded in the provincial secretary's office460 with a plan
signed by the surveyor-general annexed both to the grant and the record.
The completed and recorded grant was then sent to the office of the receivergeneral of quit-rents and the auditor of grants, in each of which offices the grant was
entered into their records or deemed void and of none effect.461 Along the exchange
through the many offices from the provincial secretary to receiver to auditor, each would
sign an accompanying certificate confirming their recording or docketing of the grant.
Finally, it was then given to the grantee as complete, upon payment of any requisite
fees.462
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A copy of the land registries entries was required to be sent regularly by the
treasury commission, and an abstract of all grants had to be transmitted to the Colonial
Office, with a duplicate to the Privy Council for Trade and Plantations, every six months
through the provincial secretary.463
The land granting process under the 1807 Land Administration Laws was
cumbersome and inefficient and had many touch points that were vulnerable to mistakes
along the way. Furthermore, as with most laws that are passed by individuals who are
removed from the realities of the circumstance, the 1807 Land Administration Laws
presupposed a land administration infrastructure that simply did not exist in the colony
of Nova Scotia. It was unrealistic for London to expect land surveys to be completed within
six months, and that interim occupancy by its prospective owners would not end in
permanent occupancy under colour of title. In this way the Instructions created the
conditions conducive to permitted occupancy on Crown land without fee simple.
3.4.4 Lot Size Constraints
The land grant instructions, based on lessons learned from the past,464 required
the governor to “take special care” that the quantity of land issued by a grant be in
proportion with the ability of the applicant to cultivate the same.465 Thus the 1807 Land
Administration Laws required the governor to strictly observe the following regulations
in all grants that are to be made by him:
One hundred acres of land be the proportion to be allotted to any
person being Master or Mistress of a Family and fifty acres for each
of their children actually present at the time of making out the
Grant.466 [emphasis added]
The governor was further authorized to grant a larger tract of land to a person if
it appeared to the governor and the Council that the applicant is “of sufficient ability to
463
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cultivate”, provided, however, that any grants over 500 acres required express permission
of the Crown,467 upon recommendation by the governor and Council with supplementary
reasons submitted to one of the secretaries of state.468
The maximum number acres permitted to be issued through the 1807 Land
Administration Laws was 500 acres per grantee, but 200 acres was the “ordinary
allotment to a settler who was possessed of the average means of cultivation.”469 At the
very least, 100 acres of land was needed to be self sufficient. Twenty years after the 1807
Land Administration Laws, testimony in connection with the Lord Durham’s Report470
indicates that successful settlement required at least 100 acres of land, being at least 25
acres for cultivation, 25 acres for wood, and 50 acres for pasture.471 These minimum
standards for lot sizes (100 – 200 acres) were in effect at the time of settling the Black
Refugees, yet the Black Refugees received only 10 acre lots. Furthermore, these were
minimum standards. The governor was authorized to grant up to 500 acres of land and
did so regularly to White settlers.
3.4.5 Quit Rent Requirements
While the governor was authorized to issue land grants above 100 acres (but
below 500 acres), a land grant exceeding 200 acres triggered additional quit rent
amounts.472 The 1807 Land Administration Laws required that all grantees be required to
pay to the Receiver-General quit rent in the amount of two shillings sterling for every
hundred acres, to commence two years after the date of the Grant, and to be paid yearly
467
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and every year, or, in default of such payment, the Grant to be void.473 However, if the
grant exceeded 200 acres, the 1807 Land Administration Laws required the grantee to
pay to the Receiver-General quit rent in the amount of five shillings for every fifty acres
granted over and above the quantity of 200 acres.474
The collection of quit rent was an integral component of the legalized land
administration system. It will be recalled that Britain’s primary objective for colonial
settlement was financial gain to Britain. To accomplish this, the costs of administering
colonialism were best paid through what little revenue the colony could generate. Land
revenue was a key source revenue generation. Therefore, it was imperative that the
governor establish and maintain effective financial controls, a vital responsible that the
Secretary of State of War and Colonies emphasized in his concluding instruction to the
Governor of Nova Scotia in 1807, as follows:
And it is Our further Will and Pleasure that you do consider of a
proper and effectual method of collecting, receiving and
accounting for Our Quit Rents when the same shall become
payable whereby all Frauds, Concealment, Irregularity or Neglect
therein may be prevented and whereby the receipt thereof may be
effectually checked and controlled. And if it shall then appear
necessary to pass an Act for the more speedily and regularly
collecting Our Quit Rents you are to prepare the heads of such a
Bill as you shall think may most effectually conduce to the
procuring the good ends proposed and to transmit the same to us
through One of Our Principal Secretaries of State for Our further
directions therein.475
3.4.6 Cultivation Conditions
In addition to the payment of quit rent, land grants were subject to occupation
and cultivation conditions that endangered the legality of their status as land grants. For
every fifty acres of “plantable” land, each grantee had up to five years to clear and work
473
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at least three acres of that part of the land which the grantee shall judge most convenient.
Alternatively, the grantee could clear and drain three acres of swampy or sunken grounds
or drain three acres of marsh if any such lands were on their tract. For every fifty acres of
“barren” land, each grantee was required to, within three years of the grant, put and keep
on his land “three neat cattle which number he shall be obliged to continue on his land
until three acres of every fifty of the improvable land shall be fully cleared and
improved.”476 It is interesting to note here the expectation that grantees would acquire
both plantable and barren lands on their lot. However, contingencies were in place in the
event the entire lot was barren. The 1807 Land Administration Laws stipulate that if no
part of the grantee’s tract of land was fit for immediate cultivation, the grantee was
obligated to erect upon the barren lands a “habitable dwelling house” within three years
from the date of grant and at the same time keep “three neat cattle” for every fifty acres
of granted land.477 Furthermore, if the granted land was “so rocky or strong as not to be
fit for culture or pasture” than the grantee could satisfy the cultivation conditions by
employing within a reasonable time from the date of grant and for a duration of at least
three years, “one able hand for every hundred acres in cutting wood clearing the land or
in digging any stone quarry.”478
The determination of plantable or rocky and barren land, and the quantity of both
on each tract of land, was required to be made by the land surveyor upon instruction from
the governor in the warrant of survey, and described by the surveyor in the plan
description.479 It is important to note that the 1807 Land Administration Laws required
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the governor to evenly spread out the plantable and barren lands among the grantees.
They state:
[…] And Our Will and pleasure is that in all Grants of Lands to be
made by you as aforesaid [,] regard be had to the profitable and
unprofitable acres that each Grantee may have a proportionable
number of one sort and the other as as[sic] far as local
circumstances may admit.
It is probable that the Lieutenant Governor, on the advice of the Surveyor General,
violated this aspect of the law when deciding the location of the Black Refugee
settlements. There have been many concerns expressed about the poor quality of land
that was allocated to the Black Refugees, and while much of the land in Nova Scotia was
difficult to cultivate, particularly in the interior parts of the province, having regard to the
racial context in which these decisions were being made, the Black Refugees were likely
settled on disproportionate amounts of barren lands relative to White settlers. This racial
disparity in land quality would have then exacerbated the inability of the Black Refugees
to meet the terms of the grant (had the grants been issued as they should have been).
Demonstrating to the government that the cultivation conditions were met was a
necessary step toward finalizing a land grant, but the legal process for proving completion
was not simple nor straightforward. When a grantee reached their cultivation milestones,
they then had to attend their local county court to have the proof certified by the judge
and jury foreman, which certification then had to be filed with the registrar’s office to be
recorded into the registry with the corresponding grant, or otherwise risk forfeiture of
the land.480
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Colonial land in Nova Scotia was granted with the expectation that the recipient
would occupy and cultivate their property. Land cultivation milestones were often
expressed as conditions in the land grants, or in the paperwork that preceded the grant
such as a ticket of location. Historian Lillian Gates writes: “[I]t was generally understood
that land was granted on condition of cultivation. The location tickets which preceded the
patents contained this condition.”481 However, as Gates also points out, while land had
been granted on condition of occupation and improvement “the requirement had neither
been defined nor enforced.’482 This lack of clarity often meant that cultivation
expectations were not met, despite them being conditions precedent to the grant. In
addition, the cultivation requirements were often unenforced by government officials. To
this end, Gates writes: “It took time to perform settlement duties and if settlers could not
receive their patents until these duties were proved by the filing of a proper certificate
[…] the land officers could not receive their fees until the patents were passed.483 This
created an incentive for government officials to confirm grants event though conditions
remained unfulfilled.
3.4.7 Prescriptive Nature
While the 1807 Land Administration Laws did not prescribe the form of land grant
document per se, they did give precise instructions on some of its terms. For example,
there was specific instruction that the terms and conditions must be specified in every
land grant, along with an express clause that if the terms and conditions were not fulfilled
within five years from the date of the grant then the grant shall be void and of no effect
and the lands reverted back to the Crown.484 It is important to note here the injustice of
occupying and cultivating land for five years with permission, only to have it forfeited
when one or more of the strict conditions remained unfulfilled or perhaps fulfilled but
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not demonstratable as such through the legalized bureaucracy of the courts and
government offices.
There were other areas where precise wording was prescribed by law, such as the
requirement that each grant specify the county and parish in which the granted lands
were situated,485 and the requirement that all grants of land contain a clause which
reserve to the Crown and its heirs and successors all mines and minerals.486 There were
also requirements to insert a clause which deems the grant null and void if the lands
contain timber that should be reserved for the royal navy.487 Lastly, to ensure the settler
population were aware of the new land laws, the governor was required to publicly
announce the terms and conditions by proclamation.488
3.4.8 Surveyors
As previously mentioned, land surveyors formed an integral part of the colonial
land administration process. They were relied upon to lay out the lots and mark the
boundaries, which comprised an essential component of every land grant. Land surveyors
were given extraordinary discretionary power to describe the lands and distinguish
between plantable land and barren land and to allocate which sort to which grantee. The
Surveyor-General was an esteemed member on the Majesty’ Council, and the position
that was held in its entirety by the influential Morris family spanning four generations.489
However, notwithstanding the surveyor’s immense power, they too were not spared from
imperial instruction which, among other things, prescribed the rules by which land
surveyors conducted their surveys. For example, the 1807 Land Administration Laws
required surveyors to run the boundary lines in such manner that the length of land tract
did not extend along the shoreline or riverbanks but rather into the mainland so that the
grantees would have “a convenient share of what accommodation such Shores or Rivers
may afford […]” and further, that sufficient space be marked out and reserved for roads
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from the interior settlements to the shoreline and riverbanks, and the front of every lot
not exceed eighty rods.490
The land surveyors were trusted colonial administrators, appointed under the
Surveyor General, and obligated to swear an oath for the due performance of their office
and return of their exact surveys.491 Yet, despite their immense discretionary power over
the administration of land in this province, they were not authorized by law to decide lot
sizes. This power was reserved for the governor with the advice and consent of the
Majesty’s Council. It is important to remember this point when examining the
circumstances that resulted in the Black Refugee’s receiving only ten acres lots of land,
on the advice of the Surveyor General.
3.4.9 Escheatment
The 1807 Land Administration Laws were instrumental in carrying out the land
administration policies of the early nineteenth century. The end of the 1790 restraining
order on land grants opened a new era of gratuitous, albeit conditional, land grants. It
also paved a new road for the governor to reclaim the much-needed land that was being
tied up in previously issued land grants but abandoned or otherwise unimproved. In this
regard, the Secretary of State of War and Colonies wrotes to the Governor of Nova Scotia:
And whereas considerable bodies of Land within Our said Province
are claimed or held by persons who have not improved and
cultivated the same nor otherwise complied with the Terms and
Conditions of their respective Grants and in most instances no Quit
Rents reserved to Us have been paid thereupon. And whereas
many loyal Subjects who may hereafter come into Our said
Province may be desirous of settling and improving the Lands
which are under the circumstances aforesaid. It is Our Will and
490
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pleasure that you do give directions to the proper Officers that
such legal steps be taken as may effectually revest in Us Our Heirs
and Successors such Lands as by Law are liable to be escheated
and forfeited within Our said Province either by non improvement,
non payment of Quit Rents, or non performance of any other
conditions of the Grants and thereupon to grant the same to such
persons in such quantities and upon such conditions as by these
Instructions you are directed and authorized.492 [emphasis added]
The escheatment process proved to be more difficult and costly than the Colonial
Office thought it to be, and so it was many years before the province took meaningful
steps to recover escheatable lands for redistribution.
3.4.10

Legalizing Prior Land Grants
It will be recalled that the 1790 land grant embargo created an underground

system of informal land allocations because the governor was prohibited from issuing free
land grants. This resulted in many British immigrants settling on lots of land with informal
permission from the governor to occupy it on the hope that one day he would be
permitted to grant title, or in other situations, settlers adversely possessing land without
authorization from either Crown or the absent landowner. Despite the Colonial Office’s
attempt to curb the “irregularities” of the eighteenth-century land laws with the 1790
restraining order, those irregularities in land grants persisted, just in a different form.
Whereas the legal grant of large tracts of land to speculators may have discontinued,493
illegal grants of land were issued with ostensible authority and promises of title, without
any controls in place to assess the validity of the government decision making. Thus, one
of the key objectives of the 1807 Land Administration Laws was to legalize title to
previously issued land grants by prioritizing the processing of their applications. This was
one of the first of many land titles clarification initiatives that the province of Nova Scotia
would undertake over the next 200 years.
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The 1807 Land Administration Laws aptly describe the problem, and the
government’s approach to resolve it:
And whereas it is understood that many Persons since the date of
Our restraining Order of the sixth day of March 1790 have been
induced to settle upon portions of the Waste Lands within our Said
Province in the expectation of receiving regular Titles thereto
when the above mentioned Restrictions should be withdrawn. It is
Our Will and pleasure that all due preference and encouragement
should be given to the applications of persons so circumstanced for
Grants of the Lands upon which they may have actually settled or
which they had received permission to occupy subject however to
the restrictions contained in these Instructions with respect to the
number of Acres to be granted and provided they do within twelve
months after publication notice given by you of Our gracious
intention in this respect apply for and take our Grants in proper
form for the same.494 [emphasis added]
Unfortunately, the problem of irregular titles and squatting persisted in Nova Scotia,
despite many attempts by government to rectify the situation. Thus, the land titles issue
was not and is not unique to African Nova Scotian communities, yet the cycle of poverty
that is often attributed to this problem, seems to have disproportionately affected African
Nova Scotians.
3.4.11

Tenure
It is important to note that the 1807 Land Administration Laws made no mention

of tenurial concepts such as fee simple or licences of occupation. When the Secretary of
State for War and Colonies communicated the 1807 Land Administration Laws to the
Governor of Nova Scotia, there was reference to settlers who “received permission to
occupy” land during the land grant moratorium, but the terms ‘licence of occupation’ or
‘tickets of location’ were not used and the implication appears to be that the occupancy
with permission was an oddity, and not the intended normal course of colonial
settlement. Likewise, while a land grant conveyed fee simple interest in the land, such
terminology did not form part of the 1807 Land Administration Laws. It wasn’t until
fourteen years later that the term ‘tickets of location’ finds its way in the Nova Scotia land
494
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administration laws, through the 1821 Land Board Regulations495 established by then
Lieutenant Governor Sir James Kempt.
3.4.12

Additional Instructions (1811-1820)
Within the 15 years after the 1807 Land Administration Laws, which were released

during the time of Sir John Wentworth as the British-appointed Lieutenant Governor Nova
Scotia (1792-1808), the colony of Nova Scotia experienced three changes to the role of
Lieutenant Governor, Lieutenant Governor Sir George Prevost (1808-1811), Lieutenant
Governor Sherbrooke (1811-1816), and Lieutenant Governor Dalhousie (1816-1820).
With each appointment came new instructions from the Colonial Office, but the 1807
Land Administration Laws were preserved throughout the entirety of their terms.
There is much to be learned from critical assessment of the imperial instructions
that were sent to newly arrived colonial governors in Nova Scotia. They are a harsh
reminder of the systematic and subtle methods that were employed by Britain in the
process of colonialization that are now so deeply entrenched in the fabric of this province
that change seems impossible. The rigid establishment and elitist administration of the
legal system through these royal instructions is but one example of inherited colonial
structures in this province. The royal instructions are detailed and prescriptive and
demonstrate a high degree of experience in systematically dominating the space of
others. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the royal instructions in their entirety
will not be examined in detail, except what has already been discussed pertaining to the
constitutional framework derived from the royal commissions that were sent to Governor
Cornwallis in 1749.496 Suffice it to mention that the royal instructions dated October 22,
1808 that were sent to Lieutenant Governor Prevost, the royal instructions dated April
12, 1816 that were sent to Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke, and the royal instructions
dated April 27, 1820 that were sent to Lieutenant Governor Dalhousie, add little more in
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terms of historical records which describe the land administration laws, policies, and
practices at the time of the Black Refugees’ arrival.
3.5

The 1821 Land Board Regulations
While the 1807 Land Administration Laws ushered in a new era of gratuitous land

grants, with annexed conditions to ensure productivity, colonial land administration
challenges endured. Nevertheless, the responsibility for the administration of colonial
lands which was, in practice, delegated to the governor and his colonial officials by virtue
of royal instructions from London, persisted until the 1815 when “[t]hereafter an interest
in the waste lands of the colonies gradually revived in the colonial office.” 497 Historian
R.G. Riddell points to a number of reasons for the imperialists’ renewed interest in the
colonies, including the economic distress after the War of 1812 and the over-population
and unemployment in Britain. It was thought, Riddell writes, that “emigration would
become ‘a safety valve’ by which the unwanted poor could be let escape” 498 and by that
by this process “a pauper, for whose labour no renumeration can be afforded at home,
will be transmuted … into an independent proprietor.”499 While the Colonial Office sought
to use land policy as a means to promote and assist emigration, they encountered
resistance by settlers in Nova Scotia, which contributed to “prevalent dissatisfaction
amongst colonial officials over the existing regulations.”500 Riddell writes:
In every colony governors found that effective control of the land
had fallen into the hands of a group of local office-holders with
little inclination to let land serve the purposes of emigration, and
that all efforts at reform ran foul of local vested interests. A
further argument for change appeared when Bathurst in the
colonial office gradually became aware of the fact that land was
of value only in relation to capital. Waste lands in the hands of
colonists without capital to develop them was valuable as a
speculation only, and no amount of supervision could alter this
fact. Bathurst, therefore, set himself to devise a system by which
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land would be given only to settlers with the means to develop
it.501 [emphasis added]
Thus, the general dissatisfaction with the ineffectiveness of the 1807 Land
Administration Laws as a tool to facilitate emigration was a reason for change in the land
administration system, and a divide between capitalists and labourers was beginning to
take form. By 1818 the colonial government in Nova Scotia accelerated its efforts to
facilitate the settlement of European immigrants.502 For example, the government took
more proactive measures to liberate land that was tied up in abandoned land grants and
invested more resources into the province’s transportation infrastructure.503 However,
most European immigrants did not have the financial means to buy or rent property, or
to pay the associated fees and conditions of the “free” land grants. 504
As European immigration peaked after the War of 1812, and post war recession
plummeted most employment opportunities, a growing group of pauper immigrants
were descending upon the shores of Nova Scotia and, amid the disorder of accepting
them, the land administrations laws were becoming more difficult to administer and
enforce. The colonial scheme to distribute land was not working for the pauper
immigrants and so land squatting became rampant, especially in Cape Breton.505 Thus,
fourteen years after the adoption of the 1807 Land Administration Laws, and only five
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years after the settlement of the Black Refugees in communities such as Upper
Hammonds Plains, Nova Scotia’s Lieutenant Governor Kempt established new land
granting procedures to help curb the problems that were being experienced by many
White settlers across the province.
In 1821 Lieutenant Governor Kempt established the Boards of Land
Commissioners in each county

506

for the purpose of “facilitating the settlement of

emigrants and other poor persons on the Crown Lands in this Province with the least
possible trouble and expense.”507 Through these regulations, which supplemented but
did not supersede the 1807 Land Administration Laws, a person desirous of obtaining land
within the county limits could submit a petition, addressed to the Lieutenant Governor,
containing a description of the land applied for,508 along with “usual declarations”
including an oath that that the petitioner had no knowledge of any person being located
on the land. What was changed, however, is that a two-tiered land distribution system
was then triggered. Those who could afford the costs of the land granting process could
proceed through the normal course prescribed in the 1807 Land Administration Laws.
Those who could not afford such costs were directed to the Boards of Land
Commissioners who were empowered by the Lieutenant Governor to grant tickets of
location for temporary permitted occupancy, rather than land grants. In doing so,
historian J.S. Martell writes:
the government made what was probably its most helpful move.
Board of Land Commissioners were set up in the different localities
to iron out irregularities in settlement, discourage land-jobbing,
and assist poor people and immigrants in becoming established.
Henceforth, instead of petitioning the Governor for land or walking
many miles to the capital to make a personal appeal, prospective
settlers could apply to their local Board for a temporary ticket of
location, and when the time came to take permanent possession,
506
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they were allowed to join with others (five was the limit) in one
grant for the ordinary fee which was split between them. This
system remained in effect until 1827 when, in reluctant conformity
with Imperial instructions, the Surveyor-General of the peninsula
ordered that Crown Lands be sold.509 [emphasis added]
While the objectives of the 1821 Land Board Regulations were three-fold, being
(1) to iron out irregularities in settlement, (2) discourage land-jobbing , and (3) assist poor
people and immigrants in becoming established, the focus in this thesis as it pertains to
the Black Refugees is that the 1821 Land Board Regulations facilitated assistance to poor
White immigrants to acquire more land, but at the same time, denied the Black Refugees
from accessing this benefit under the law by excluding them from eligibility.
3.5.1 Tickets of Location
Under the 1821 regulations, the Board of Land Commissioners were directed to
appoint a secretary and meet at least once a month to receive petitions from persons
desirous of obtaining land with the limits of the commission. The petitions had to be
addressed to the Lieutenant Governor, (which was likely a workaround to ensure
compliance with the 1807 Land Administration Laws) and were required to contain a
particular description of the land applied for, as well as the usual declarations to be made
in land petitions. For example, petitioners were required to make oath that they had no
knowledge of any person being located on the land applied for or making any claim
thereto. The petitions were then taken into consideration by the commissioners at their
general meeting, and “if upon a careful inquiry into their character and circumstances”
the commissioners thought the petitioner would be a good settler and faithful subject of
his Majesty, then the commissioners were authorized to grant the petition tickets of
location in varying lot sizes. To unmarried men, they were authorized to issue a ticket of
location for 100 acres, and to married men, 200 acres. But they were not allowed to issue
tickets of location for land exceeding 200 acres without special authority from the
Lieutenant Governor. Once the tickets were in hand, the recipients had to immediately
cultivate and erect a house upon the land that was allotted to them, or risk not having
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the grant confirmed. The tickets were merely an authority to settle on the lands and were
valid only for twelve months, but to make the taking of grants as easy as possible, the
regulations allowed up to five settlers to be included in one grant.510 The ticket holders
had to pay the usual fees to have their tickets confirmed as grants, which were roughly
70 shillings on 200 acres, and after the grant issue, they had to pay annual quit rent of 2
shillings per 100 acres, which was consistent with the 1807 Land Administration Laws.
However, as with the quit rent obligations under the 1807 Land Administration Laws, in
practice, the quit rents “had never been paid or collected.”511
3.5.2 Black Refugees Ineligible
At this point, one may wonder why the Black Refugees who, by 1821 were settled
in the province for more than five year (hence proved to be “good and faithful subjects”)
and had been already burdened with similar possessory title (licences of occupation) but
to smaller lots of land (10 acres), could not avail themselves of better tenure and larger
lots through this new system of efficiency and affordability. However, two key features
of the 1821 land regulations served to exclude the Black Refugees from this land
settlement incentive, notwithstanding their ostensible fit with the aim of the regulation’s
objective. First, before the commissioners could grant tickets of location, they had to be
satisfied that the petitioner had not previously received land from the government and
did not possess any land by purchase of otherwise. By reason of the colonial settlement
decisions made five years prior that placed the Black Refugees on mediocre land in terms
of size, quality, and tenure, they were once again denied an opportunity for economic
growth through government-based initiatives. Second, the 1821 land regulations
expressly prohibited the granting of any tickets of location to any person who resided in
the province for a period longer than six months. The resident settlers, which at that point
included the Black Refugees, had to forward their land petitions through the Board of
Commissioners to the Lieutenant Governor who processed the petitions in the same
manner prescribed in the 1807 Land Administration Laws. Thus, not only were the Black
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Refugees excluded from the less costly and more efficient land allocation scheme in the
1821 Land Board Regulations, the procedures under the 1807 Land Administration Laws
became more cumbersome and expensive with the insertion of yet another
administrative office in the land granting process, being the Board of Land
Commissioners. The fees payable to the secretary of the Land Board by every person
presenting a petition to be transmitted for consideration of the Lieutenant Governor and
Council was 1s 6d.512
3.5.3 Racially Disparate Impact
More research is needed to understand the degree to which pauper White
immigrants seized their legal advantages to acquire crown land by sidestepping the
“trouble and expense” of the usual land grant process. While over 28,000 immigrants
arrived in Nova Scotia with government assistance between 1815 and 1831, 513 the 1821
Land Board Regulations appear to have not fully resolved their struggles with insufficient
capital to acquire land,514 nor the colonists’ attitudes which discouraged their arrival.515
The struggle to acquire quality land, combined with a lack of surveys and administrative
processing and fees, is likely a leading reason why so many poor White immigrants
resorted to land squatting. Historian Peter Burroughs comments,
[u]nauthorized occupation was more prevalent in Nova Scotia than
in any other part of British North America, because of the inferior
quality of disposable land and the poverty of the greater number
of immigrants. The facilities for squatting were so great, or rather
the means of preventing it were so inadequate, that these
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newcomers immediately spread themselves over the waste lands
of the province.516
Elsewhere, Burroughs points out that in the 1842 inquiry commission led by Lord
Durham, it was estimated that 20,000 individuals, or half the population of Cape Breton,
were settled on land to which they had no title.517
However, the effectiveness of the 1821 Land Board Regulations in resolving the
troubles experienced by pauper White immigrants is not the point. The point is that the
law responded to the realities of their impoverished situation and created a special
pathway to prop them up, while at the same time, prevented the Black Refugees from
availing themselves of the same advantage despite their impoverished circumstances that
placed them squarely within the objectives of the law. And, while it may not have it easy
for pauper White immigrants, with or without the wind at their backs, they were still
provided advantage under the law as compared to the Black Refugees in terms of
accessing crown land. The 1821 Land Board Regulations provided them with simplified
access to larger lots of land, and unfairly excluded the Black Refugees from the same.
Unfortunately, despite the attempts to revive the gratuitous land granting system
in 1807, including the 1821 Land Board Regulations to better accommodate the financial
realities of pauper White immigrants, the land administration problems in colonial Nova
Scotia endured. Historian Peter Burroughs explains that “past regulations, despite their
complexity and frequent amendment, had failed to prevent large tracts of land from
falling into the hands of speculators, absentee proprietors and others who were not bona
fide cultivators of the soil.”518 However, the problem was not only the law itself, but also
the institutions and actors that supported it. As one historian writes, “the real problem,
however, was not to devise regulations but to enforce them.”519 The quit rents often went
uncollected and unpaid without recourse,520 and cultivation conditions were regularly
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unfilled, yet the escheatment of land rarely occurred. Eventually the weaknesses in the
law, combined with abuse and corruption by the actors521 within the system, were
exposed and by 1827, a radical shift in land policy reached the shores of colonial Nova
Scotia.522
3.6

The 1827 Land Sale Regulations
On May 8, 1827523, under the direction of the Colonial Office, Nova Scotia adopted

a uniform system of land distribution through auction sales.524 Pursuant to these laws, all
Crown lands were required to be sold by auction with a minimum upset price as
determined by the surveyor-general, instead of being issued as gratuitous land grants
from the governor.525 Much like the 1807 Land Administration Laws, the 1827 Land Sale
Regulations were designed to advance specific economic and political policies, described
as follows:
The policy change was inspired by the ideas of a lobby group in
Britain known as the colonial reformers, who looked to partially
recreate the British class-based social structure of a small group of
landowners and a substantial pool of tenants and labourers. It was
also intended to raise revenues for colonial governments, for
Britain in the 1820s was also implementing a policy of
retrenchment in colonial spending.526
The class-based system of landownership referred to here is known as the
Wakefieldian system of colonization, named after Edward Gibbon Wakefield, a convicted
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convict who was imprisoned for three years in 1827 for kidnapping a fifteen-year-old girl
in a scheme to inherit her family wealth. Afterwards, Wakefield was appointed a colonial
officer who was known for his colonization scheme which aimed to populate a colony
with a class-based combination of capitalists and immigrant labourers, financed by the
sale of land to the capitalists who would in turn support the immigrant labourers through
employment. The essence of his scheme required land to be sold by auction at a
sufficiently low enough price to draw capitalists’ investment, but high enough to exclude
labourers as landowners. The revenue derived from land sales would serve to finance the
administration of the scheme and used to promote the emigration of more labourers.
Wakefield’s scheme and techniques were very controversial but managed to influence
the Colonial Office in their policy decisions that were ultimately implemented in colonies
such as Nova Scotia in the 1827 Land Sale Regulations.527
3.6.1 Land Sales by Auction
Pursuant to the 1827 Land Sale Regulations, the lieutenant governor was required
to issue a public notice in the Royal Gazette (or another widely circulated newspaper)
detailing the time and place appointed for the sale of Crown lands in each district, along
with the upset price at which the lots were proposed to be offered. The upset price was
determined by the surveyor general and was roughly two shillings per acre.528 The lots
were then sold to the highest bidder, and if no offer was made at the upset price, then
the lands would be reserved for future sale in a similar manner at a later auction. The
maximum lot size available for auction was set at 1,200 acres, and the purchase money
could be spread across four payment instalments, without interest. The first instalment
was due at the time of the sale, and the second, third, and forth instalments were due in
each subsequent year thereafter. If any of the instalments were not paid, the amounts
527
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already paid were forfeited, and the land reverted to the Crown for sale again by
auction.529
3.6.2 Law Reform for Poor Settlers
As with the 1821 Land Board Regulations, exceptions were made for the
impoverished White resident settlers, in attempts to advantage their economic
prosperity. Where a purchaser could not afford to advance the purchase money by
installments, the commissioner of crown lands could allow them to purchase up to 200
hundred acres of land through lease-to-own type of arrangement. Rather than paying the
purchase money in four installments with the first installment due upon sale, under the
alternative payment plan the purchaser could occupy the land upon payment of a quit
rent equal to five per cent of the purchase price, with one year’s quit rent to be paid at
the time of sale and annually thereafter. The purchaser then had twenty years to pay off
the purchase price through the annual quit rents or pay it off entirely through up four
installments of the net balance within the twenty-year timeframe. As with purchase
money installments, upon failure to pay the annual quit rent the lands would be forfeited
and referred for sale by auction.530 Thus, after 1827, Crown lands in Nova Scotia could be
either purchased on installments (up to 1,200 acres) or rented on terms almost identical
to free grants (up to 200 acres).531 However, as already pointed out, quit rents in practice
were often not paid, nor collected. Thus essentially, this law provided a significant
advantage to wealthy settlers who could purchase significant amounts of crown lands (up
to 1,200 acres), at a price substantially equivalent to rent, but also advantaged poor
settlers who could rent a moderate amount of Crown land (up to 200 acres) without ever
having their rent collected.
An additional advantage was extended to the impoverished settlers who were also
recent immigrants. While the 1827 Land Sale Regulations prescribed that Crown land
could only be purchased during the regularly schedule annual auctions, recent pauper
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immigrants who had not been in the province for more than six months preceding the
last annual sale, could purchase up to 200 acres of land at interim periods throughout the
year, at the same upset price as the offered at the last annual auction, and choose
between the purchase installment option or the payment plan through quit rents over
twenty years. 532
It is not known the degree to which any of the Black Refugees purchased land
under the 1827 land administration laws, either through the more expensive route of four
payment plans for up to 1,200 acres, or through the more affordable payment plan option
for up to 200 acres. There are a few land grants in Hammonds Plains from 1830s to 1850s
which suggest that the Black Refugees did purchase some land through the 1827 Land
Sale Regulations, but these acquisitions have often been mischaracterized as gratuitous
land grants. However, it would not be surprising to find that the procedural aspects in the
administration of these regulations impeded their participation in this land scheme, such
as publication of the scheme in the Gazette as the means of communicating the details,
or the racial hostility that the Black Refugees would have encountered had they arrived
at the auction house to make a bid for land during the scheduled times. Unlike the newly
arrived pauper White immigrants, the Black Refugees were more than six months in the
province and so were not extended the advantage to purchase the land privately during
interim opportunities, without the hostility of the crowd.
As is the case with the 1821 Land Board Regulations, which created a less costly
and more efficient process for pauper White immigrants to acquire land under the 1807
Land Administration Laws, it is also not known the extent to which the modified land
regime in the 1827 Land Sales Regulations effectively made a difference in assisting
resident or recent pauper White immigrants in acquiring Crown land through the
payment plan option or at the interim auction time slots. Some evidence suggests that
the 1827 land sales regulations benefited resident settlers more so than new settlers. For
example, Historian Peter Burroughs points out that between 1839 and 1841 only 18
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immigrants bought 1,596 acres, as compared with 206 resident colonists who purchased
24,569 acres.533 However, what this law does demonstrate it that, once again, the law
attempted to respond and adapt to the impoverished circumstances of White people but
failed to account for the unique circumstances of the Black Refugees who, at this point,
were still waiting for their licenses of occupation to be confirmed as grants in fee simple.
3.6.3 No Patent Until Payment
It is important to note that while the 1827 Land Sale Regulations sought to
distribute Crown land in exchange for valuable consideration, the payment plans,
whether by four consecutive annual installments or quit rents spread over two years,
meant that few purchasers left the auction with their land grant in hand. Not only were
the usual land grant fees still payable to administrative officers such the governor,
provincial secretary, surveyor-general, and attorney general, and the purchase money
and quit rents were payable to the commissioner of crown lands, the 1827 Land Sale
Regulations prescribed that “No Patent will be granted until the whole of the purchase
money shall have been paid, nor any transfer of property made, except in case of Death,
until the whole of the Arrears of the Instalments or Quit Rent shall have been paid.”534
3.6.4 Commissioner of Crown Lands
With the adoption of the 1827 Land Sale Regulations came a newly created
position, the Commissioner of Crown Lands. J.S. Morris was the inaugural appointee, who
at the time of his appointment worked in the surveyor-general’s office under the direction
of his father, Charles Morris. Upon the resignation of his father as surveyor-general in
1831, J.S. Morris became the Surveyor General as well as the Commissioner of Crown
Lands.535 The Commissioner of Crown Lands was responsible for submitting annual
reports to the Governor informing him of the quantity and quality of Crown lands in each
district, together with his opinion as to which lands should be offered for sale and at what
price. If the Governor agreed, the sale by auction process would begin.
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3.6.5 Campaign to Convert Unperfected Grants
The 1827 Land Sale Regulations were a dramatic shift in land policy designed to
attain uniformity across the British colonies by stripping the lieutenant-governor of their
authority to issue “free” grant lands in the same way that had occurred for the preceding
seventy years since the arrival of Governor Cornwallis. With the passing of the 1827 Land
Sale Regulations, the lieutenant-governor no longer accepted applications for land grants
either at his office (or through the Boards of Land Commissioners established under the
1821 Land Board Regulations), and no longer possessed the legal authority to issue free
land grants to Crown lands in the province.536 The change in law was inspired by Britain’s
relentless need to receive financial profit from the exploitation of land and other
resources in its colonies. However, something had to be done about the land
administration chaos that had resulted from decades of flawed and poorly managed
previous land administration laws. Therefore, as with the 1807 Land Administration Laws
that sought to “clean up” the land titles problems resulting from the 1790 land grant
moratorium, the 1827 Land Sale Regulations aimed to do the same. At the same time as
announcing the new land sales regime, the 1827 Land Sale Regulations encouraged all
unperfected grant holders to convert their interests into fee simple grants with the
following announcement:
all persons holding Lands under Warrants of Survey, Tickets of
Location, Crown Leases, or other authority from Government, will
be allowed to obtain Grants in the accustomed manner, provided
the fees for the same be lodged at the proper Office in Halifax, or
with Henry W. Crawley, Esq. of Sydney, previously to the 1st of
January next, after which time they will not be permitted to
complete their Titles to their Lots, except by purchase, in
conformity with the new Regulations.537
To put this into perspective, if a landowner acquired 100 acres of land under a free
land grant from a lieutenant-governor under the 1807 Land Administration Laws (as
modified by the 1821 Land Board Regulations which required the land petition to flow
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through the Board of Land Commissioners), they could be in occupation of land under a
Warrant of Survey (with or without surveyed boundaries) for any number of years paying
quit rent and improving their lot, without fee simple title pending the grant approval and
documentation process through the many administrative offices and corresponding
payment of fees. However, if one of those offices (including the surveyors) did not
complete the processing of the grant within the six month timeframe between May 8,
1827 and January 1, 1828, being the date of the 1827 Land Sale Regulations and deadline
for the landowner to perfect title, respectively, then the landowner would purportedly
lose their chance to acquire title to their land by a free grant, notwithstanding their
improvements and paid quit rent, and need to purchase the land at a public auction under
the 1827 regulations.
However, assuming the landowner was able to meet this deadline and convert
their interest into fee simple, the quit rents that would have otherwise been payable
under the 1807 Land Administration Laws were essentially accelerated under the 1827
Land Sale Regulations such that the landowner had seven years to pay out twenty-yearsworth of annual quit rent at 2 shillings per 100 acres, being a total payment of 40 shillings
per 100 acres over the seven year period.538 Note, however, that 40 shillings is still much
lower than the cost to purchase land by public auction at an upset price ranging from 4
to 10 shillings per acre under the 1827 Land Sale Regulations.539
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Testifying a few years later for the Buller Report,540 then Provincial Secretary of
the Province of Nova Scotia, Sir Rupert George, reported that approximately 1,820 people
in Nova Scotia availed themselves of the 1827 campaign to convert land titles, covering
about 200,000 acres. An additional 1,120 people in Cape Breton attempted to do the
same, but as at Sir Rupert George’s testimony, many of those grants remained incomplete
for want of surveys, which most settlers were unable to pay.541 It is unclear exactly what
impact this land titles conversion campaign had on the land titles in Upper Hammonds
Plains. Many scholars point to the 1834 Land Grant in Upper Hammonds Plains542 as
evidence to support claims that the lots allocated to the Black Refugees in Hammonds
Plains were confirmed as grants.543 However, as discussed throughout this thesis, the
1834 Land Grant was not a confirmatory grant but rather a grant purchased by the Black
Refugees for monetary consideration.
3.6.6 More Barriers for the Black Refugees
The unified land sales system was not well received in Nova Scotia, nor
administered with much success. For example, Surveyor General J.S. Morris testified in
the 1838 Buller Report that only 120,000 acres of land had been disposed of through the
land auctions, at an average purchase price of two shillings per acre, and that in many
instances payment installments were not made.544 It is possible that the new regulations
compounded the title obscurity problems in the province by removing the flexibility of a
lieutenant-governor to correct the title problems by confirming title to the previously
issued, but unperfected, grants. The Nova Scotia government quickly realised that
complete uniformity was not practicable and that local exceptions were needed, and with
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this realization the push to get land policy into the hands of colonial legislatures was
accelerated.545
It seems that the “inept land policy of the Imperial government was a source of
grief to both the local officials and the immigrants themselves.”546 Requirements to pay
fees on land grants or purchase crown land at auction sales, created barriers for most
immigrants,547 and as early as 1817 the Assembly of Nova Scotia proposed to the Colonial
Secretary that “the newcomers should be given land ‘free from any expense’ and a few
‘Implements of Husbandry’.”548 Tracts of land were occasionally made available by means
of escheat, but at too slow of a pass to keep up with demand.549 However, gradually land
policies were reformed to better reflect the harsh realities of pauper immigration.
Archivist with the Nova Scotia Public Archives, D.C. Harvey, notes there was an emerging
reformist perspective that “every newcomer, though at first he might appear a burden, if
put readily to work on the land, by preserving industry he would soon lay the foundation
of a happy home.”550 But, sadly, those attitudes were not extended to the Black Refugees
in the way they were to White settlers, including pauper White immigrants.
While the change in land laws to a uniform system of public auction sought to
create equal opportunities for settlers to acquire land through competition in a “neutral”
market, as with most neutral laws, the race-neutral approach to the uniform land sales
system neglected to factor in anti-Black racism as a variable impact on the outcome. From
the Black Refugees’ perspective, being the group who were denied equal access to 1807
Land Administration Laws that could have rapidly “promoted and increased” their
landholdings, as well as to the 1821 Land Board Regulations which could have granted
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them land with the “least possible trouble and expense”,551 the uniform approach of the
1827 Land Sale Regulations not only failed to serve the needs of the Black Refugees but
ultimately had a discriminatory affect on their situation. When it came time to correct
the meagre land possessions of the Black Refugees at various junctures in the land
administration reforms, the 1827 Land Sales Regulations were used as legal justifications
to block the Black Refugees from obtaining more prosperous land opportunities in
exchange for the inferior ones that were thrusted on them upon their arrival. For
example, when Lieutenant Governor Campbell suggested to Lord Glenelg in 1837 that the
Black Refugees in Preston should be relocated to better land,552 the request was
denied.553 The rejection was not for lack of desire (alone),554 but rather based on a formal
application of the law. Glenelg writes:
The mode however in which you propose that this should be done
is open to serious & I fear insuperable objections. The free gift of
any part of the Waste Lands of the Crown would involve a
departure from the spirit as well as the letter of the present Land
Regulations, to the strict observance of which the faith of Her
Majesty’s Government has been so repeatedly pledged. Her
Majesty’s Government feel that they would not be justified in
sanctioning any infringement of those Regulations excepting in
cases where satisfactory proof could be adduced that the Public
interest imperatively required their relaxation. In the present
instance, no such proof is afforded. On the contrary the measure
is merely an expedient for the relief of these People, the principle
as well as the success of which seems to be very doubtful. […]. The
proposed scheme appears to me directly calculated to cherish the
mistaken & mischievous notion, that if they are to subsist at all, it
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must be as proprietors of Land and not as Laborers for hire.555
[emphasis added]
A rigid application of the law combined with anti-Black racist ideology led to an
outright refusal to apply an exemption under the 1827 Land Sales Regulations,
notwithstanding the purpose for doing was to redress an injury caused by the same office
being asked to grant the exemption. Thus, also driven by fear of setting a bad precedent
for expenditures,556 Glenelg relied on the 1827 Land Sale Regulations to deny the Black
Refugees an opportunity to improve their landholdings.
3.7

Conclusion
While a lot of information was covered in this chapter, it is hoped that one can

better understand the colonial context in which the Black Refugees were settled upon
their arrival to Nova Scotia after the War of 1812. More importantly, it is hoped that the
role of the law is better understood in the creation and exacerbation of racial disparities
in land-based wealth and poverty in this province. This chapter demonstrates how Britain
imposed British law into the colony (without any regard for Indigenous existence), and
how British law empowered the institutions and colonialists who administered the law to
operate unchecked, which allowed the law to be applied in a racially discriminatory
manner. That law, which Nova Scotia inherited, combined with the colonial institutions
and actors appointed to administer it, created a legal system that asphyxiated the
economic opportunities for African Nova Scotians and bolstered the economic
opportunities for White Nova Scotians.
The next chapter explores in greater depth the precise ways in which the law
created and exacerbated racial disparities in land-based wealth, particularly in the context
of the Black Refugees settled in Upper Hammonds Plains. This work will demonstrate how
the law, in addition to allowing the flagrant disregard of contractual promises combined
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with a racially discriminatory application of the law, further exacerbated the racial
disparities in land allocations through colour-blind approaches to law reform.
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Chapter 4: Anti-Black Racism in Land Laws
4.1

The Impact of Land Laws on the Black Refugees
The underlying research question in this thesis asks: what is role of the law in

creating and reinscribing racial disparities in land-based wealth? The intention is to
reframe the land titles discourse into one that explores anti-Black racism and White
supremacist ideology embedded within the origins of property law in this province, that
resulted in, among other things, the inferior quantity of land that was allocated to the
Black Refugees as compared to White settlers.
The following race-conscious legal analysis is guided by two vital questions
pertaining to each of the 1807 Land Administration Laws, the 1821 Land Board
Regulations, and the 1827 Land Sale Regulations. First, does this law exclude, underserve,
financially exploit, oppress, or invalidate Black people? Second, does this law include,
serve, financially resource, uplift, or validate White people?
The intention is to demonstrate three precise ways in which the land
administration laws created and then exacerbated the racial disparities in land-based
wealth in this province. First, the law allowed a racially discriminatory application of
seemingly race-neutral laws (the 1807 Land Administration Laws) which disadvantaged
the Black Refugees in terms of, among other things, smaller lot size. Second, the law
aggravated the situation through the adoption of a colour-blind approach to law reform
(1821 Land Board Regulations) that not only exacerbated the disadvantage to the Black
Refugees by excluding them from eligibility because of the prior racial discrimination, but
also launched pauper White immigrants into greater land-based economic opportunities.
Third, the law (1827 Land Sale Regulations) intensified the land-based injustices against
the Black Refugees by not only (again) creating opportunities for pauper White
immigrants that excluded the Black Refugees from eligibility, but also through the
adoption of a unified system of land sales, which (a) required the Black Refugees to pay
monetary consideration to have their previously issued (smaller) lots confirmed as grants
when ought to have been issued as (larger) free grants, and (b) on the basis of a strict
interpretation of the law, served to deny the Black Refugees the opportunity to be
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relocated to better and larger lands when they sought to have these racial injustices
redressed. In these ways, combined with its failure to protect the Black Refugees from
Britain’s flagrant disregard for compliance with the Cochrane Proclamation, the law
created and then exacerbated the racial disparities in wealth and poverty that is exists in
this province today.
4.1.1 Background Events
It is important to situate this critical race legal analysis into historical context of
slavery. When the Black Refugees arrived in Nova Scotia between 1813 - 1815, slavery
was still legal in the British empire, including Nova Scotia. The prevailing attitudes among
colonists were that Africans and people of African descent were inferior to White people.
The enslavement of Black people was vital to the global economy, including the economic
prosperity in the United States.557 Britain’s military tactic to entice the African Americans
to flee enslavement during the War of 1812 was strategic and effective. Yet, because of
the prevailing anti-Black racist attitudes, Britain felt empowered to renege on its
contractual commitments to the Black Refugees in the Cochrane Proclamation. These
attitudes of anti-Black racism and White supremacist ideology persisted throughout the
entire settlement process of the Black Refugees, including in the application of ostensibly
race neutral laws and the adoption of colour-blind law reform.
It will be recalled that Vice Admiral Cochrane issued a proclamation during the
War of 1812 which induced the enslaved African Americans to flee enslavement and join
the British in exchange for freedom and ‘encouragements’ (see Part 2.2.3 above). This
proclamation set a reasonable expectation that the Black Refugees would be treated like
other ‘free settlers’ in the colony in terms of land grants (size, tenure, and quality).
However, Britain reneged on this obligation and did not settle the Black Refugees as
promised, but rather, sent them to the interior parts of the province in search of
employment. On March 25, 1815, Vice Admiral Cochrane informed Lieutenant Governor
Sherbrooke that he intended to send an additional 1,500 to 2,000 Black Refugees to
557
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Halifax.558 In the midst of a post-war economic recession, and inspired by his early desires
to settle the disbanded soldiers,559 Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke then wrote to
Secretary Bathurst on April 6, 1815, suggesting:
as encouragement to those [Black Refugees] who are industrious
and may be willing to settle and cultivate land, that they should on
being located receive rations gratis for themselves and families in
the same proportions and for the same period as was allowed to
the disbanded soldiers and their families who settled in this
Province at the Peace of 1783.560 [emphasis added]
Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke’s suggestion to grant land to the Black Refugees
was not a novel one. It was already a contractual representation561 that was made one
year prior in the Cochrane Proclamation which promised ‘encouragements’, meaning free
land, implements, and provisions. However, based on the colonial correspondence in the
Spring of 1815, the government had no intention to comply with this contractual
representation. It wasn’t until unexpected events revived their White-serving interests in
doing so,562 but on a reduced basis, being terms comparable to the disbanded soldiers
instead of the average settler per the Cochrane Proclamation.
At this point, Sherbrooke had two pending land settlement requests awaiting
Secretary Bathurst’s approval, despite already having the legal capacity to grant land
under the 1807 Land Administration Laws.563 One dated March 15, 1815, asking to have
the disbanded soldiers directed to Nova Scotia for settlement in the interior parts of Nova
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Scotia,564 and one dated April 6, 1815, suggesting settlement of the late arrival Black
Refugees.565 It is important to note that by the end of 1814, Sherbrooke had made plans
to receive the disbanded soldiers into the Hammonds Plains area in hopes of building a
road to Annapolis Royal,566 but no similar plans were yet arranged for the Black Refugees,
including the early arrivals who had been in the province for over a year and a half at this
point. However, knowing that the disbanded soldiers were needed in Europe and so could
not be spared for settlement yet, Bathurst addressed Sherbrooke’s two requests with one
response on May 10, 1815, instructing him to settle the Refugees instead of the disbanded
soldiers, with the encouragements analogous to the disbanded soldiers.567
Secretary Bathurst’s sanction of Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke’s plans to settle
the Black Refugees comparably to the disbanded soldiers was not immediately
implemented by Sherbrooke, since on June 13, 1815, while approving Sherbrooke’s plans
to keep the Black Refugees at Melville, Secretary Bathurst again instructed Sherbrooke to
settle the Black Refugees. This time, specifying “small grants” with no mention of the
comparable treatment to the disbanded soldiers, Bathurst writes:
The only other point in these Dispatches to which it is in any degree
[illegible] relates to the disposal of the negroes landed in the colony
by Sir Alex. Cochrane, and on this, while I equally approve the [line]
adopted by you and the Instructions given in consequence
[illegible], I wish merely to call your attention to the advantage
564
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which might result from giving to those persons, who are mostly
accustomed to agricultural labour, small grants of land by the
cultivation of which they might in a short time be enabled to
provide for their own subsistence and to promote the general
prosperity of the province in which they might be settled.568
[emphasis added]
Sherbrooke replied to Bathurst on July 20, 1815, and as John Grant points out,
while Bathurst’s approval was a welcomed one, Sherbrooke cautioned in his reply that:
the barren appearance of this country before it is cleared operates
with other causes against the immediate execution of it, as the
negro on the first arrival seem to dread so arduous an undertaking
as the tilling of ground of this description appears to be.569
[emphasis added]
However, he was:
hopeful, however, that many of the blacks, after being employed
in the country and seeing the potential of the soil, might desire to
cultivate it. To those so inclined, he [Sherbrooke] promised to give
every encouragement and informed the Colonial Office that he had
‘already directed the Surveyor-General to look out for and reserve
the most favourable situations now unappropriated for the
purpose of locating such of the free Negroes as are willing to
become settlers.’570 [emphasis added]
Thus, by July 1815, Sherbrooke had instructed the Surveyor General Charles
Morris to find land suitable to settle the Black Refugees.571 Both Sherbrooke and Morris
seemingly forgot about (or were still hoping to reserve for the disbanded soldiers) the
lands already deemed suitable at 100 acres each in Hammonds Plains through to
Annapolis Royal, which Bathurst instructed him to give to the Black Refugees in his letter
of May 10, 1815. It wasn’t until November 1815 that the issue of land in Hammonds Plains
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was revisited by Sherbrooke and Morris as a settlement option, this time for the Black
Refugees at 10 acre lots instead of the disbanded soldiers in 100 acre lots.572
Writing to update Secretary Bathurst on November 21, 1815 with an update on
the settlement in Preston, Sherbrooke informs him that “[a]nother Situation has been
discovered well suited for the Negroes, and with which they appear to be much pleased
[,] at Hammond Plains about twenty miles from Halifax.”573 Sherbrooke proceeded to
explain that “one hundred eighty of the refugees were at work, clearing the land and
building houses and that he hoped to have them and their families under shelter before
the ‘severe weather sets in.” 574 Thus, in November 2015, Sherbrooke instructed the
surveyors to run lines in preparation for lots.575 It is not known whether the boundary
lines would have already drawn in late 1814 in the preparations to settle the disbanded
soldiers in the area, but if they were they would have been laid out in 100 acre lot sizes
per Morris’s testimony in February, 2015. However, by November 1815, when it came
time to settle the Black Refugees on these lots instead of the disbanded soldiers, Morris
had changed his position on lot size and instead applied his 10-acre lot size approach that
he used a few months earlier to settle the Black Refugees in Preston.576
It makes sense that some Black Refugees were residing in the Hammonds Plains
area before formally being settled there by the British government, some of whom were
likely living on private lands owned by John Liddell.577 It appears that by October 2, 1815,
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British agents were appointed to issue rations to the Black Refugee in the area, and that
John Liddell was a designed agent at Hammonds Plains.578 At least one historian referred
to John Liddell as the superintendent of the Hammonds Plains settlement. 579 The
literature also shows that some Black Refugees were “settled on the estates of private
landowners by the proprietor of the estates.”580 One scholar references a letter from
Dominic De Broker and thirty-five other residents in Hammonds Plains who on December
4, 1819 petitioned for more land in the area that was owned by John Liddell but had since
reverted to the Crown.581 They stated that when the people had been settled by John
Liddell and others in the Hammonds Plains area, “these landowners did not feel disposed
to settle more than eighty families, with ten acres for each family.582 They further
declared that since then, several of them had built houses and made improvements on
the abandoned lands.
The work of historian, J.S. Martell in Military Settlements lays a foundation from
which the land settlement decisions experienced by the Black Refugees can be compared
to that of the disbanded soldiers. This is especially the case in Hammond’s Plains where
the land was originally earmarked for a disbanded soldier settlement and then
repurposed into smaller lots for the Black Refugees. First, it can be gleaned from Martell’s
work that Surveyor General Charles Morris recommended 200-acre lots for the disbanded
soldiers in March of 1815, but only 10-acre lots for the Black Refugees in Preston a few
578
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months later in September 1815. The 10-acre lot sizes were then replicated for the Black
Refugees in Hammonds Plains in November 1815, notwithstanding that Hammonds Plains
was likely already prepared for 200-acre lots to receive the disbanded soldiers earlier that
year.583 Martell’s work also refutes a common misunderstanding that all Black Refugee
settlements were on disproportionately poor-quality land. The quality of land in the Black
Refugee settlement in Hammonds Plains may have been not much worse than the quality
of land elsewhere in the province. However, that is not to say that the land was not rocky
or barren. Lastly, it appears that the Surveyor-General Charles Morris played an
instrumental role in the land tenure decisions which resulted in the Black Refugees
receiving licenses of occupation instead of fee simple land grants, which was a similar
approach that he adopted for the land allocated to the disbanded soldiers around the
same time, but which was later confirmed as grants in fee simple.
4.1.2 Hammonds Plains Settlement
After being institutionalized for eight months at the former military prison known
as Melville Island, several Blacks Refugees were settled on lands at Hammond’s Plains by
the end of 1815. In November of that year George P. Brehm surveyed the boundaries for
their settlement, and John Liddell and Thomas Johnston were the issuers of their
provisions.584 The exact number of Black Refugees first residing in Hammonds Plains is
unclear. According to C.B. Fergusson, who based his numbers on lists of people entitled
to rations (which is not determinative of people actually on the lands), the number of
recorded Black Refugees in Hammonds Plains started somewhere between 42 and 80 in
1815.585 However, in one archival record dated November 17, 1815, it shows that Mr.
Liddell ordered provisions for 360 men for six months.586 Also, in another (undated)
archival record from 1815, there are 122 “people of colour” in Hammonds Plains listed as
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entitled to receive rations by order of Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke.587 The latter list
includes names of the Black Refugees residing in Hammonds Plains and has been
reproduced in this thesis as Appendix A.
In terms of recorded lots of land, one (undated) archival record dated between
late 1815 or early 1816, lists 293 Black Refugees (113 men, 81 wives, 111 children) in
Upper Hammonds Plains, showing each house number and lot of land.588 The list has been
reproduced in this thesis as Appendix B. On June 8, 1816, it was reported that 307 Black
Refugees (Men 129, Women 89, Boys over 12-7, Girls over 12 – 15, Boys and Girls under
12 – 71) were settled in Hammonds Plains.589 However, in September 1816 the number
of recorded residents was 321, and by December 30, 1816, the census of the refugees
entitled to receive rations reports 504 refugees at Hammonds Plains (201 men, 131
women, and 172 children).590
It is important to note that not all the names listed as entitled to receive rations
in Appendix A (1815 Rations Return) are listed as receiving lots in Appendix B (1815 Lot
List), despite both lists covering similar timeframes. The differences could be that a
greater number of Black Refugees were receiving rations in the area but did not receive
their lots of land. More research is needed to reconcile the names on the two lists. The
discrepancies are further complicated by different names listed in another settlement
return, dated sometime around 1817,591 which is reproduced in this thesis as Appendix
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C, as well as in the (undated) Licence of Occupation,592 which was issued sometime
between 1816 and 1820 (likely 1818).593 The Licence of Occupation is reproduced in this
thesis as Appendix D. For example, William Marshman is listed in the 1815 Rations Return
(Appendix A) and the 1817 Settlement Return (Appendix C) but is not listed in the Lot List
(Appendix B) nor the 1818 Licence of Occupation (Appendix D).594 Additionally, note that
William Marshman is not listed in the 1815 Lot List (Appendix B) or the 1818 Licence of
Occupation (Appendix D), but William Marshman and William Marshman Jr. are later
listed as two of the 35 people in the 1834 Land Grant595 that was purchased by some of
the Upper Hammond Plains residents, which is reproduced in this thesis as Appendix E,
but then not listed in the number of lots listed in the 1835 return,596 which is reproduced
in this thesis as Appendix F. Genealogical research is difficult in the best of circumstances.
It is especially challenging for African Nova Scotians, who’s ancestors were rarely afforded
the privilege of proper record keeping.
A census dated December 30, 1816, shows the number of Black Refugees entitled
to receive rations in Upper Hammonds Plains at 504,597 which is an increase from the 122
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recorded as entitled to receive rations in the 1815 Rations Return (Appendix A). The 1818
Settlement Return (Appendix C) shows a total of 469 blacks dwelling at Upper Hammonds
Plains in 1817, but another record shows that only 388 persons at Upper Hammonds
Plains received rations in August 1817, which, again, suggests a disparity between
receiving rations and land.598
As with the rest of the province, the number of Black Refugees residing in Upper
Hammonds Plains fluctuated over the years. At its peak in the years shortly after the war,
the population was 504 on December 30, 1816. However, by 1838, the settlement of
Upper Hammonds Plains had a population of less than 200, and by 1861 the population
had increased again to 770.599 Over 170 years later in 1964, the population fell again to
500.600 Presently, the African Nova Scotian population is roughly 300 people, but modern
development is now a leading threat to the community’s cultural landscape and
population.601
4.2

Application of 1807 Law to Black Refugees

4.2.1 The Hammonds Plains Licence of Occupation (1818)
It will be recalled that after a seventeen-year moratorium on free land grants at
the turn of the nineteenth century, the 1807 Land Administration Laws re-empowered
the Lieutenant Governor to issue gratuitous land grants ranging from 100 to 500 acres in
size, to persons desirous of improving and cultivating the lands. It was customary to grant
between 100 to 200 acres of land and known to government that at least 100 acres of
diverse quality of land was need for successful settlement. However, while Black people
were not expressly excluded under the law from receiving land grants, they were not
treated with equality under the law and thus granted inferior land holdings. This racially
discriminatory application of the law supported and promoted an anti-Black racist and
White supremacist ideology that excluded the Black Refugees from accessing equal
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benefit under the law as compared to White settlers, including disbanded soldiers. The
racially discriminatory application of this ostensibly race-neutral law, particularly in terms
of smaller lot sizes in the application of the law, financially disadvantaged the Black
Refugees and financially advantaged White settlers, including pauper White immigrants
and disbanded soldiers, through the allocation of more land, being a springboard to
wealth accumulation.
The Cochrane Proclamation was a contractual representation that induced the
Black Refugees to perform, despite significant risk in doing so, in exchange for
“encouragements”, being free land, implements, and (for a limited time) provisions.602 It
set a reasonable expectation that the Black Refugees would be treated the same as the
White settlers in the colony in terms of land grants (size, tenure, and quality), meaning,
among other things, the Black Refugees ought to have received the customary amounts
of 200 acres of land, or up to 500 acres of land, under the 1807 Land Administration Laws.
However, the Cochrane Proclamation was ignored until the Spring of 1815, and then the
promise was downsized to terms that were comparable to the disbanded soldiers, who
on average received 150 acres each.603 But then, ultimately, on the advice of the Surveyor
General, whose discretionary authority was accepted without question and without
restraint or supervision by the Colonial Office, the Black Refugees received only 10-acres
of land, which resulted in an even further discrepancy between the amount of land they
received compared to what was promised.
It is within this context that the Black Refugees were issued the 1818 Licence of
Occupation (Appendix D) to 10-acre lots of land in Hammonds Plains, notwithstanding
their legal entitlement under the 1807 Land Administration Laws to receive at least 100500-acre lots in fee simple, which was customary for ‘free settlers’. Once again, the legal
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system failed to effectively enforce the law that would have benefited the Black Refugees
had those laws “been applied with rigour.”604
When Lieutenant Governor Dalhousie granted the 1818 Licence of Occupation to
the Black Refugees in Hammonds Plains, they were already settled on their lots for at least
one year, possibly three. They were settled in that location under the direction of
Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke in November 1815, who remained Lieutenant Governor
until June 1816 and it wasn’t until September 1816 that Lord Dalhousie arrived to assume
the position. Since the licence was issued by Lord Dalhousie as Lieutenant Governor, it
must have occurred after September 1816 but before he ceased being Lieutenant
Governor in 1820. Furthermore, the Licence of Occupation specifically states, “the
following Lots of Land on which they are respectively settled, […].” However,
notwithstanding Lieutenant Governor Dalhousie’s commencement as Lieutenant
Governor in September 1816, the licence likely wasn’t issued until in 1818. This estimated
date is based on a similar licence that was granted to the Black Refugees settled at
Refugee Hill, which is dated March 27, 1818.605
The 1818 Licence of Occupation granted permission to 75 Black Refugees to
occupy, possess and enjoy during the term of the licence, the 10-acre lots of land on which
they were already settled. The version of this licence that is available at the Nova Scotia
Archives is incomplete, but assuming the term is the same as the licence that was granted
to the Black Refugees at Refugee Hill, the term was five years. At the end of the term, the
licence stipulates, the licensees shall be approved to receive grants of confirmation from
the government provided they conducted themselves as industrious peaceable and loyal
subjects. However, the licences were never confirmed as grants. Many scholars point to
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the 1834 Land Grant as the confirmatory grant, but upon closer examination, that is not
the accurate. The 1834 Land Grant was purchased by the Black Refugees at a cost of sixty
pounds and covers different parcels of land than what was described in the licence.
The present-day land titles discourse centres around historical licenses of
occupation such as the 1818 Licence of Occupation that was issued in Upper Hammonds
Plains. But it important to note that the Black Refugees were not the only people to
receive licenses of occupation. Permitted occupancy on Crown lands was common
throughout the colonial settlement era as a precursor to a grant in fee simple. For
example, British settlers after the American Revolutionary War were often issued licenses
of occupation until the lands were surveyed, or on land awaiting completion of the
escheatment process.606 Similarly, as was discussed in Chapter 3, licenses of occupation
were issued during the land grant moratorium between 1790 and 1807. The colonial land
administration system was complex and inefficient. The resulting circumstance of
authorized occupancy, but unperfected land titles, was an inevitable outcome. As were
instances of unauthorized occupancy, known as adverse possession or squatting. It will
be recalled that, for example, due to a variety of historical circumstances, such as land
grant moratoriums and an influx of pauper immigrants, obscure land titles afflicted much
of Cape Breton.607
This is not to suggest that anti-Black racism was not a contributing factor to the
land tenure decisions that impacted the Black Refugees. It likely was. As it was likely a
contributory factor causing the significant delay in confirming those licences into grants
(or not at all). The legal entitlement under the 1807 Land Administration Laws were to
receive fee simple land grants, not licenses of occupation, but the practice of granting

606

John Garner, The Franchise and Politics in British North America 1755-1867 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1969) at 20: “Many licenses of occupation had been issued to the loyalists on unsurveyed
land or on land which the Crown had already alienated but on which the grants were to be revoked. These
licenses of occupation were to be replaced by freehold grants once the lands were surveyed or the process
of escheat had been completed.”
607
Girard et al, History of Law, supra note 53 at 601 write “The moratorium on granting freehold land was
the origin of large-scale squatting on Cape Breton, but the cause of its substantial increase was another
imperial policy, the change from free land granting to land sales in 1827.”

166

licences continued, and became a specific element of land administration that the colony
had to contend with. However, while the Black Refugees may not have been alone in their
receipt of occupancy licences, the delay (or denial) in having their licences formally
confirmed as grants sets them apart from the experience of the disbanded soldiers, for
example, who had their licences confirmed within five years.608 The Black Refugee
experience with licences of occupation also varies from that experienced by White
settlers in Cape Breton. Over the centuries, many attempts have been made to clarify title
to lands in Cape Breton. For example, after the reannexation of Cape Breton in 1820,
colonists were anxious to have Cape Breton represented in the new House of Assembly.
However, conscious of the fact that Cape Breton had few freeholders,609 Nova Scotia
passed special legislation which gave holders of Crown leases and licenses of occupation
in Cape Breton the right to vote, and in doing so, “[r]esidents of Cape Breton had been
officially encouraged to treat their tenures as equivalent to grants in fee simple, and
conveyances had been made on lands held by lease or license.”610 Those statutory
privileges were not extended to the Black Refugees who, at this point, were still awaiting
confirmation of their land titles. The 1824 legislation concerning Cape Breton was not the
only time that Nova Scotia sought to clarify land titles in that region, as these legal
historians explain:
From the late 1830s through the 1850s the colony also devoted
considerable legislative and administrative resources to trying to
regularize the legal problems caused by British policy going back to
the moratorium. The land occupied pursuant to the original
licences did not pose long-term problems because the occupiers,
and others, thought they did have good title, and a market in land
operated as if they did.611
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And further,
A process was put in place for those with Crown leases or licences
to convert to fee simple title, but not every-body took the time or
was willing to spend the fees necessary to do so. After the failure
of these attempts to regularize the position administratively, two
short statutes of 1850 fixed the problem legislatively. The first
declared that anything done by the government of the
independent colony between 1784 and 1820 that had to do with
‘the Descent, Distribution, and Conveyance of Real and Personal
Estate’ was valid. The other stated that anybody who had gone into
possession under a Crown lease, or had derived title from such a
person, ‘shall respectively have, hold, and enjoy all such Lands and
Tenements in Fee Simple.’612
While the administrative and legislative schemes to regularize land titles for White
landowners in Cape Breton did not completely resolve the land title issues in that
region,613 the response appears to have had more success than that in African Nova
Scotian communities.614 More importantly, however, notwithstanding the insecure title
held by White Nova Scotians and African Nova Scotians, the ensuing cycle of poverty
appears to have disproportionately impacted African Nova Scotians more so than White
Nova Scotians.
In addition to the common issuance of licenses of occupation, albeit noting the
distinct disadvantage that was experienced by the Black Refugees in terms of the delay or
denial of having those licences confirmed as grants, it is also important to note that the
legal effect of a licence of occupation to Crown lands is uncertain, and so the potential
financial impact caused by possessory title over confirmed title is difficult to ascertain.
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Many scholars have assumed that a licence of occupation limited the Black Refugees
ability to sell their land. While the status of licence holder may have been a contributing
factor to this impediment, when the licence of occupation is considered within the
context of the complicated land administration practices of the time, this assumption may
not be entirely accurate. Historian Shirley Tillotson recovered a story from the Nova Scotia
Archives which suggests that holders of tickets of location, who did not have completed
title, could still sell and mortgage their lands. The story involves Samuel Cowling, a
mortgage holder who lent £25 to a disbanded soldier in 1828 as a mortgage on the
soldiers two lots that were held by tickets of location in the Dalhousie and Sherbrooke
settlements. The soldier failed to repay the loan and so when he died in 1832, Cowling
expected the title in the land to pass to him. He later discovered that the soldier only had
a ticket of location and so he petitioned the governor who allowed the grant to pass to
Cowling provided he paid the usual fees.615 This example suggests that ticket holders were
able to mortgage and sell their lands despite their imperfect title. Additionally, lawyer and
historian Beamish Murdoch writes in circa 1832:
Lands have frequently been granted to the colonists by what are
called licenses of occupation, being written licenses signed by the
governor, to occupy a particular piece of land. These according to
the practice of the government and the usage of the colony are
considered as absolute grants in fee simple, although expressed
simply as permission to the individual to occupy the ground. They
were frequently granted in the early periods of the settlement, but
more rarely afterwards, and I believe have not been given for many
years.616
Murdoch proceeds to explain the absence of any judicial guidance on the matter
but elaborates on his legal analysis and opinion, and states:
I am not aware of any decision by which the nature of the title, held
in Nova Scotia by virtue of licenses of occupation, can be accurately
settled. Where there has been a continuance of possession an
improvement made under them, it has been (as far as I can learn)
the invariable practice of the government to consider them as fee
615
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simple titles; and no difficulty has ever been made in obtaining
regular grants in the usual form, under the great seal of the
province, in favor of the party who received such a licence or his
heirs or assigns.617
Thus, while a strict application of common law principles may lead one to conclude
that the licenses of occupation gave only an “estate at will” (being revocable permission
to occupy the land), the continued possession and the labour and expense of
improvements that were made by the occupants may have legally entitled them to a fee
simple interest in the land.618 This legal determination is important because many people
involved in the land titles discourse often assume that the absence of legal title was the
root cause of the cycle of poverty for the Black Refugees.619 However, it appears that
something more was at play than legal title. The colonists were functioning within a
system of insecure land titles, but what was preventing the Black Refugees from being
able to do the same? Imperfect titles alone were not impeding their ability sell land in a
secondary market, or use the land as collateral for loans, no more so than imperfect title
would impede such activity today. It comes down to risk, and how much risk a prospective
buyer or a prospective lender is willing to absorb. For the Black Refugees, regardless of
how perfect their land titles were in fact or at law, other circumstances such as anti-Black
racism, quantity of land, and the location of the lots within predominately Black
communities are more plausible explanations for their exclusion from economic
opportunities than the land titles issue alone.
To be clear, the point in highlighting the common use of tickets of location,
warrants of surveys, licenses of occupation, or some other form of possessory title as a
precursor to a grant in fee simple, is not to discontinue the work being done to clarify land
titles in African Nova Scotian communities. As it has been discussed above, the Black
Refugees were disadvantaged with the delay or denial of having their land interests
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confirmed as fee simple, whereas many White settlers such as the disbanded solders and
the settlers in Cape Breton were advantaged by the administrative and legislative
measures implemented to confirm their land titles. That disparity must continue to be
addressed. Nor is it the intention here to suggest that the licenses of occupation, despite
their legal effect, did not impede the Black Refugees’ mobility options or their ability to
derive monetary profit from their land. But rather, the point here is that the emphasis on
land titles issue alone, has subdued a more pressing racial disparity in colonial land
administration, being lot sizes, and furthermore, both issues are the result of broader
systemic anti-Black and White supremacist ideology that is embedded within the origins
of property law in this province.
The lot sizes that were allocated to the Black Refugees as compared to White
settlers, including the disbanded soldiers, created a significant disadvantage/advantage
resulting from the racially discriminatory application of the law combined with colourblind approaches to law reform, both of which were rooted in anti-Black racist and White
supremacist ideology. It will be recalled that the modified instructions from the Colonial
Office were to grant land to the Black Refugees on terms analogous to that issued to the
disbanded soldiers, but the instructions were later stipulated “small grants” of no specific
size.620 It is possible that “small grants” in this context could have meant the customary
100 to 20 acres of land, as opposed to the 500 or more acres that troubled the colony
before the adoption of the 1807 Land Administration Laws, yet for the Black Refugees, it
has been inferred to mean 10 acre lots.621
It is not known with any certainty why Morris recommended 10-acre lots for the
Black Refugees, but this was not the first time that colonial administrators ignored the
law regarding land allocation to Black residents in the colony. When the land promises
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that were made to the Black Loyalists during the American Revolutionary War remained
unfulfilled, colonial administration was reprimanded. Historian John Grant describes the
situation of one Black Loyalist, Sergeant Thomas Peters, who after being denied land
stemming from representations made in the Dunmore Proclamation filed a petition to the
imperial government in London. The Colonial Office reprimanded Governors Parr of Nova
Scotia and Carleton of New Brunswick for their neglect and ordered an immediate inquiry,
“and if the complaints were found true, to take the necessary steps to atone for the
injustice.”622
Many scholars point to anti-Black racism as the underlying motivation behind
Surveyor General Charles Morris’ decisions to allocate only 10 acre lots to the Black
Refugees, connecting it to a larger scheme aimed at maintaining the Black Refugees as an
economically dependent source of low wage labour for the White settler economy. While
these claims are not disputed here, it is also important to recall that Charles Morris was
part of a family dynasty of surveyors, who was a third generation Surveyor-General in
Nova Scotia when he succeeded his father and his grandfather before handing the role
over to his own son, J.S. Morris, as the last Surveyor-General before the position merged
with the Commissioner of Crown Lands in 1851. A cursory read of J.S. Morris’ testimony
in the Buller Report leaves one with the impression that the Morris surveyors regarded
themselves as the ultimate caretakers (or, at times, overseers) of the land in this
province.623
While the Morris’ may have respected the authority of the governor, and more
importantly, the Colonial Office to determine land policy, the views and experience of the
Surveyor-General informed and shaped those policies and decisions, and they had a
significant amount of discretion in the application of those laws. Thus, if the Surveyor
General was concerned about the scarcity of available land in the province and thought
he could preserve land by granting smaller lots to vulnerable groups who would not have
the means to complain to his superiors in London, then the Surveyor General would have
622
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the means and discretion under the law to implement those ideas. Similarly, if the
Surveyor General believed that Black people and disbanded solders were flight risks, then
he would have the means to grant them temporary occupation as a precautionary
measure to protect his primary concern, being the preservation of land as a capitalist
asset. Or, if frustrated at the unwillingness of the government to escheat large tracts of
land sitting idle in the hands of abandoned landowners, the Surveyor General had the
breadth of discretionary power needed to devise alternative methods to complete his
primary task, being getting people on their lots as quickly as possible through the issuance
of licences of occupation until land was available for fee simple grants.
Regardless of his motivations, the advice of the Surveyor General to grant 10-acre
lots to the Black Refugees was implemented, notwithstanding the representations in the
Cochrane Proclamation which set a reasonable expectation that the Black Refugees would
be treated the same as the White settlers in the colony in terms of land grants (size,
tenure, and quality), meaning, among other things, the Black Refugees ought to have
received the customary amounts of 200 acres of land, or up to 500 acres of land, under
the 1807 Land Administration Laws. While the law 1807 Land Administration Laws were
ostensibly race-neutral, the actors within the system decided to apply the law in a racially
discriminatory manner and the law failed to protect the Black Refugees from the
consequences of this racially discriminatory application of the law.
4.3

Application of Law to Black Refugees (1821-1827)
The impacts of the racially discriminatory application of the ostensibly race-

neutral 1827 Land Administration Laws discussed above, were exacerbated by the 1821
Land Board Regulations which excluded the Black Refugees from opportunities to acquire
more land because of the previous racially discriminatory treatment under the law.624
Then, the 1827 Land Sale Regulations further exacerbated the racial disparities in land
allocations by (1) creating opportunities for pauper White immigrants that excluded the
Black Refugees from eligibility, and (2) adopting of a colour-blind approach to a unified
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system of land sales, which (a) required the Black Refugees to not only then pay monetary
consideration to have their prior lots confirmed as grants, and (b) served to deny the Black
Refugees opportunities to be relocated to better and larger lands to redress the prior
racial injustices.625
4.3.1 The Hammonds Plains Land Grant (1834)
With respect to item 2(a) above, many scholars have pointed to the 1834 Land
Grant in Hammonds Plains (Appendix E) as evidence to support claims that the Black
Refugee lots under the 1818 Licence of Occupation were confirmed as grants.626
However, upon closer examination of the 1818 Licence of Occupation and the 1834 Land
Grant, this assumption appears to be incorrect for the following reasons. First, unlike the
1842 Confirmatory Land Grant that was issued for lands in Preston,627 which specifically
recites the intention to confirm land titles and was issued without monetary
consideration, the 1834 Land Grant in Upper Hammonds Plains does not recite
confirmatory intentions and was purchased for consideration, being sixty pounds628 to
purchase six hundred acres of land. Secondly, in reviewing the map outlining the lots of
land in the 1818 Licence of Occupation compared to the land descriptions in the 1834
Land Grant, the land that was purchased in 1834 Land Grant was a different parcel of land
(surrounding Lizard Lake) which was not included in the 1818 Licence of Occupation.
Third, the 1834 Land Grant was purchased by only 30 Black Refugees, whereas the Licence
of Occupation was issued to 75 Black Refugees. Fourth, only 7 of the 30 names on the
1834 Land Grant are also listed on the 1818 Licence of Occupation.
It will be recalled that 75 Black Refugees were allotted 10-acre lots under the 1818
Licence of Occupation. However, based on the records pertaining to rations, lots, and
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settlement (Appendix A, B and C, respectively) there were between 113 – 144 families
residing in Hammonds Plains at the time of the licence. This means that only half of the
Black Refugees in Upper Hammonds Plains received a licence of occupation to their lots
in circa 1818. Furthermore, now that it has been established that the 1834 Land Grant
was not a confirmatory grant for the 1818 Licence of Occupation, those who did receive
a licence in circa 1818, never had their title confirmed as grants.629 Therefore, it is likely
that none of the government-issued lots in Upper Hammonds Plains were ever
confirmed as grants and so, aside from the Crown lands that the Black Refugees (and
their descendants) purchased after the 1827 Land Sale Regulations, it is likely that the
Black Refugees in Upper Hammonds Plains have never received the gratuitous land
grants that were promised to them in the Cochrane Proclamation.630
Despite never receiving their gratuitous land grants as promised, many of the
Black Refugees (and their descendants) acquired legal title to land in the community
through the purchases with monetary consideration. In addition to the lands in the 1834
Land Grant that was purchased, in 1846, John Jackson, William Marsman, Robert Jackson,
and Charles Jackson purchased 100 acres of Crown land surrounding Lizard Lake, at a
purchase price of ten pounds, eighteen shillings and nine pence. In 1859, Eliza Marsman
(widow of William Marsman) and her children, William, Dorothy, and Eliza, purchased
fifty-five acres of crown land on the other side of Lizard Lake, at a purchase price of ten
pounds, eighteen shillings and nine pence. This parcel of land (combined with other land
subsequently acquired) was passed through the generations of the William Marsman
lineage until 1974, when it foreclosed through what appear to be unethical lending
practices. More research is needed to ascertain how much land was purchased by the
Black Refugees in Hammonds Plains because of the shift to a uniform land sales system,
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but often assumed to be issued as “free” land grants in fulfillment of the Cochrane
Proclamation.
4.4 Upper Hammonds Plains 200 Years Later
When Justice Campbell in Downey connected anti-Black racism in this province to
the land-based injustices experienced in African Nova Scotian communities, he wrote:
African Nova Scotians have been subjected to racism for hundreds
of years in this province. It is embedded within the systems that
govern how our society operates. […] That has real implications for
things like land ownership.631
While the racially discriminatory application of the colonial land administration
laws, combined with the colour-blind approaches to reform, sparked a sequence of landbased injustices in Upper Hammonds Plains, there were many other instances of landbased racial injustices experienced within African Nova Scotian communities over the 200
years that followed. This section discusses only two of those instances, in relation to
Upper Hammonds Plains.
4.4.1 Pockwock Watershed Expropriation632
In 1974 a large tract of communal land in Upper Hammonds Plains, known as the
Melvin Lands,633 was expropriated by the Nova Scotia Department of Lands and Forests634
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and the Public Service Commission (now Halifax Regional Water Commission) in
connection with the development of the Pockwock Watershed, being a main water supply
for the Halifax Regional Municipality. In total, approximately 9,600 acres of land was
expropriated for the project, from approximately 28 landowners with holdings ranging
from 0.3 to 1,345 acres (no residential holdings).635 Roughly 300 acres of the Melvin Lands
were expropriated during the process, being the only tract of communal land involved in
expropriation.636 The expropriation was legalized by filing the expropriation documents
in the land registry system. There was no advance notice, no opportunity to be heard, and
the amount of compensation was “negotiated”637 after the expropriation had taken place
and based on appraisal reports that were procured on behalf of the Province.638
The expropriated property on the Melvin Lands were appraised at $88,500, and
the Province offered $75,000 plus interest and an additional 15% of market value for
disturbance damages under the Expropriation Act, for a total of $97,250. The offer was
accepted by the trustees of the trust entity that owns the land on behalf of the
community, but there is strong likelihood that the trustees did not receive legal advice as
to matters of compensation,639 and consequently, not informed of their right to appeal
the compensation under the recently modernized Expropriation Act.
The landowner adjacent to the Melvin Lands, however, Provincial Realty Co. Ltd.,
appealed its expropriation compensation and was awarded additional compensation as a
result.640 The Provincial Realty decision shows that the Province’s expropriation appraiser
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assessed the expropriated lands much lower than the landowner’s appraiser, being
$175/acre and $300/acre, respectively. The Expropriation Compensation Board in
Provincial Realty set compensation at $230/acre, being $130/acre more than what was
paid for the Melvin Lands. More importantly, the Provincial Realty decision reveals that
the Province’s expropriation appraiser valued the neighbouring Melvin Lands lower than
the Provincial Realty lands ($100/acre versus $175/acre, respectively), notwithstanding
the Melvin Lands had property improvements that increased it value relative to the
Provincial Realty lands.
Additionally, the Compensation Board in Provincial Realty awarded injurious
affection damages to Provincial Realty equal to 10% of the market value of the lands. The
injurious affection was based on severance or distortion in the configuration of the
claimants remaining lands.641 Thus, the Compensation Board concluded that “a purchaser
of the remaining lands would insist on a price reduction because of the peculiar shape.”642
The distorted shape is the effect of the pipeline that runs between the Melvin Lands and
the Provincial Realty lands as a result of the expropriation. While the Board agreed with
the Province’s appraiser that no injurious affection results from the installation of the
pipeline itself, it disagreed that the pipeline constitutes a betterment as a source of water
to service a future development.643 In summary, if the Province’s expropriation appraiser
had valued the Melvin Lands at $175/acre, like he did for the neighbouring Provincial
Realty lands, it could have resulted in additional compensation of approximately $18,600
to the Melvin Society for the expropriated lands. Furthermore, if the Melvin Society
received legal advice encouraging them to appeal the compensation, like its neighbour
Provincial Realty did, it could have resulted in additional compensation of approximately
$35,000, or more.644
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The lasting effect of the Pockwock Watershed expropriation on the community of
Upper Hammonds Plains is best described by a community elder who explains:
[n]o greater issue has been so deeply-rooted in the memories of
the residents than the expropriation of some 365 acres of land and
Pockwock Lake to provide water service for the municipality. Most
remarkably and ultimately most hurtful, was the fact that the water
pipes were not routed through the hosting community, but rather,
away from the community.645
There is little doubt that the sacrifice made by the community of Upper
Hammonds Plains facilitated the economic boom experienced by the Halifax Regional
Municipality resulting from sustainable water supply, as well as the housing
developments that run along Dunbrack Street, Halifax, under which the water pipelines
run.
Expropriation is another example of racially disparate effects of ostensibly neutral
laws, which suggests the existence of systemic anti-Black racism within the legal
structures that support it. The extraordinary power of expropriation has been used many
times with disadvantage Black communities for the benefit of White-serving interest, 646
but when has expropriation been used with disadvantage White communities to benefit
Black-serving interests?
4.4.2 Water Fight647
Perhaps the most egregious aspect of the Pockwock Watershed expropriation of
the Melvin Lands was the government’s decision to exclude the community of Upper
Hammonds Plains from the water supply. Supporters of this decision argue it was not
racially motived, but the result of jurisdictional scope of Public Service Commission, now
Halifax Regional Water Commission (HRWC). They claimed that HRWC was empowered
645
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to supply water to the City of Halifax only, not Halifax County where Upper Hammonds
Plains was located. This argument was officially debunked in 2002 by a Human Rights
investigator who, after reviewing the evidence presented by the community’s then
lawyer, states “[…] the Public Service Commission did have the power to develop the
water supply for the benefit of communities outside the City of Halifax, and, more
specifically, had the power to do so for the Upper Hammonds Plains area.”648
In addition to the denial of water supply from the nearby watershed, the
community of Upper Hammonds Plains experienced water problems for many years
following the installation of the Pockwock Watershed. In 1996, water testing revealed
harmful bacteria in 47% of the wells tested in the community. Thus, the community
engaged HRWC to install a central water system. The initial cost of the project was
estimated at $4.3 million, of which $2.85 million would require contribution by property
owners through frontage fees of approximately $49 per foot.649 This cost was
prohibitively high for many community members, particularly the elderly residents.
Negotiations ensued for roughly three years, with modifications to the project scope in
efforts to reduce the cost. In addition, the community sought municipal, provincial, and
federal funding, and the frontage fees were further reduced. During negotiations, HRWC
informed the community that any costs savings from reduced construction tender prices
would be used to further reduce the frontage fees. However, when the project tenders
came under budget because of community-led action, HRWC instead used the savings
towards servicing a new housing development in the adjacent area known as English
Corner, and none of the savings were used to benefit the community of Upper Hammonds
Plains.
This resulted in long and costly litigation.650 Ultimately, the court ruled in favour
of the community of Upper Hammonds Plains and awarded $267,400, together with costs
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($31,092, plus disbursements) for negligent misrepresentations made by government
officials.651 The litigation, which is referred to by the community as the “water fight”, is
yet another example of African Nova Scotians being induced to act on representations
made by government officials and then having to fight to have them fulfilled.
Government apathy towards fulfilling representations it makes to the African Nova
Scotian community is a constant theme in the African Nova Scotian lived experience, as
pointed out by Justice Nathanson, stating:
I have difficulty understanding why HRM Council dealt in a
somewhat shallow manner with the complaint of the leader of the
UHP community, Daniel Norton. One would think that it would
want to investigate Norton’s claim that the UHP community had
attached explicit conditions to its acceptance of the project, that
the conditions had been communicated in writing to officials of
HRM, and that the conditions had not been dealt with or even
acknowledged by HRM or any of its officials. One would also think
that HRM Council would be even more interested in allegations
that a senior official of HRWC and, to a lesser extent, some of its
own officials had represented that savings from the tender process
would lower frontage charges to the UHP community. Its interest
in ascertaining the truth appears to have been low and of short
duration.652
He proceeds to state:
The Province is not without blame. It did not authorize its
appointed representative to police the scope and performance of
the project. It appears to have accepted HRWC’s uninformative
invoice at face value and without question. The responses of
Marvin MacDonald and Deputy Minister Darrow reflect poorly
upon the Province […] He showed no interest in discovering
whether there was truth to a complaint of the UHP community
about the project for which the Province was on the verge of
expending $500,000 of public money. […] It is obvious that neither
considered that the Province had a higher obligation to ascertain
the truth.653
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As with the experiences surrounding the Pockwock Watershed expropriation, the
Water Fight has had a long-lasting impact on the community of Upper Hammonds Plains
and is a painful reminder of the accumulated unfulfilled representations made to the
community, dating back to the Black Refugees in the Cochrane Proclamation.
The Melvin Lands remain one of the largest African Nova Scotian community
owned properties in the province, notwithstanding other expropriations that have further
reduced its size. Furthermore, while environmental designations in the area create some
land-use restrictions, there is hope that with financial support and other resources, the
land can be leveraged to benefit the community in sustainable and innovative ways, such
as affordable housing, community heritage preservation, and recreational landscape.
Additionally, there are plans in the community to create a community land trust aimed at
providing affordable housing in the community while at the same time, protecting its
cultural heritage.654
4.5 Conclusion
When the Black Refugees arrived in the autumn of 1813, Nova Scotia had already
developed pre-existing racial attitudes towards people of African descent based on, for
example, previous experiences with the Black Loyalists and Jamaican Maroons. Historian
Whitfield notes “[t]he racial badge of slavery continued into the nineteenth century and
reinforced a hierarchical society, which placed the black community on the lowest rung
of the social ladder.”655 Regardless of whether formal slavery was practiced in Halifax at
the time or not, these racial attitudes “still shaped the opinions of the white
population.”656 These opinions, being anti-Black racism and White supremacist ideology,
infiltrated the legal system in this province at its origins, by allowing attitudes of racial
inferiority toward Black people prevail over honouring principles of contractual
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compliance and equal treatment under the law, which created disadvantages for Black
people and advantages for White people. Then, through to a series of colour-blind
approaches to law reform, exacerbated existing the racial injustices.
The Cochrane Proclamation (Part 2.2.3 above) set a reasonable expectation that
the Black Refugees would treated the same as the White settlers in the colony in terms
of land grants (size, tenure, and quality). This means that, among other things, the Black
Refugees ought to have received the customary amounts of 200 acres of land, or up to
500 acres of land, under the 1807 Land Administration Laws. Then Britain reneged on its
promises and, eventually, downsized the land promises to terms that were comparable
to the disbanded soldiers, who on average received 150 acres each. This means that,
among other things, the Black Refugees ought to then have received 150 acres of land,
under the authority of the 1807 Land Administration Laws. But then, ultimately, on the
advice of the Surveyor General, the Black Refugees received only 10-acres of land, which
resulted in an even further discrepancy between the amount of land they received
compared to what was promised. What is important to note here is that the 1807 Land
Administration Laws did not exclude the Black Refugees from eligibility to receive the
customary amounts of 200 – 500 acres of land (or the 150 acres of land) through crown
grants. It was in the application of this law that precluded their opportunity to receive the
land, and the law failed to protect them from that discriminatory application of the law.
As legal historians point out,
rare were the instances of formal discrimination […]. But in virtually
every case where Blacks needed or came into contact with
government action, and in all too many court proceedings, Blacks
encountered discrimination in the applications of laws or policies
that appeared neutral on the surface. Insofar as these actions
contributed to Black impoverishment and economic dependence,
these results seemed only to confirm white stereotypes that
equated Blacks with cheap labour and lack of initiative, members
of a group who could never aspire to positions above the bottom
of the social hierarchy657
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While the 1807 Land Administration Laws were not overtly racist, they were
applied in a manner that was rooted in anti-Black racism and White supremacist ideology.
This racially discriminatory application of the ostensibly race-neutral 1807 Land
Administration Laws, specifically in terms of smaller lot sizes, invalidated the Black
Refugees as citizens who are capable and desirous of improving and cultivating the land,
and thus precluded their participation in economic benefits under the law. At the same
time, the law, by granting larger lots of land to White settlers, validated White people as
bona fide settlers and thus facilitated their uplifting through the allocation of more land,
being a capital resource in wealth accumulation.
Then, the 1821 Land Board Regulations exacerbated the racial oppression by
ignoring the realities of anti-Black racism, again, by excluding the Black Refugees from
eligibility to receive larger lot sizes comparable to White pauper immigrants, because of
their prior coerced participation in a racially discriminatory application of the law which
placed them on smaller lots. Yet, at the same time, the 1821 Land Board Regulations
served White pauper immigrants by acknowledging their impoverished situation and
creating special allowance under the law to facilitate their better access to greater
quantities of land than what was made available to the Black Refugees. In doing so, the
law uplifted the pauper White immigrants and validated them as bona fide settlers while
reinforcing the invalidation of Black people as citizens who are capable and desirous of
improving and cultivating the land.
And, finally, the 1827 Land Sale Regulations intensified the land-based injustices
against the Black Refugees by not only (again) creating opportunities for pauper White
immigrants that excluded the Black Refugees from eligibility, but also through a colourblind approach to the adoption and application of a unified system of land sales, which
required the Black Refugees to then pay monetary consideration to have their prior lots
confirmed as grants, and also served to deny the Black Refugees opportunities to be
relocated to better and larger lands to redress the prior injustices.
As a result of all the foregoing, systemic anti-Black racism and White supremacist
ideology in Nova Scotia’s property law choked the economic opportunities of the Black
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Refugees which triggered an inter-generational cycle of poverty for African Nova Scotians
spanning over 200 years.
Furthermore, this all stems back to the breach of contractual obligations in the
Cochrane Proclamation which induced the Black Refugees to risk their lives fleeing
enslavement in exchange for freehold land grants in Nova Scotia, and those contractual
obligations likely remain unfulfilled today because of the monetary consideration that the
Black Refugees had to pay for their “confirmatory grants” to smaller-than-average lots.
System anti-Black racism is more than the racially prejudice attitudes held by its
individual actors. When racial bias is combined with social and institutional power it
produces a system of advantage and disadvantage based on race and involves one group
having “the power to carry out systematic discrimination through the institutional policies
and practices of the society while shaping the cultural beliefs and values that support
those racist policies and practices.”658 Systemic racism is not always straight-forward. It is
often more insidious, proceeding gradually and subtly without detection until its harmful
effects are rooted deep within the institution. This stealth infiltration makes anti-Black
racism within the legal system especially challenging to pinpoint and dismantle. But,
through knowledge and exposure comes the opportunity to redress the harm it has
caused and repair (or dismantle) the systems moving forward.
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Chapter 5: Reparations
The Black Refugees were not passive participants in a British North American
migration story. They were not “people to whom history happened” but rather people
“who made history themselves.”659 What are often depicted as self-defeating choices of
geographic and social isolation, were ingenious survival tactics made by a self-reliant and
mutually supportive community.660 Had the Black Refugees been socially, politically, and
economically included within the broader community, or otherwise offered the chance
to feel the wind at their backs as many White settlers had, the Black Refugees too could
have soared to higher levels of economic prosperity throughout the generations. This is
not to suggest that every White settler in Nova Scotia thrived economically or did not
struggle, but comparatively, group to group, White settlers were economically
advantaged through the legalized exclusion of Black Refugees from land-based economic
opportunities. This historical disadvantage (and corresponding advantage) contributed to
present-day racial disparities in wealth and poverty in this province.
The Black Refugee migration story is one that historically has been told through a
White colonialist lens, which has understated the contractual nature of the proclamatory
representations (implicit and explicit) that induced the Black Refugees to act. The Black
Refugees acted in reliance on the representation that they would “be meet with due
encouragement,”661 meaning free land, implements, and (for a limited time)
provisions.662 A contextual interpretation of the Cochrane Proclamation, relative to the
applicable land administration laws in effect at the time, calls for a presumptive starting
position that the land to be distributed to the Black Refugees in satisfaction of the
proclamatory representation ought to have been granted on terms equivalent to that
which was being granted to White settlers in Nova Scotia at the time, pursuant to the
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1807 Land Administration Laws. Those contractual terms were not fulfilled, and because
of this breach, the Black Refugees incurred damages for which restitution is owed.
In similar ways that the Transatlantic Slave Trade bankrolled the industrial
revolution,663 colonial land grants contributed to the accumulation of capitalist wealth in
Nova Scotia. Furthermore, although elite White settlers may have benefited more than
pauper White immigrants in this regard, pauper White immigrants and disbanded soldiers
benefited from more land grant opportunities than the Black Refugees. The law created
these racial disparities in lot sizes through the establishment of a legal system which
enabled its actors to apply the law in a racially discriminatory manner. Then, the law
exacerbated the racial disparities in lot sizes through the creation of laws that advantaged
pauper White immigrants and disadvantaged the Black Refugees. In doing so, the
nineteenth century land administration laws triggered a cycle of poverty for African Nova
Scotians through a systematic strangling of their wealth-generating opportunities.
5.1

Utility of Conventional Law
Despite the role of the law in creating and exacerbating the harm inflicted on the

Black Refugees, the legal system in its present form is not equipped to effectively deal
with these types of historical racial injustices, nor repair the inter-generational damage
that it has caused to the African Nova Scotian community. While there may be multiple
legal avenues that, in theory, could be available to the descendants of the Black Refugees
for the land-based injustices, there are practical barriers within the legal system that
would significantly impede the likelihood of success, or, even if successful, fail to restore
the injured parties to what ought to have been their original condition.664 Barriers such
as statutes of limitations, judicial standing, rules of evidence, stare decisis, and principles
governing the eligibility and quantification of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, all
add layers of complexity which would cause delay and expense to an already long and
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costly litigation regime.665 For example, after identifying instances of racial discrimination
experienced by African Nova Scotians during the Halifax Explosion relief efforts, authors
Mark Culligan and Katrin MacPhee examine four legal avenues to redress the historic
claims of discrimination. They considered a claim under section 15 of the Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, a claim under human rights legislation, a suit for unjust enrichment, and
an action for breach of fiduciary duty. Ultimately, they conclude that each legal avenue is
unlikely to succeed because of structural barriers within the legal system, which
exemplifies “how the development of Canadian law has effectively served to bar many
claims for redress for historic claims of discrimination.”666
Similarly, Corrine Sparks explores the utility of conventional legal actions and
corresponding relief that could be available to the former Africville residents, specifically
unjust enrichment, and unconscionable transactions.667 Before doing so, Sparks situates
the legal analysis within the context of accumulated distrust and apprehension that
African Nova Scotians have towards the legal system, and writes:
Recourse through the courts, at times, has caused frustration,
bitterness and disappointment. […] Black Nova Scotians are
sceptical about the ability of the justice system to respond fairly
and equitably to racial and social injustice. This distrust is […] more
broadly based as Nova Scotian Blacks do not believe that the White
judicial system has the capability to conceptualize and understand
the burden of racism in society. […] This is in contrast to others such
as White males, for example, who may have an inherent and
unquestioning belief in the ability of the judicial system to respond
to their conflicts.
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Whereas Sparks ultimately determines that with a contextual approach to the law,
grounded in critical race theory, “an action of unjust enrichment and the doctrine of
unconscionability are flexible enough to hold promise for Africville residents”, since the
commencement of a class action lawsuit in 1996, litigation pertaining to Africville remains
unresolved to the satisfaction of the African Nova Scotian community.668 To this end,
Sparks explains:
[f]rom my research, litigation, while always an alternative for
resolving redress conflicts, may not be the complete answer for
reparation and compensation, however. It was not the answer for
Japanese Canadians […].
While the conventional legal system may not yet be equipped to effectively
respond to racial injustices, historic or present, “judicial leadership and innovation should
not be underestimated.”669 It is hoped that the judiciary will find innovative approaches
towards a more effective redress for historic racial injustices in this province that have
had long-lasting impacts afflicting African Nova Scotians today.670 In the meantime,
however, it seems political mobilization offers the most promising strategy for redress, as
was the case for reparations to the Japanese Canadian community after World War II.671
5.2

Reparations Movement
While, in simple terms, reparation is a form of redress to atone for a wrongdoing,

reparations in the context of human rights violations connotes something more nuanced
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and comprehensive. What can be understood as a form of transitional justice672 or
reparatory justice,673 reparations entail both the victims (and their descendants) right to
receive reparations as well as the perpetrators (and their benefactors) duty to give
reparations. The United Nations prescribes five principles underlying a full and effective
reparations framework, namely restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction,
and guarantees of non-repetition.674 Reparations programs can be monetary and nonmonetary and owed to individuals as well as collectives.675
The global slavery reparations movement is long-standing and multifaceted,676
and has gained stronger momentum during the United Nations Decade for People of
African Descent (2015 – 2024).677 Stemming from the World Conference against Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban in 2001, the
United Nations adopted the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action which
requested the Commission on Human Rights to establish a United Nations working group
to study, and make proposals for the elimination of, the problems of racial discrimination
faced by people of African descent living in the African Diaspora.678 The Working Group
of Experts on People of African Descent, established the following year, visited Canada in
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October 2016 which resulted in the Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of
African Descent on its mission to Canada.679
Organizations such as the African Nova Scotian Decade for People of African
Descent Coalition and the Global Afrikan Congress Nova Scotia Chapter have been
instrumental in leading the global reparations movement in Nova Scotia, as well as
representing Nova Scotia in the global discourse. Across the country there have been calls
for an African Canadian Reparations Act,680 which would include an African Canadian
Reparations Commission to iron out the details and implement the recommendations set
out in the Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its
mission to Canada. Locally, African Nova Scotians have been calling for an African Nova
Scotian Reparations Commission to focus on reparations for matters coming under the
constitutional jurisdiction of the provincial government, which includes property
matters.681
5.3

Quantifiable Loss from Smaller Lot Sizes
The racial disparities caused by the early nineteenth century land administration

laws must now be rectified if Nova Scotians are to reconcile the injustices from the past
with the promise of the present. The systemic anti-Black racism in this area of property
law excluded, underserved, financially exploited, oppressed, and invalidated the Black
Refugees, and at the same time, included, served, financially resourced, uplifted, and
validated White settlers. Whether this was the intent or not, the effect remains that the
law created and reinscribed racially disparate effects in opportunities for land-based
economic growth which set into motion a different wealth trajectory for the Black
Refugees compared to White settlers. This racial disparity in land possessions set the
foundation on which present-day racial disparities in wealth and poverty are based. The
enormity of the disparity is such that clarification of land titles, at this point, will have
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limited impact on the cycle of poverty within the African Nova Scotian community. Even
with legal title, African Nova Scotians face barriers in accessing quality loans and other
financial resources that are needed to derive financial profit from their land, assuming
capitalism is the desired route. Furthermore, the opportunity for significant intergenerational accumulation of land-based wealth has passed and so now African Nova
Scotians are 200 years behind their White counterparts in that respect. Therefore, drastic
and proactive approaches are needed to, among other things, make up for lost time.682
To date, the land issue in African Nova Scotian communities has been mischaracterized,
which has led us to misplace our efforts in the solution. A significant, albeit insufficient,
amount of time and resources have been put into addressing the land titles issue, which
is a worthy pursuit, but has come at the expense of diverting attention away from the
bigger picture – land reparations.
When one party wrongs another party, that party ought to make amends for the
harm they caused. Whether the promises in the Cochrane Proclamation are characterized
as misrepresentations (fraudulent, negligent, or innocent), or an intentional breach of
contract (offer, acceptance, and consideration), damages are owed to the heirs of the
Black Refugees. And while it may be challenging (though not impossible) to quantify
damages associated with land tenure, that is not the case for lot sizes. In simple terms, at
the time of the Black Refugees arrival, land was being granted in lot sizes ranging from
100 to 500 acres. At the low end, being a comparison to the disbanded soldiers who were
receiving on average 150 acres each, there is a disparity of 140 acres compared to the 10
acres that the Black Refugees were receiving. At the mid range, being a comparison to
married pauper White immigrants under the 1821 land regulations who could obtained
200 acres, there is a disparity of 180 acres compared to the 10 acres that the Black
Refugees were receiving. At the high end, being the opportunity to receive the maximum
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lost size grant that the Lieutenant Governor was legally empowered to issue under the
1807 Land Administration Laws, which was 500 acres, there is a disparity of 490 acres
compared to the 10 acres that the Black Refugees were receiving.
In terms of value per acre, while it may be difficult (though not impossible) to
determine the value of land in 1814, but by 1827 monetary value was be attributed to the
land for the purposes of calculating the upset price under the land sale regulations. In the
Buller Report, Surveyor-General J.S. Morris testified that the upset price was two shillings
per acre.683 It is important to note here that the upset price is merely the starting point
for the auction, and so the final purchase price per acre may have been much higher
depending on the location and quality of the land being auction. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of this simple calculation, the two shilling per acre will be used.
5.3.1 Table of Quantifiable Loss from Smaller Lot Sizes
-

Land Value 1827 (2 shillings
per acre)
Land Value 2020
($2,332684/£1,339685 per
acre)
Difference in loss/gain per
Black Refugee

Black
Refugees
10 Acres

Disbanded
Soldiers
150 Acres

20s (£1)

300s (£10)

Pauper
White
Immigrants
200 Acres
400s (£20)

White
Settlers
500 Acres

£13,390
$23,320

£200,850
$349,800

£267,800
$466,400

£669,500
$1,166,000

-

($326,480)

($443,080)

($1,142,680)

1,000s (£50)

Note that these calculations do not account for lost investment opportunities or
other missed opportunities that could have been gained by leveraging the additional land
as a capital asset. There are likely more sophisticated methods for calculating the financial
loss attributed to smaller lot sizes, but it is hoped that these crude calculations will at least
illuminate the need for calculating this information. Organizations such as Property
Valuation Services Corporation, being the legal entity responsible for assessing all
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property in Nova Scotia under the Assessment Act,686 likely have the resources capable of
carrying out this valuation more precisely.
Based on the calculations set out in the above table, each of the 2,000 or more
Black Refugees are owed, at a minimum, damages ranging from $326,480 to
$1,142,680687 for the systemic anti-Black racism in property law which resulted in their
receipt of substantially reduced lot sizes compared to their White counterparts. These
amounts should be paid to the descendants of the Black Refugees to make amends for
this wrongdoing. And, as with typical instances of legal damages for personal injury, those
amounts are owed directly to the claimants, being the descendants of the Black Refugees
who are living with the consequential inter-generational trauma and cycle of poverty, and
not paid into government programming. African Nova Scotians need the economic
security and independence to make their own financial decisions which serve their unique
individual and collective financial circumstances.
Reimbursing African Nova Scotians for their inter-generational loss attributed to
smaller lot sizes and acknowledging the corresponding inter-generational gain
advantaging White Nova Scotians, is only one aspect of a larger system of redress for
slavery and egregious injustices against people of African descent. The reparations
movement, dating back to at least 1783,688 is longstanding, deep-rooted, and
multidimensional, but in simple terms, “reparations is a program of acknowledgement,
redress, and closure for a grievous injustice.”689 To elaborate,
Acknowledgement is the admission of wrong and the declaration
of responsibility for restitution by the culpable party. Redress is the
act of restitution—compensation for the wrong—carried out by
the culpable party. Closure is the settling of accounts between the
686
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victimized community and the culpable party—the arrival at
conciliation. Closure means that the debt has been paid and that
the victimized community will make no further claims for
restitution, barring the occurrence of new atrocities or the
recurrence of old atrocities.690
What is particularly noteworthy about the reparation’s movement is the emphasis
on direct payments to the injured party. In this regard, the “reparations” decision by the
City of Evanston in Illinois, United States is a cautionary tale to consider in the structuring
of reparations to African Nova Scotians for smaller lot sizes. In 2019, Evanston City Council
passed Resolution 58-R-19, “Commitment to End Structural Racism and Achieve Racial
Equity” which triggered a process aimed at addressing the historical wealth and
opportunity gaps that Black residents experienced compared to White residents. Through
this process, the City identified actions that it could take to implement a meaningful repair
and reparations policy. The first initiative for restorative relief that was identified was
housing reparations for the city’s part in housing discrimination arising out of early to midtwentieth century city ordinances that were in effect during a city ban on housing
discrimination. Thus, on March 22, 2021, Evanston, Illinois City Council approved what is
called a “Local Reparations Restorative Housing Program” under which qualifying Black
residents can receive up to $25,000 grants for repairs or down payments on homes.691
The city has earmarked $10 million over ten years for fund, using revenue from
recreational cannabis taxes, and has called upon citizens, businesses, and organizations
to make private contributions to the reparations fund.
While touted as the first city in the United States to issue racial reparations for
slavery, it has been pointed out that this is more a housing voucher program than
reparations692 because, among other reasons, cash payments are not made directly to the
recipients to be used at their discretion, which is a hallmark of the reparations movement
and consistent with reparations that were paid to other groups for historical injustices,
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such as German payments to Holocaust victims and United States’ payments to Japanese
descendants for their internment during World War II. Likewise, Canada paid reparations
to Japanese Canadians for the forcible relocation and internment of over 22,000 Japanese
Canadians during World War II. The $300 million compensation package included direct
payments to claimants.693
5.4

Promise of the Present: Count Us In Report
On May 8, 2018, Nova Scotia joined the United Nations General Assembly in

proclaiming 2015 to 2024 as the International Decade for People of African Descent, with
the theme “People of African Descent: recognition, justice, and development.” In doing
so, the Province of Nova Scotia committed to addressing the issues facing African Nova
Scotians and called on all Nova Scotians to “take action in support of our African Nova
Scotian communities in their efforts for full inclusion in all facets of Nova Scotian
society.”694 One aspect of this work included the development of an action plan which,
building upon earlier reports and recommendations by African Nova Scotians, proposes
“a system-wide blueprint for lasting change”

695

by promoting the three pillars:

recognition, justice, and development. The then Premier of Nova Scotia wrote:
This action plan is designed to recognize the important
contributions of people of African descent living in Nova Scotia,
while at the same time working to tackle the unique challenges
impacting the community. […] This action plan will be our guiding
document. It will provide government with specific actions,
direction and strategic priorities to steer decision making using the
three pillars: recognition, justice and development.696
While there are visionary gaps between the United Nation’s calls for reparations
which entails “acknowledgement, redress, and closure”, as compared to Nova Scotia’s
pillars of “recognition, justice, and development”, there is an expressed commitment in
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Count Us In toward the “journey of healing and resolution” which underscores its
mandate and aligns it closer to the spirit and intent of reparations.
The vision for Nova Scotia’s Count Us In Action Plan is for African Nova Scotians to
prosper and equitably and respectfully access and participate in all facets of Nova Scotian
society.697 To that end, the “Recognition” pillar in the Action Plan strives to recognize and
celebrate the important contributions of African Nova Scotians, “while also recognizing
the long-standing prejudices and unfair treatment endured for generations.” 698 Actions
such as education and data governance are items listed under this pillar. It is important
to note here that while employment income is a common data collection item, data on
net worth and other data points that would capture the percentage and value of Blackowned capital assets (such as land) compared to White-owned capital assets, are not
readily available. Bridging the income gap is a worthwhile pursuit but bridging the wealth
gap will require a more comprehensive data collection strategy.
The “Justice” pillar of the Action Plain strives to bridge the gap between what the
law promises and what law enforcement and the justice system deliver.699 To that end,
one goal is for African Nova Scotians to have access to a fair and equitable justice system,
including systems which impact African Nova Scotian children, youth, and families, as well
as environmental justice, and land-based issues affecting African Nova Scotian
communities.700
The third pillar in the Count Us In Action Plan, “Development”, endeavors to create
healthier and more prosperous African Nova Scotian communities through goals such as
closing the education gap and supporting health and well being of African Nova Scotians
of all ages. 701 Another key goal of the “Development” pillar is to bridge the income gap
through economic development strategies. In this regard, the Count Us In report
incorporates the work of another Government of Nova Scotia report that was published
697
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in 2014 entitled Now or Never: An Urgent Call to Action for Nova Scotians, commonly
known as the “Ivany Report”.702 Stemming from the Ivany Report, the Government of
Nova Scotia developed a 10-year plan to help achieve the goals established in the Ivany
Report, known as One Nova Scotia.703 While one of the key mandates of the Ivany Report
was “to better understand the circumstances and opportunities for different regions,
economic sectors, and cultural communities across the province”704 the Ivany Report does
not investigate the realities of anti-Black racism nor acknowledge its consequences on the
African Nova Scotian community. African Nova Scotians are mentioned nine times
throughout the 84-page Ivany Report, and four of the nine references situate African Nova
Scotians as unemployed or underemployed labourers.705 To that end they write “[t]he
birth rate for these communities is higher than in the general population so they
represent an important potential source of young new entrants to the labour force. 706
Once again, African Nova Scotians are being relegated to the role of labourers in support
of White-serving economic pursuits. Thus, not surprisingly, Goal #8 in One Nova Scotia is
employment rate equality, not racial wealth gap reduction. Nevertheless, even with this
narrow vision, as of August 6, 2021, Goal #8 is not progressing on track and achieved only
16% towards its target.707
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The vision for improving the financial health of African Nova Scotians that is
embedded in the Ivany Report is too narrow and fails to address the racial disparities in
personal net worth (assets minus liabilities) which will undermine any success in attaining
employment rate equality. Unfortunately, with this narrow vision now incorporated into
Count Us In, the action items under the “Development” pillar equally fall short of what is
needed to bridge the racial wealth gap in this province. More work is needed to better
understand the extent of racial disparities in personal net worth, that include intergenerational wealth accumulation from real estate, followed by concrete action to bridge
the gap. What is also missing from Count Us In is a reparations strategy that would not
only settle the accounts of historical debts associated with the colonial land
administration laws, but also situate many African Nova Scotians into positions of
stronger financial health.
5.5 Recommendations
The work in this thesis supports the need for an African Nova Scotian-led
reparations commission to develop and implement a reparations strategy for, among
other things, the historic racial injustices caused by the colonial land administration laws.
In Canada, the provinces have constitutional jurisdiction over property matters, thus
while the colonial land administration laws pre-existed confederation, a constitutional
decision was made which places legal responsibility with the Province of Nova Scotia.
Additionally, this work highlights the need for a multidisciplinary African Nova
Scotian research institute. The systemic racism in the colonial land administration laws is
merely a subset of systemic racism in property law, which itself, is a subset of systemic
racism in law. However, there are many areas of law which actively create or passively
support anti-Black racism, all of which need to be explored, dismantled, and redressed.
Furthermore, the systemic anti-Black racism extends beyond the field of law, and even
within law, often cuts across multiple fields of discipline.

Properly structured, a

multidisciplinary African Nova Scotian research institute would be well suited to engage
scholars and practitioners in various fields of study who could work collaboratively to
serve the interests of the African Nova Scotian community at large.
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Lastly, in terms of systemic racism in property law, more research is needed to
investigate the scope and degree of racial disparities in land-related matters such as land
titles, but also the tenure, size, and location of land owned by African Nova Scotians as
compared to non-African Nova Scotians. As a starting point, Nova Scotia’s online system
which provides access to land ownership and related information managed by Nova
Scotia’s Land Registration Office, referred to as Property Online, needs reform. The
financial costs associated with accessing Property Online (minimum $80/month) is
prohibitive to many citizens, as well as academic researchers. Additionally, the data
currently collected and organized within this system is not conducive to empirical or other
research activities. The collection of race-based data pertaining to land, and equitable
access to that data, is instrumental to the identification and redress of systemic racism in
property law.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
A guiding perspective under critical race theory is to look beyond the law’s active
role in creating inequalities (positive law) and examine the covert ways in which the law
supports racial inequalities through the recognition of seemingly harmless laws and social
customs.708 Critical race theorists challenge these tacit ways in which the law creates and
reinscribes racial inequalities.709 The role of the law in supporting and promoting antiBlack racism and White supremacist ideology through the colonial land administration
laws in this province was not the result of overtly racists laws, but rather, the law covertly
supported anti-Black racism and White supremacy through the acceptance of conditions
that allowed these attitudes to thrive.
This thesis sought to reframe the African Nova Scotian land titles discourse into a
broader understanding about systemic anti-Black racism and White supremacist ideology
embedded within the origins of law in this province, specifically real property law.
Through a critical race theoretical analysis of the early nineteenth century colonial land
administration laws, this work reveals the ways in which anti-Black racist and White
supremacist ideology embedded within the origins of law created and exacerbated racial
disparities in land-based wealth in this province.
Despite promises to receive land as ‘free settlers’, which induced the Black
Refugees to risk their lives fleeing captivity and side with the British during the War of
1812, the law allowed anti-Black racist and White supremacist ideology to infiltrate its
early origins in this province by failing to protect the Black Refugees when the colonialists
flagrantly disregarded, without consequence, their obligations under the Cochrane
Proclamation. The law further failed to protect the Black Refugees when it allowed antiBlack racist and White supremacist ideology to subvert the colonialists’ application of an
ostensibly race-neutral law, which resulted in, among other things, inferior land
allocations to the Black Refugees as compared to White settlers. Then, the law
exacerbated the racial gap in colonial land allocations through a colour-blind approach to
708
709

Walker, Legal Odyssey, supra note 21 at 1.
Ibid.
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law reform which served the interests of newly arrived pauper White immigrants. This
law reform created better colonial land acquisition opportunities for pauper White
settlers but excluded the Black Refugees from eligibility because of their previous racially
discriminatory treatment under the law. Finally, after all of the above, the law again
exacerbated the racial disparities in land allocations through the adoption of a unified
system of land sales, which (a) required the Black Refugees to pay monetary consideration
to have their previously issued (smaller) lots confirmed as grants when ought to have
been issued larger lots as free grants, and (b) served to deny the Black Refugees the
opportunity to be relocated to better and larger lands when they sought to have these
racial injustices redressed. In all of these ways, the law supported anti-Black racism by
promoting and protecting the interests of a White supremacist ideology, and in doing so,
created and reinscribed the racial disparities in land-based wealth and poverty that exists
in this province.
In the context of property law in this province, systemic anti-Black racism finds it
origins in colonialism, including the colonial land administration laws which resulted in
the Black Refugees receiving significantly smaller land allocations than White settlers. This
racially disparate effect in law had an impact on inter-generational wealth and poverty
disparities among White Nova Scotians and African Nova Scotians. The importance of
highlighting this racially disparity, and its longstanding financial impact, is not to condone
or legitimize colonialism or capitalism. The intent is to acknowledge the realities of
systemic anti-Black racism and to lay a foundation for which further work can be
developed and meaningful action can be taken, including reparations to African Nova
Scotians as a first step towards redressing the consequences of systemic anti-Black racism
in the law.
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Appendix A: (1815) Rations Return
[Copy] The Return of People of Colour in Hammonds Plains entitled to Rations by order
of His Excellency Sir J.C. Sherbrooke from [blank] to 1815 inclusive.710

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Francis Butler
Geo. G Butler
Wm. D. Butler
Isaac Butler
George Butler
Abraham Butler 1st.
Hector Butler
William Butler
Cato Butler
James Butler
Juba Butler
Joe Butler
Abraham Butler 2nd
Henry Butler
Sampson Butler
Gabriel M Butler
Jeffrey Butler
John Butler
Patrick Butler
William Marshman
Frederick Bailey
Simon Cochran
Jack Hamilton
[Shed] Hamilton
Reuben Hamilton
Joe Wiley
July Hamilton
Henry Hamilton
Deal Wiley
Luben Wiley
April Cooper
July Cooper
Isaac Grant
Brutus W Nish
Charles Gekie
Francis [Rofs]
Francis Grant
Richard [Rofs]
Henry Bailey
Scipio Cooper

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Moses Maysey
Sandy Cooper
Duncan Moysey
Sandy Poisco
Thomas Horseman
[Caityny] Hamilton
Dominic de Broka
Jack Hamilton 1 st
[Brafs] Hamilton
Tony Hamilton
Richard Hamilton
James Hamilton 1st
[Quashy] ] Hamilton
Peter Glasgow
Jack Hamilton 2nd
James Hamilton 2nd
Godfrey Darcy
Jeremiah Johnson
Newman
Brookenberry
Robert [Roicee]
Andrew Smith
Robert Hamilton
Joesph Grimes
Alexander Cooper
Benjamin Jackson
Samuel Cooper
London Cooper
Colly Copa
[Listing] Cooper
John Morris
Quash Cooper
Robert Bingle
Peter Hamilton
George Johnston
Solomon Boling
Adam Nero
Mark Taylor
Jack Watt
Dick Hamilton
Ebo Hamilton
James Groce

710

82. John Butler
83. Lewis Stuben
84. Peter Bain
85. Cogo Butler
86. Charles Jackson
87. Cuffe Drake
88. Mark De Young
89. Lindo W Intosh
90. John Cooper
91. Lory Mathews
92. Apollo Mathews
93. Mark Murphy
94. Lawrence Murphy
95. George Johnston
96. Harry Edwards
97. Aaron Bailey
98. Dick McCarty
99. Solomon Boullen
100. Joe Johnston
101. Simon Cochran
102. Mark Taylor
103. Nassau Jackson
104. Jack Watts
105. William Griffin
106. John Rogers
107. Mary Mart [or
Mast?]
108. John Alexander
109. James Watson
110. Timothy Williams
111. Abel Harding
112. Geral Saunders
113. Moses Senior
114. Philip Watkins
115. Pompey Joseph
116. John Lewis 1
117. John Lewis 2
118. Quash Mantly
119. John Baptist
120. Petion Jean Pierre
121. John Hamilton
122. John Cooper

(undated) PANS RG1 Vol 420 Doc 92). Note, the names appear as listed in the record available at PANS
online https://archives.novascotia.ca/african-heritage/archives/?ID=245.
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Appendix B: (1815) Lot List
[Copy] List of Black Refugees at Hammonds Plains, showing the number of houses and
lots of land.711
No.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Name
Richard Fitzue
Peggy Butler
Charles Stewart
Henry Butler
Wm P Butler
Francis Butler
George G Butler
Joseph Davis
Dominica DeBruce
Samson Butler
March Butler
Caesar Wiley
Joe Wiley
Henry Hamilton
Reuben Wiley
July Cooper
March Christopher
Emanuel Griffin
Lewis Willis
Lewis Stuben
Robert Cooper
Charles Gekie
Francis Ross
Richard Ross
Scipio Cooper
Sandy Cooper
Sandy Pascoe
Robert Hamilton
John Hamilton
Toney Hamilton

No. of the House
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

No. of the Lot of Land
-

Wife
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Children
2
3
1
2
1
2
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
1
2

(continued)

711

(undated) PANS RG 1 Vol 422 Doc 111. Note, the names appear as listed in the record available at
PANS online <https://archives.novascotia.ca/african-heritage/archives/?ID=525>.
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No.

Name

No. of the House

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Shed Hamilton
Diana Hamilton
Reuben Hamilton
Jerry Johnstone
Robert Rowe
Godfrey Davies
Benjamin Jackson
Samuel Hamilton
Qualley Cooper
Quash Cooper
Samuel Cooper
Samuel Jenkins
George [Mars?]
James Pierrie
Landon Cooper
Lusten Cooper
Alexander Cooper
George Graham
Newman Bronkenbury
Quash Hamilton
Richard Hamilton
[Brafs?]Hamilton
Thomas Osman
Peter Hamilton
George Hamilton
Quash Mantley
Duncan Massey
Charles Jackson
Henry Bailey
Frank Grant
Isaac Grant
Brutus McNish
Charles Stubenfield
Joe Cooper
April Cooper
Deal Wiley
Quash Cooper
Patrick B Butler
John Jenkins
Jeffery H. Butler

31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

(continued)

214

No. of the Lot of
Land
-

Wife

Children

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
3
3
1
1
2
1
2
3

No.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Name
Grant M. Butler
John Brown
Abraham Butler
George Butler
Cato Butler
Joe Butler
Hector Butler
William Day Butler
Isaac Butler
Simon Cochran
John Butler
Susan Fowler
John Lamone
March Movis
March Cooper
Larama Vindra
Cuffy Mattis
Nero Mattis
Babtiste Mattis
Peter Ryan
John Thomas
Roger Cooper
John Lewis
John Massey
John Watts
Jesse Parker
Andrew Smith
Philip Hamilton
Peter Pierrie
John Gregory
Bristo Ryan
John Peachong
Daniel Goffigan
Jesse Carter
George Francis
George Appoling
John Babtiste
John Hamilton
James Hamilton
Apollo Mattis
Bristo Mott
Charles Butler
Richard Cunard

No. of the House
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
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No. of the Lot of Land
-

Wife
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
81
Total:

Children
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
1
2
111
293

Appendix C: (1817) Settlement Return
[Copy] A return of the number of Black Refugees and their families settled at Hammonds
Plains712

Names
Parry Brown
Richard Fitzhue
John Butler
Simeon *Cochran
John Tyson
Henry King
William Palmer
Isaac Butler
Francis Butler
Willm Days
Charles Stewart
George *Gingham
John Carolina
Joseph Davis
Hector Butler
Joseph Butler
Kato Lee
George Butler
Simpson Fox
York Forrester
Joseph Pencil
Aplo Solmit
Charles Arnold
Abr. Butler
George Tailor
Brister Mot
Dom De Broker
John Newton
John Hamilton 2d

Males
Under
Women
7 yrs.
of age
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
1
2
1
2

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2

Do.
Under
14 yrs.
of age
1
3
1

Do.
Above
14 yrs.
of age

Females
Under 7
yrs. of
age
2
3

Do.
Under
14 yrs.
of age
1

1
1
1

1
4
2
1

2

4
1
2
1

1

1

2
1
1

2
1

712

Do.
Names of
Above
those desirous
Total
14 yrs.
of going to
of age
Trinidad
5
9
3
2
4
3
Trinidad
3
1
6
6
4
4
9
Trinidad
1
Trinidad
5
5
4
Trinidad
4
4
1
3
2
Trinidad
1
4
1
5
1
3
4
3
1
6
2
3

(undated) PANS RG 1 Vol 422 Doc 19. Grant, Immigration and Settlement, supra note 59 at 92 cites this
document in footnote 125 and dates it as “about the same time” as another report dated August 1817
report. He also states at 95 that Sherbrooke wrote to the Colonial Office on February 2, 1816 that he would
“inform himself” of the number of refugees who desired to remove to Trinidad and that he would report
this information as soon as possible. However at 96, Grant references another Trinidad “return” by Richard
Inglis which, if dated close to the similar return for Beechville (PANS RG 1 Vol 422 Doc 20), would place the
date of this return as somewhere close to August 20, 1820. Note, the names appear as listed in the record
available at PANS online < https://archives.novascotia.ca/african-heritage/archives/?ID=432>.
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Antwine Goodry
Dolly Lee
Jubah Wallace
Andw Smith
Hope Maxwell
James Sanders
Brister Webb
Aplo Pier
John Grigaw
John Mersy

1
1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1

2

1

4
1
1

Total

2
1
3
4
5
2
2
2
2
143

Trinidad

Trinidad
Trinidad
Trinidad
arrived for

(continued)

Names

John P. Petion
James Mitchell
Charles Randle
Brister Wearing
Jesse Parker
Rodger Cooper
Peter Ryan
Nasseus La Coss.
George Copy
John Battist
John Larama
John Lewie
John Cooper
Peter Hamilton
Peter Verrice
James Allison
March Movile
Samuel Jenkins
John Hamilton 3d
John Thomas
Nora Mathews
Dolly Mathews
George Fransiva
Benj Days
Robn Cunard
———Jessama

Do.
Males Do.
Females
Above
Under 7 Under
Under 7
Women
14
yrs. of 14 yrs.
yrs. of
yrs. of
age
of age
age
age
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Do.
Under
14 yrs.
of age

1

Do.
Names of those
Above
desirous of
Total
14 yrs.
going to
of age
Trinidad

1

1
2
1
1

2
1

1

1

1
1

1
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4
4
1
4
3
2
4
2
3
5
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
2
2
3
5
2
1
1
1

Trinidad
Trinidad

Trinidad
Trinidad

Trinidad

Josh Pollodore
Ab Cunard
Richd McIntosh
Rosa Glostling
MIDDLE STREET
Fredk Bailey
Quashy Cooper Sr.
Colly Cooper
John Lamo
Samuel Cooper
Lennon Cooper
Benj Jackson
Liston Cooper
Phoebe Cooper
Josh Grimes

1

1
1
1
1
1

1
2
1
2

1

1

1

2
1
1

1
Total

1
1
1
2
1
1
5
5
4
4
2
1
3
1
3
241

Trinidad

Trinidad

carried forward

(continued)

Names
Toney Hamilton
Godfrey Davis
Newman Brookinbery
Robert Rowe
Judith Parker
Josh Johnson
Mary Parker
Peter Peir
Ruben Hamilton
Nassau Jackson
Quashy Hamilton
Richard Hamilton
Shed Hamilton
Brass Hamilton
Thoms Hosterman
Chs Stubberfield
John Hamilton 1st
Ketmes Hamilton
Robt Hamilton
Alex Harrison
George Hamilton
Robert Bingley
Peter Basama

Males Do. Do.
Under 7 Under Above
Women
yrs. of 14 yrs. 14 yrs.
age
of age of age
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

Do.
Under
14 yrs.
of age
1

Do.
Names of those
Above
desirous of
Total
14 yrs.
going to
of age
Trinidad
5
3
3
4

3
1
1

1
3

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Females
Under 7
yrs. of
age

7
2

1
2
1

1
1

2
1

1
1
2
1
2
1

1

1
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1
7
5
11
4
4
3
2
4
3
4
3
4
2
1
3

Trinidad
Trinidad

Trinidad

Quashy Mantly
Michl William
John Watts
Richd McCarty
Charles Jackson
Duncan Meroy
Henry Baily
Sandy Cooper
Sippio Cooper
Richd Ross
Cock Ross
Frank Grant
Isaac Grant Sr.
Judith Been
Frank Ross
Charles Giggy
Thos McNeish
Isaac Grant Jr.

1

2

1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
2
2

1

1
2

1
1

1

1
1

1
1
1
1

1

1

2
1
1
Total

5
1
1
1
3
2
5
2
5
5
1
2
3
3
5
3
3
2
376

Trinidad

carried forward

(continued)

Names

Robert Cooper
Lewis Stewband
Danl Goffigan
Jesse Carter
William Griffin
Robert Grant
Mark Young
Jos McClew
April Cooper
March Cooper
July Cooper
Ruban Wiley
Deal Wiley
Quashy Cooper Jr.
Josh Wiley
Henry Hamilton
Patk Bailey
Gabriel Jenkins

Males
Under
Women
7 yrs.
of age
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Do.
Under
14 yrs.
of age

Do.
Above
14 yrs.
of age

1

1

1
2

1
1

1
1

Do.
Under
14 yrs.
of age

Do.
Above
Total
14 yrs.
of age

2
1

1
2

1
1
1
1
1

Females
Under 7
yrs. of
age

1

1

1

2
1

1

1

1

1
1

1
1

1
1
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2
4
4
4
5
2
2
5
4
1
5
4
4
4
4
1
4
3

Names of
those
desirous of
going to
Trinidad

Trinidad
Trinidad
Trinidad

Cesar Wiley
John Jenkins
William Marshman
Jeffrey Howe
Sampson Butler
Gabriel Manigo
John Brown

1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1

3
1

1

Total
Wally Wiley
La Fortune
George Rantham
Rose Rushley

1
Total
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1
4
3
7
4
6
1
___
464
1
1
1
2
___
469

Trinidad

Trinidad
Trinidad
Trinidad

Appendix D: (1818) Licence of Occupation
[Copy] License from Lieutenant Governor Lord Dalhousie to Sampson Butler and a number
of other Black Refugees to occupy certain lots of land at Hammonds Plains (estimated
1818).713
***********
Dalhousie By His Excellency Lieutenant General the Right Honorable George Earl of Dalhousie Baron —
Dalhousie of Dalhousie Castle, Knight Grand Cross of the most Honorable Military Order of the Bath
Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief and over his Majestys Province of Nova Scotia and its
dependencies
License is herby given to the following men of Color to occupy possess and enjoy for and during the term
of ____ years from the date here of (their [sic] [then] if their conduct as industrious Peaceable and LoyalSubjects, shall be approved to receive Grants of confirmation from Government) the following Lots of Land
on which they are respectively settled, situate lying and being at Hammonds Plains in the County of Halifax
in the following Shares and proportions to wit unto Charles Gigge the Lot Number one (in the Western
division of ten acre Lots, letter C) containing ten acres unto Frank Ross the Lot Number two in said division
unto Dick Ross the Lot Number three in said division, unto Cephas Cooper the Lot Number four in said
division, Unto Sandy Cooper the Lot Number five in said division, Unto Sandy Pares the Lot Number Six in
said division, Unto Robert Hamilton the Lot Number Seven in said division, Unto Richard Hamilton the Lot
Number Eight in said division, Unto Kitness Hamilton the Lot Number nine in said division, Unto Jack
Hamilton the Lot Number ten in said division, Unto Anthony Hamilton the Lot Number Eleven in said
division, Unto Shead Hamilton the Lot Number twelve in said division, Unto Henry Williams the Lot Number
Thirteen in said division, Unto Reuben Hamilton the Lot Number fourteen in said division, Unto Jeremiah
Johnston the Lot Number fifteen in said division, Unto Rob Roe the Lot Number Sixteen in said division,
Unto Godfrey Davis the Lot Number Seventeen in said division, Unto Ben Jackson the Lot Number Eighteen
in said division, Unto Samuel Cooper the Lot Number Nineteen in said division, Unto Caleb Cob the Lot
Number twenty in said division, Unto Quack Cooper the Lot Number twenty one in said division, Unto
Maranette Cooper and Pedro Nero the Lot Number twenty two, Unto March Murvill the Lot Number
twenty three in said division, and unto John Thomas the Lot Number twenty four in said division. And unto
Brutus Maquish the Lot Number One (in the Eastern division of ten acre Lots letter C) containing ten acres
unto Isaac Grant the Lot Number two in said division, Unto Francis Grant the Lot Number three in said
division, Unto Henry Bailey the Lot Number four in said division, Unto Charles Jackson the Lot Number five
in said division, Unto Donkin Massey the Lot Number Six in said division, Unto Quack Mantle the Lot
Number Seven in said division, Unto Robert Bingley the Lot Number Eight in said division, Unto George
Hamilton the Lot Number Nine in said division, Unto Thomas Mashorman the Lot Number ten in said

713

(undated) PANS RG1 Vol 419 Doc 119. The Black Refugees were settled in Hammonds Plains under the
direction of Lieutenant Governor Sherbrooke in November 1815, who remained Lieutenant Governor until
June 1816 and it wasn’t until September 1816 that Lord Dalhousie arrived to assume the position. Since the
licence was issued by Lord Dalhousie as Lieutenant Governor, it must have occurred after September 1816,
but before he ceased being Lieutenant Governor in 1820. Furthermore, the licence specifically states, “the
following Lots of Land on which they are respectively settled, […].” However, notwithstanding Lord
Dalhousie’s commencement as Lieutenant Governor in September 1816, the licence likely wasn’t issued
until 1818. This estimated date is based on a similar licence that was granted to the Black Refugees settled
at Refugee Hill, which is dated March 27, 1818. Note, the names appear as listed in the record available at
PANS
online
<https://archives.novascotia.ca/africanheritage/archives/?ID=141&Page=201112295&Transcript=1>.
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division, Unto Brass Hamilton the Lot Number Eleven in said division, Unto Richard Hamilton the Lot
Number twelve in said division, Unto Quack Hamilton the Lot Number thirteen in said division, Unto Pierre
Vance the Lot Number 15 in said division, Unto Peter Piere the Lot Number fifteen in said division, Unto
Newman Brackenbury the Lot Number Sixteen in said division, Unto Joseph Graham the Lot Number
Seventeen in said division, Unto Alexander Cooper the Lot Number Eighteen in said division, Unto Liscomb
Cooper the Lot Number Nineteen in said division, Unto Lonnie Cooper the Lot Number twenty in said
division, Unto Lash La Cort the Lot Number twenty one containing ten acres) Unto George Coppey the Lot
Number twenty two containing ten acres Unto Samuel Jenkins the Lot Number twenty three in said division,
and unto Nero Matthias the Lot Number twenty four in said division. And unto Maringo Butler the Lot
Number one (in the Northern division of ten acre Lots letter B) containing ten acres, Unto Jeffrey Howe the
Lot Number two in said division, Unto John Jenkins the Lot Number three in said division, Unto Patrick
Bailey the Lot Number four in said division, Unto Quack Copper the Lot Number five in said division, Unto
Deal Wiley the Lot Number Six in said division, And unto April Cooper the Lot Number Seven in said division.
Unto Sampson Butler the Lot Number one (in the Southern division of ten acre Lots — letter B) containing
ten acres Unto William Hausman the Lot Number two in said division, Unto Cesar Wiley the Lot Number
three in said division, Unto Joseph Wiley the Lot Number four in said division, Unto Henry Hamilton the Lot
Number five in said division, Unto Reuben Wiley the Lot Number Six in said division. And unto July Cooper
the Lot Number Seven in said division — Unto William Butler the Lot Number one (in the Western division
of ten acre Lots letter A) containing the ten acres — Unto Frances Butler the Lot Number two in said
division, Unto George Gigge the Lot Number three in said division, And unto Joseph Davis the Lot Number
four in said division. – Unto William Butler the Lot Number three (in the Eastern division of ten acre Lots
letter A) containing ten acres, Unto Isaac Butler the Lot Number four in said divisions, Unto William D.
Butler the Lot Number five in said division, Unto Hector Butler the Lot Number Six in said division, Unto
Joseph Butler the Lot Number Seven in said division, Unto John Lee the Lot Number Eight in said division,
Unto George Butler the Lot Number nine in said division and unto Abraham Butler the Lot Number ten in
said division – All which several divisions and Lots of Land aforementioned are a butted and bounded
according to the Plan hereto annexed.
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Appendix E: (1834) Land Grant
[Copy] Land grant to William Day and a number of other Black Refugees at Hammonds
Plains.714
******************
NOVA-SCOTIA.
C. Campbell
WILLIAM the FOURTH, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, King,
Defender of the Faith, and of the United Church of England and Ireland, on Earth the Supreme Head.
TO ALL TO WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME,
GREETING.
KNOW Ye, that We, of our Special grace, certain knowledge and mere motion, have given and granted, and
do by these presents, for Us, our Heirs and Successors, in consideration of the Sum of Sixty pounds Nova
Scotia currency to us paid, Give and Grant unto, William Day, Abraham Smith, Hector Johnson, Cuffee Gray,
Sampson Brown, Jack Harris, S. Hamilton, Gabriel Manigo, Cato Manigo, Andrew Smith, James Ellison,
Joseph Holmes, Newman Brackenbury, Joseph Graham, Thomas Brunt, Charles Jackson, Alexander
Emerson, Lawrence Hamilton, Patrick Bailey, Joseph James, William Marshman, July Cooper, Deal Wiley,
Frederick Davis, Lewis Stewben, Israel Mott, Edward Price, William Marshman Junr., Peter Jenkins and
Reuben Davis, all of Hammonds Plains, in the County of Halifax. People of Colour and severally known by
the names above written. Six hundred acres of land, which said land is situate lying and being contiguous
to the Black Settlement at Hammonds Plains aforesaid, and is contained in five separate allotments marked
B. C. D. E. & F. on the annexed Plan, which said lots of land are abutted and bounded according to said plan
which said lots, pieces and parcels of land is particularly marked and described in the annexed Plan, as also
in a Plan or Survey of the said lots of land made by Titus Smith Deputy Surveyor together with all
Hereditaments and Appurtenances whatever thereunto belonging or in any wise appertaining ; To have and
to hold the said Lots, Pieces and Parcels of Land, and all and singular the premises hereby granted, with
their appurtenances, unto the said Granteees as tenants in common their Heirs and Assigns for ever, they
or them yielding and paying for the same, to Us, our Heirs and Sucessors, one Peppercorn of yearly Rent on
the 25th day of March in each year, or so soon thereafter as the same shall lawfully demanded ; and we do
hereby SAVE and RESERVE to Us, our Heirs and Successors, all and singular the Mines of Gold, Silver, Coal,
Iron Stone, Lime Stone, Slate Stone, Slate Rocks, Tin, Copper, Lead, and all other Mines, Minerals, in or
under the said Land, with full liberty at all times to search and dig for, and carry away, the same and for
that purpose to enter upon the said Land, or any part thereof.
Given under the Great Seal of our said Province of Nova-Scotia. Witness our Trusty and Well-beloved His
Excellency Major General Sir Colin Campbell Th. C. B Lieutenant Governor and Commander in Chief, in and
over our said Province, this twentieth day of October in the fifth year of our Reign, and in the Year of Our
Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and thirty four.
(Duplicate)
Grant to the Blacks

714

20 October 1834 RG 1 Vol 419 Doc 120. Note, the names appear as listed in the record available at
PANS online < https://archives.novascotia.ca/african-heritage/archives/?ID=142>
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Appendix F: (1835) Lot List
[Copy] Report on Lots at Hammonds Plains Nova Scotia Lands and Forests — Crown Lands
series Nova Scotia Archives RG 20 series C volume 88 number 185.715
***********
Sirs
The within is a list of the names who has been regularly settlers by Government in which time I
believe about 24 Families has Settled themselves on lots for which they have no card neither are they
included in this — You will find in the first column the names of the persons who was Settled by Government
in the Second you will find the names of those that now lives on the lot with the number of the lots vacant
and on the third Column you will find the names of the person owning the lot whether vacant or otherwise
— The people are well satisfied to assist in turning the lives wherever it will please you to call upon them.
NB if there should be any other information wanted I shall be very happy to attend to any call from you I
am Sir your most humble servant
Joseph Thomas
Hammonds Plains
June 17th 1835
Hammonds Plains Lots 1835 No. 185
No of Lots in Hammonds Plains
No. of lot
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Originally assigned to
Richard Fitsrie
Joseph Pence
Charles Steward
Henry King
Samuel Butler
Francis Butler
George Gingam
Joseph Davies
Samuel Brown
William March
Ceaser Wily
Joseph Wy
Henry Hamilton
Rubin Wily
July Cooper
March Christopher

By whom occupied
do
William Leigh
none
none
none
none
Mrs. Gingam
none
do
do
do
none
none
Charles Parker
do
none

715

By whom owned
do
do.
Easter Steward
John Butler
William Days
Mrs. Gingam
do
Edwd Brice
do
do
do
Hannah Wily
William Sawyers
do
do
Mrs. Fowler

17 June 1835, PANS, Box – Halifax County Land grants 1787-1835, RG 20 series C volume 88 number 185.
Note, the names appear as listed in the record available at PANS online
<https://archives.novascotia.ca/africanheritage/results/?Search=Joseph+Thomas&SearchList1=all&TABLE1=on>.
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17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Emanuel Griffin
Daniel Goffagan
Lewis Stuban
Robert Cooper
Charles Giggy
Francis Ross
Richard Ross
Scipio Cooper
Alexr Cooper
Alexr Pasco
Robert Hamilton
Richard Hamilton
Kindness Hamilton
John Hamilton
Anthony Hamilton
Shed Hamilton
Henry Hamilton
Rubin Hamilton
Jeremh Johnson
Robt Roe
Godfrey Davis
Benjn Jackson
Sami Cooper
Edd Cup Senr
Squash Cooper
Nearo March
March Movil
John Thomas
Robt Nory
George Coppy
Naseus Lampeat
Leonard Cooper
Lestan Cooper
Alexr Cooper
Joseph Grimes
Newan Brokenberry
Peter Peer
Squash Hamilton
Richd Hamilton
Brass Hamilton
Charles Stubblefield
George Hamilton
Robt Bingly
Duncan Masse
Charles Jackson
Henry Bailey
Francis Grant

none
do
do
Henry Piles
do
none
do
none
none
none
none
none
Rose Hamilton
do
Lawrence Hamilton
do
Esau Jackson
do
do
George Jackson
do
do
do
Edd Cup Junr
none
none
none
none
Thos Brunt
Jesse Parker
none
James Watts
Ester Steward
Phoebe Lee
do
do
none
none
none
none
Esau Jackson
Henry Bailey
none
none
none
none
none
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Deal Wily
do
do
do
do
Agnes Ross
do
Scipio Cooper
Scipio Cooper
Rose Hamilton
Mrs. Jinkins
Lawrence Hamilton
do
do
do
do
do
do
do
do
do
do
do
Saml Cooper
William March
Esau Jackson
Rynah Thomas
do
do
Rynah Thomas
do
do
do
do
do
Rubin Hamilton
Andrew Smith
Liddy Hamilton
Hector Johnson
Abraham Smith
do
Charles Jackson
July Cooper
Charles Jackson
Pompy Bailey
Deal Wily

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Isaac Grant
Brittus McNish
April Cooper
Deal Wily
Quash Cooper
Pat. Bailey
John Jinkins
Jeff ry Howe
Gabriel Butler
Abraham Smith
George Butler
Kato Lee
Joseph Jerry
Hector Johnson
William Days
Isaac Butler
Simon Cochrane
John Butler
Susanah Fowler

none
none
Kato Manago
do
Charles Jackson
do
Joseph James
William Brown
none
do
John Worrell
none
Edward Price
do
do
none
none
do
none
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Isaac Grant
Isaac Grant Junr
do
do
Henry Piles
do
do
Alexr Howe
Gabriel Manago
do
William March
William Arnold
do
do
do
William Days
Simon Cochrane
do
John Butler

